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American Influence on Israel's
Jurisprudence of Free Speech
By

PNINA LAHAV

This is a study of the role played by judicial development of the
First Amendment to the United States Constitution in shaping the ju-

risprudence of free speech in Israel-a country without a bill of rights.
Rivalry and contrast between opposing modes of legal thought, judicial
styles, doctrines, and finally, models of democracy within Israel's
Supreme Court are major themes. Most of the adversarial elements

reflect competing ideas in the intellectual history of American free
speech law. Thus, the tension within Israers Supreme Court reflects
the tension between American free speech jurisprudence as it now is

and as it was in the early decades of the twentieth century.
When Israel gained independence in 1948, its newly established

Supreme Court had little on which to rely in developing constitutional
law. Although a vague commitment to democracy and liberal constitutionalism existed in the new nation, no enlightening debate by the
founding fathers on the nature of the Israeli polity or the content of its
constitutional principles had ever occurred.!

Unlike Britain or the

United States, Israel lacked any significant history of a local political
struggle to attain free speech.2 Furthermore, the legal system that
Israel inherited from the British Mandatory Government offered little

support for a regime of free expression, because that system was largely
authoritarian and suppressive. In creating constitutional law, there3
fore, Israel's Supreme Court looked outward at other legal systems.
In creating its jurisprudence of free speech, the Israeli Court has
1. See generally J. SHAPIRA, DEMOCRACY

IN

ISRAEL

(1977) (in Hebrew); D.

HOROWITZ & M. LISSAK, THE ORIGINS OF THE ISRAELI POLITY

(1977) (in Hebrew); A.

RUBINSTEIN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN ISRAEL (3d ed. 1980) (in Hebrew). [Editor's note:
Unless otherwise noted all materials denoted by "(in Hebrew)" are not available in English.
The author has translated the Hebrew titles of these materials into English for reference
purposes].
2. See generally Lahav, GovernmentalRegulationofthe Press: A Study ofIsrael'sPress
Ordinance (pts. I & 2), 13 ISR. L. REV. 230, 489 (1978) (in English). That does not mean
that claims to free speech were not invoked, but they were closely tied to the political struggle against the British and the Arabs. Suppression of Arab verbal attacks on the legitimacy
of the Jewish enterprise in Israel was not considered illegitimate.
3. See Apelbom, Common Law &L'4mkricaine, 1 ISR. L. REv. 562 (1966) (in English);
Gorney, American Precedentin the Supreme Court of Israel, 68 HARV. L. REV. 1194 (195455).
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developed a deeply ambivalent relationship with American law. A basic similarity between the Israeli and American legal systems makes
transplantation 4 of American law both attractive and feasible. Long
before independence, the Israeli judicial process had been predominantly shaped by the common law.5 Israeli law, therefore, shares with
its United States counterpart a significant volume of legal terminology
and respect for common law techniques of judicial decisionmaking.
Israel further shares the United States' commitment to democracy and
to the values underlying liberal constitutionalism.
Some crucial dissimilarities between the two systems, however,
complicate the feasibility of transplantation. One critical difference is
the supremacy of the Constitution in the United States compared with
the supremacy of the Knesset (Parliament) in Israel. Since Israel has
neither a constitutional text in which freedom of speech is asserted nor
practice of judicial review by which statutes that infringe on that freedom are declared unconstitutional, the power of the Israeli Supreme
Court to transplant American free speech law is considerably less than
the power of the United States Supreme Court that has developed it.
The feature of theoretical authority, however, should not be overemphasized. The barren language of the First Amendment, as important
as it undoubtedly has been, has not by itself created American free
speech law. Rather, its development has been heavily influenced by
contemporary American legal thought, particularly by the ascendance
of sociological jurisprudence over the trend of legal formalism or
mechanical jurisprudence. 6
Styles of judicial opinions are closely connected to these two
schools of thought. Karl Llewellyn's terminology of Grand and Formal Styles illustrates the extremes on the continuum of judicial fashions.7 Opinions leaning toward the Grand Style are those which reflect
sociological jurisprudence, in that they articulate both legal and nonlegal arguments to explain and to justify the decision. Opinions leaning
4. For a definition of transplantation, see text accompanying note 19 infra.
5. Tedeschi & Zemach, Codffcation and Case Law in Israel,in THE ROLE OF JUDICIAL
DECISIONS AND DOCTRINE IN CIVIL LAW AND IN MIXED JURISDICTIONS 272 (J. Dainow ed.

1974).
6. G. WHITE, From Sociological Jurisprudence to Realism: Jurisprudenceand Social
Changein Early Twentieth CenturyAmerica and The Evolution ofReasonedElaboratioir JurisprudentialCriticism andSocialChange, in PATTERNS OF AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT 99,
136 (1978). See also Summers, ProfessorFuller'sJurisprudenceandAmerica'sDominantPhilosophy of Law, 92 HARV. L. REv. 433 (1978). For a discussion of one component of sociological jurisprudence, the method of interest balancing in judicial decisionmaking, see text
accompanying notes 66-111 infra.
7. K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 35-41 (1960).

Fall 19811

Fall 19811

ISRAEL'S JURISPRUDENCE OF FREE SPEECH

toward the Formal Style reflect legal formalism, in that they present the
outcome as "following ineluctably or mechanically from preexisting
rules." 8 In order to transplant American free speech law, therefore,
Israel's Supreme Court had to harbor sympathy for sociological jurisprudence and the Grand Style. Legal formalism, however, strong in
Britain, left its mark on Israeli legal culture. 9 This formalistic trend in
Israel was reinforced by another important factor; many prominent
figures in the legal profession were educated in continental Europe and
brought to Israel their training in conceptualism,' 0 a school of thought
similar to legal formalism.'I On the jurisprudential level, then, the development of Israeli free speech law can be characterized by a rivalry
between sociological jurisprudence and the Grand Style, heavily influenced by American law, on the one hand, and legal formalism and the
Formal Style, on the other.
This tension is manifest at the doctrinal level. American influenced opinions transplanted American free speech doctrines, including
the clear and present danger 2 test and definitional balancing.13 The
Formal Style opinions relied on Lord Kenyon's maxim, dating back to
1799: "[Tihe liberty of the press is dear to England, but the licentiousness of the press is odious to England."' 4 Thus, rivalry also existed
between high (Grand Style) and low (Formal Style) tolerance of free
expression.
Analysis of the doctrines and the justifications advanced for them
exposes still another tension-a tension between the participatory and
8. Shapiro, Appeal, 14 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 629, 652 (1980).
9. The British legacy of legal formalism was a predicament shared by many ex-colohies. See R.

SEIDMAN, THE STATE, LAW AND DEVELOPMENT

31-34 (1978).

10. Conceptualism is the elaboration of legal concepts and categories. The assumption
implicit in this type ofjuristic analysis is similar to legal formalism, Le., that legal concepts
have a fixed and static meaning, hence that law is neutral, objective and apolitical. FRiEDMAN, LEGAL THEORY, 268-70 (1967).
11. Damaska,_4 ContinentalLawyer in an American Law School- Trials and Tribulations
ofAdustment, 116 U. PA. L. REv. 1363 (1968). 1 K. ZWEIGERT & H. KoTz, AN INTRODUCTiON TO COMPARATIVE LAW 133-43, 253 (1977). Notice particularly Zweigert and Kotz's
assertion that schools of sociological jurisprudence, which did develop in France and Germany in the beginning of the twentieth century, "did not have the enormous response in all
areas of legal life which the ideas of Pound and the Realists had in the United States." Id
at 253.
12. See generally text accompanying notes 66-90 infra.
13. See generally text accompanying notes 159-85 infra.
14. Trial of John Cuthell, 27 How. St. Tr. 642 (K.B. 1799). The licentiousness doctrine,
under which the court is deferential to legislative and often times to executive determinations of the limits on free expression, was distilled from this phrase. For a discussion of the
doctrine, see text accompanying notes 189-223 infra.
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the elitist models of democracy. 15 The Grand Style opinions come
closer to the participatory model, whereas the Formal Style opinions
lean toward the elitist model. History is also an important factor in
shaping the political theory used by the Israeli Supreme Court to select
a preferred doctrine of free expression. The Grand Style opinions, perceiving a similarity between the American and Israeli revolts against
colonial oppression, emphasize the struggle against authoritarianism
and seditious libel. The Formal Style opinions, when they invoke extralegal arguments, emphasize recent Jewish history-the fall of the
Weimar Republic and the rise of Naziism, which in turn brought about
the Holocaust-and are less tolerant of speech which is critical of the
nascent government. Thus, the Supreme Court's unintegrated view of
Israeli history is intermittently yet powerfully influential in developing
an indigenous concept of free speech.
These critical perspectives can be productively targeted at two
landmark free speech cases in Israel: Iol-Ha'am v. Ministerof the Interior'6 and Ha'aretz v. Electric Company.'7 These cases provide an historical overview of Israeli free speech jurisprudence from 1953, five
years after independence, when Kol-Ha'am was decided, to 1978, when
the final decision in IBa'aretz was announced. They represent the most
intensive intellectual effort by the court to articulate a theory of free
expression. Moreover, each exposes many facets of the tensions and
themes suggested above. Kol-Ha'am, a unanimous opinion, is an effort
to transplant instantly the entire corpus of First Amendment jurisprudence into Israeli law. In Halaretz, the tensions surface. In the first
round, a two-to-one decision, American law predominated, and the
rule in New York Times v. Sullivan'8 was incorporated into Israeli law.
In the second round, following "further hearing," a four-to-one decision fiercely rejected American law.
Analysis of the cases also provides an opportunity to uncover the
personal factor of individual judicial attitudes in transplantation. Indeed, a precise connection can be drawn between the justices' respective backgrounds and educations and their propensities toward one of
the rivaling modes. This study reviews the opinions of four justices.
15.

C. PATEMAN, PARTICIPATION AND DEMOCRATIC THEORY 1-44 (1970).

16. 7 Piskei Din [P.D.] [Law reports of Israeli Supreme Court] 871 (1953) (in Hebrew).
[Editor's note: The official English translation of Kol-Ha'am appears in I SELECTED JuDoMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF ISRAEL 90 (1948-1953). All subsequent citations to KolHa'am v. Minister ofthe Interior will be made to the official translation only; hereinafter
cited as I SELECTED JUDGMENTS].
17. 31(2) P.D. 281 (1974).
18. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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Two justices, Agranat and Landau, are among the founding fathers of
Israel's Supreme Court. Two justices, Ben-Porath and Shamgar, are
new appointees. The conflicts, however, are both intra- and intergenerational. Justices Agranat and Shamgar opted for Grand Style and
transplantation of American law. Justices Landau and Ben-Porath
opted for Formal Style and rejection of American law.
Finally, the article explores an important concept in comparative
law-transplantation. This author uses transplantation to describe the
complex influence of one legal system over another-from general intellectual influence in the realm of ideas to adoption of a precise doctrine or rule. Transplantation, thus conceived, suffers from a measure
of vagueness, but retains the richness which would be lost if it were
reduced to a particular form or broken into subcategories with technical terms attached to each.
Ordinarily, discussions of transplantation focus on the importation
of statutes from one country to another. Here we see a different
brand-transplantation employed by judges. How is transplantation or
rejection of the donor system brought about?--ie., what methods of
"judicial craftsmanship" are utilized to adopt or reject foreign law?
Further, the sources used for identifying foreign law are reviewed. To
what extent, for instance, is foreign law "discovered" in Supreme Court
opinions or in scholarly works which synthesize or criticize the donor
system? Finally, the quality of transplantation is examined. Is it organic or mechanistic?--e., does it attempt to tie the donor law into the
fabric of the recipient system, or is it mechanical and therefore unlikely
to "take"? What are the effects of transplantation on the development
of indigenous constitutional law? 19
The article has three parts. Part I analyzes the Kol-Ha'am case,
the transplantation of American law into Israel's legal system. Part II
is a discussion of the seeds of the emerging tensions, as they appear in
Kol-Ha'am, and an overview of Israeli free speech decisions between
1953 and 1977. Part III analyzes the sequence of transplantation and
rejection of American law in the Ha'aretz case.
I.

1953-Enter Probable Danger

A. The Case of Kal--Ha'am: A Brief Summation
Kol-Ha'am arose from the ever-prevalent Israeli preoccupation
with foreign relations. In March 1953, the respected daily newspaper,
19. The debate about the feasibility of organic as compared with mechanic transplantation had begun with Montesquieu and continues to this day. See Kahn-Freund, On Uses
and Misuses of Comparative Law, 37 MOD. L. REv. 1 (1974); Watson, Legal Transplantsand
Law Reforr, 92 L. Q. Rnv. 79 (1976).
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Ha'aretz, reported that Mr. Abba Eban, then Israel's Ambassador to
the United States, endorsed a statement by Mr. Henry Morgenthau that
in the eventuality of war between the United States and the Soviet
Union, Israel would supply the United States with a military force of
200,000 troops. Prime Minister Ben-Gurion dismissed the report as a
"journalistic hoax," but Israel's Communist Party seized the occasion.
The Party's two newspapers, one of which was Kol-Ha'am (The People's Voice), published hyperbolic editorials in standard Marxist-Leninist jargon denouncing the "anti-nationalist policy of the Ben-Gurion
government which profiteers in the blood of Israeli youth." 20 Four
days later, the Minister of the Interior suspended publication of the
papers for periods of ten and fifteen days.
The power of suspension rested on section 19 of the Press Ordinance, 1933, which reads in part: "The [Minister of the Interior]...
may, if any matter appearing in a newspaper is, in [his] opinion...
likely to endanger the public peace... suspend the publication...
for such period as he may think fit. .. .
The papers challenged the order in the High Court of Justice.' A
20. 1 SELECTED JUDGMENTS at 90. The article in Kol-Ha'am concluded:
"Despite the anti-Soviet incitement, the masses in Israel know that the Soviet
Union is faithful to the policy of the brotherhood of peoples and peace. The
speeches of Comrades Malenkov, Beria and Molotov have once more confirmed
that. If Abba Eban or anyone else wants to go and fight on the side of the American warmongers, let him go, but go alone. The masses want peace and national
independence, and are not prepared to give up the Negev in return for joining the
'Middle East Command.'
"Let us increase our struggle against the anti-national policy of the BenGurion Government, which is speculating in the blood of Israel youth.
"Let us increase our struggle for the peace and independence of Israel" Id at
93.
Kol-Ha'am was the Communist Party's Hebrew language newspaper. .41-lihad,its
Arabic newspaper, carried an article that concluded:
"And so all forms of surrender by the Ben-Gurion Government, and all her
demonstrations of faithfulness, will not avail her with her American masters; moreover, her economic, political and state bankruptcy, internal and external, are beginning to be revealed to the masses, who have started to understand whither this
Government is dragging them-not only to unemployment, poverty and hunger,
but even to death in the service of imperialism, feeding them as fodder to their war
machine, whilst those masses do not want that fate and will demonstrate their refusal.
"If Ben-Gurion and Abba Eban want to fight and die in the service of their
masters, let them go and fight by themselves. The masses want bread, work, independence and peace, will increase their struggle for those objectives, and will prove
to Ben-Gurion and his henchmen that they will not allow them to speculate in the
blood of their sons in order to satisfy the will of their masters." Id at 93-94.
21. Press Ordinance § 19(2) (1933), reprintedin 2 R. DRAYrON, LAWS OF PALESTINE
1225 (1933) (emphasis added).
22. Israel's Supreme Court serves both as an appellate court and as the High Court of
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unanimous panel of three justices23 overruled the order. Justice
Shimon Agranat, writing for the Court, began by declaring freedom of
expression and freedom of the press to be basic principles of Israers
unwritten constitutional law by virtue of Israel's commitment to democracy. 24 Balancing the interest in free speech against the interest in
national security, he then interpreted the word "likely" in Section 19 to
25
mean "likely to produce probable danger to the public peace."
Rather than remanding the case to the Ministry of the Interior, the
Court itself weighed the probability of danger and concluded that
given the components of the probable danger test, the suspension order
could not stand.26
B. The Recipient System on the Eve of Transplantation
The Press Ordinance was a British Colonial measure, designed
primarily to enable the High Commissioner in Palestine to contain inflammatory Arab incitements against Jews.27 In 1948, when the State
of Israel was inaugurated, the bulk of Mandatory (pre-1948) law, including the Press Ordinance, was recognized as Israeli law.2 8 In Israel,
the suspension power had been used sparsely, yet it was considered a
legitimate executive measure, not antithetical to the country's commitment to democracy and freedom of expression.29
It is surprising that the editors of Kol-Halam decided to challenge
the suspension order. A few weeks earlier, the paper had contested
Justice. In its latter capacity, it handles grievances of private persons against the various
organs of the state as a court of first and last resort. Historically, this curious institution,
which handles thousands of (sometimes trivial) cases per year, was conceived by the British
to prevent adjudication of matters of state by the lower courts and the native judges. In
Israel, it has developed into a powerful and prestigious institution, guarantor of democracy
and the rule of law. Courts Law 5715-1957, at § 7, 11 LAws OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL
[L.S.I.] 157 (1956-1957) (in English) (replacing Palestine Order in Council § 43 (1922), reprinted in 3 R. DRAYTON, LAWS OF PALESTINE 2569, 2579 (1933)). See I. ZAMIR, ADJUDICATION IN ADMINISTRATIVE CASES 80-84 (1975) (in Hebrew), and references therein.
23. Unlike the United States Supreme Court, Israel's highest court typically sits in a
panel of three, Courts Law, 5715-1957, at § 3, 11 L.S.I. 157 (1956-1957). In this case, Justice
Agranat was joined by Justices Sussman and Landau. All three later served as Chief Justice.
24. 1 SELECTED JUDGMENTS at 95-96.
25. Id at 102-03.
26. Id at 120-21.
27. See Lahav, supra note 2, pt. 1, at 230.
28. Law and Administration Ordinance 5708-1948, 1 L.S.I. 7 (1948). Section 11 provides: "The law which existed in Palestine on the 5th Iyar, 5708 (14th May, 1948) shall
remain in force, insofar as there is nothing therein repugnant to this Ordinance or to the
other laws which may be enacted by or on behalf of the Provisional Council of State, and
subject to such modifications as may result from the establishment of the State and its authorities." 1 L.S.I. 11 (1948). See generally A. RUBINSTEIN, supra note 1, at 37-57.
29. See Lahav, supra note 2, pt. 2, at 513-20.
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another suspension order only to be rejected on the grounds that "the
question whether a certain publication endangers the public peace is
delegated under this statute to the Minister of the Interior and not to
this Court." 0
The fresh "precedent," however, was not the most troublesome ob-

stacle. Israel of the early fifties was ambivalent about the doctrine of
stare decisis.3' Even if,as a five-year-old institution, the Israeli
Supreme Court wished to respect its own decisions in order to demon-

strate stability and consistency, to consolidate its reputation, and to
prove its affinity with the common law, it still could distinguish the
previous decision and could justify a different route.32 Instead, the major obstacles were of a more general political and legal nature. As in
30. Kol-Ha'am v. Minister of the Interior, 7 P.D. 165, 166 (1953). Justice Agranat participated in the unanimous decision of the Court, but it is not clear who wrote the opinion.
Paradoxically, this decision may have triggered the subsequent change in judicial policy.
Following the suspension of Kol-Ha'am, a Communist weekly began to appear in higher
frequency. The Minister of the Interior suspended the weekly and responded in the Knesset,
"Ilf [the Parliament member who complained about the suspensions] finds that I acted improperly from a formal-legal point of view, then there is the High Court of Justice; he can
appeal there for revocation of the order. [An appeal to the Court]... had already taken
place once, in connection with the suspension of Kol-Ha'am and he can get approximately
the very same results," quotedin Shapira, Sef-Restraintofthe Supreme Court andthe Preservat/on of Civil Liberties, 2 IYVNEY MISHPAT [Tel Aviv University Law Review] 640, 645
(1973) (in Hebrew). The reference is to the first Kol-Ha'am decision, which was apparently
viewed by the Minister as a carte blanche to order suspensions. Maybe the Supreme Court
had been alarmed by that result and therefore decided to try another approach.
31. Until 1954, the issue of whether or not the doctrine ofstare decisir obtained in Israel
was not resolved. Nothing in the Mandatory Law provided for it, and no Israeli statute
regulated the matter. In 1954, a landmark decision of five justices (among them, Justices
Agranat and Landau) decided that, subject to very minor qualification, the Israeli Supreme
Court (also as High Court of Justice) isbound by its own precedents. Reem v. Minister of
Finance, 8 P.D. 494 (1954). The Court thereby rejected the appeal of the Attorney General
that the Court refrain from adopting a rigid doctrine of stare dec/s/s in Israel. Interestingly,
the opinion that the Attorney General sought to overrule was one of those "comprehensive
and exhaustive" opinions by Justice Agranat, Amsterdam v. Minister of Finance, 7 P.D. 945
(1953). In 1957, § 33 of the Courts Law, see note 22 supra, provided that "[a] rule of law
decided by the Supreme Court binds all courts with the exception of the Supreme Court."
See generally Dror, Some Recent Developments of the Doctrine of Precedent in Israel, in
STUDIES IN ISRAEL LAW 228 (B. Akzin ed. 1958); Tedeschi, On the PrincpleofStare Decisis,
in STUDIES IN ISRAEL LAW 114 (B. Azkin ed. 1960).
32. In the first Kol-Ha'am case, 7 P.D. 165 (1953), the Court merely denied the petition
for temporary order nisi. It could be argued that the Court did not consider carefully the
issue of the limits of the suspension power. Previously, the Court had delivered several
decisions that asserted the right to free expression and free press, see. e.g., Goraly v. Attorney General, 5 P.D. 1017 (1950); Bloy v. Minister of Interior, 4 P.D. 136 (1949). See Lahav,
Freedom of Expression inthe Decisions f the Supreme Court, 7 MISHPATIM [Law Review,
Students and Faculty of Law, Hebrew University of Jerusalem] 375, 381-87 (1977) (in
Hebrew).
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Marbury v. Madison," to which Kol-Ha'am bears a striking resemblance,34 a daring result-revocation of the order-could mean a frontal confrontation between the Court and the government, the

bureaucracy and the political elite.
The government put its case on grounds of national security 3 5 -a
central raw nerve of Israeli being. Not a decade had passed since the
horror of the Holocaust had been revealed; barely five years had passed
since the bloody, desperate war of independence; Israel was subjected

daily to terrorist attacks. To reject the government's judgment that certain expression would jeopardize the young Jewish state was not a task
to be undertaken lightly by this Court. The Cold War, Israel's own
strained relationship with the Soviet Union,3 6 the fact that elsewhere in

the West communist parties were held in disrepute,3 7 and that the
United States Supreme Court had recently reached a judgment38 that
in practical terms amounted to outlawing the American Communist

Party could not invite tolerance by the Israeli Supreme Court. The Israeli bureaucracy, which internalized its predecessor's authoritarian

predisposition and inherited its vast discretionary powers, was already
fidgety about judicial contraction of its powers.3 9 Finally, Israel's elite
33. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
34. The two cases resemble one another both in their central message about constitutional principles and in the craftsmanship of the opinions. For an analysis of Marbury v.
Madison, see A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 1-12 (1962).
35. The Attorney General argued that the articles amounted either to "an obvious call"
to bring about a change in the government's policy through violence, or to "incitement to
disobedience of the law by refusing to carry out the duty of enlistment for military service."
1 SELECTED JUDGMENTS at 120.
36. In November 1952, the Slansky trial was conducted in Prague. In January 1953, a
"conspiracy" by Jewish physicians to murder Stalin was "discovered" in Moscow. Both
episodes were heavily anti-Semitic and anti-Zionist. See generally CZECHOSLOVAK POLITICAL TRIAL 1950-1954 (J. Pelikan ed. 1971). In both, Kol-Ha'am sided with the Soviet position. In February 1953, the Soviet Union severed diplomatic relations with Israel, following
an explosion in its consulate in Tel-Aviv. Between May and October 1953, however, relations with the Soviet Union improved, while relations with the United States cooled. One
commentator has argued that the shift in Israeli-Soviet relations facilitated acceptance of the
decision in the second Kol-Ha'am case by the executive and by public opinion. Shapira,
supra, note 30, 642, 645-46.
37. See generally Sheldon, Constitutionalism and Subversion: A Comparative Study of
Communist Parties and High Courts (1965) (unpublished thesis in Harvard Law School
Library).
38. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
39. I. OLSHAN, LAW AND DELIBERATIONS: MEMOIRS 238-41 (1978) (in Hebrew) (Justice Olshan, retired, was one of the first appointees to the Supreme Court. He served as
Chief Justice between 1954-1965). Generally, these were times of strife between the Israeli
Supreme Court and the government, as each branch struggled to mould the contours of its
powers and responsibilities vis-fi-vis the other branch. See A. RUBINSTEIN, supra note 1, at
232-33. In an extraordinary case in 1951, the authorities proceeded to destroy an Arab vil-
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generally upheld the values of a strong government and of social and
political unity. It was believed, by and large, that only a strong government could contain the danger to national security, assimilate the recently arrived, diverse ethnic communities into "one" Israeli people,
and construct both a durable political structure and a viable economy
on the ruins left by the British and the recent war. Dissent, particularly
hyperbolic and "unconstructive," was not regarded as a virtue and certainly was not worthy of blessing by the Israeli Supreme Court.40
The legal impediments were also discouraging. Clearly, the language of section 19 was calculated to invest wide discretionary power in
the Minister of the Interior and to exclude judicial interference with his
decisions. 4 1 Under these circumstances, a court wishing to protect freedom of the press would need first to assert the constitutional status of
the principle of free expression so as to justify its power over the statutory language and, perhaps, even to assert powers of judicial review so
as to nullify a statute which violates the constitutional principle. Yet
without a written constitution, either to articulate the constitutional
principles or, explicitly or implicitly, to allow for judicial review, "usurpation" of any powers of judicial review was impossible. Within
months after its establishment, in the context of rejecting arguments
that it should nullify statutes which violate Israel's Declaration of Independence, the Court explicitly accepted the doctrine of parliamentary
supremacy.42 By 1953, parliamentary supremacy had hardened into a
major constitutional postulate. Upsetting it was unthinkable, and the
lage despite a standing order by the Israeli Supreme Court to allow the inhabitants to return
to their homes. Id at 170.
40. See generally J. SHAPIRA, supra note 1.
41. Lahav, supra note 2, at 509-11.
42. The first part of the Declaration of Independence asserted the right of the Jewish
people to its homeland. The second part asserted a commitment to representative democracy. The third part declared a commitment to civil and political rights and read:
"The STATE OF ISRAEL will be open for Jewish immigration and for the Ingathering
of the Exiles; it will foster the development of the country for the benefit of all its inhabitants; it will be based on freedom, justice and peace as envisaged by the prophets of Israel; it
will ensure complete equality of social and political rights to all its inhabitants irrespective
of religion, race or sex; it will guarantee freedom of religion, conscience, language, education
and culture; it will safeguard the Holy Places of all religions; and it will be faithful to the
principles of the Charter of the United Nations."
The contention that the Declaration had normative constitutional powers was rejected
in two of the first cases to be decided by the Court. Ziv v. Gubernik, 1 P.D. 85, 89 (1948);
Alkarboutly v. Minister of Defense, 2 P.D. 5 (1948). It is worth emphasizing that at that
time the Court, like many people in Israel, expected that a constitution would be adopted
shortly. Albert, ConstitutionalAdudiation Without a Constitution: The Case of Israel, 82
HARV. L. REV. 1245 (1969). See also Nimmer, The Uses ofJudicialReview in Israel'sQuest
for a Constitution, 70 COLUM. L. REv. 1217 (1970).
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Court appeared to embrace it earnestly.43
Even the absence of judicial review, however, was not crucial. The
Court could still construe section 19 in a way which would considerably contract the suspension powers. The availability of a legitimate
constitutional principle of free expression, which would justify such
statutory construction, was crucial. In the absence of a written constitution, the Israeli Supreme Court had to "create" the principle, and the
difficulties of so doing were remarkable. The Declaration of Independence could be, and, as will be shown, was invoked, but it had already
been stigmatized as lacking authoritative power. 44 Further, as a result
of the undisturbed continuity between Mandatory and Israeli law, the
content of Israeli public law was largely authoritarian. It provided for
a very strong administration, with every conceivable legal power to
snuff out any flame of liberty if the government wished to do so. For
example, censorship, seditious libel, limitation on the right to demonstrate, and administrative detention were all part of the positive law.45
Hence, it was impossible for the Court to distill a tradition of "fundamental liberties" from within its own legal system. Furthermore, there
were few doctrinal tools for narrowly construing the broad statutory
powers of section 19. 4
This lack of internal limiting doctrines was compounded by the
43. There had been a possibility of recognizing limited judicial review, which would
screen only Mandatory legislation. Such limited review would avoid confrontation with the
Knesset, since it would not extend to genuine Israeli legislation. Law and Administration
Ordinance 5708-1948, 1 L.S.I. 11 (1948), see note 28 supra. It had, moreover, the advantage
of authoiity derived explicitly from an Israeli statute. Yet even this limited review had been
rejected previously by the Court, which preferred an orthodox version of parliamentary
supremacy. It could be argued that statutes which were fundamentally undemocratic could
not survive in democratic Israel. The Court rejected such interpretation in the same group
of cases where the validity of the Declaration of Independence was disposed with. In Lyon
v. Gubernik, I P.D. 58, 69 (1948), the Court held that the "changes" stipulated by § 11 are
technical only, ie., those "which do not necessitate the particular discretion required by the
question if to drop a statute from the existing statutory system." The interpretation of § I1
was modified years later. Hougim Leoumiyim v. Minister of Police, 24(2) P.D. 141 (1968).
44. In fact, the Declaration of Independence does not guarantee freedom of expression.
In a debate about the Declaration in the Provisional State Assembly the representative of
the Communist Party suggested the addition of freedom of the press and assembly to the
Declaration. Prime Minister Ben-Gurion responded: "This is not a constitution; there shall
be a constitution separately." Protocolsofthe State ProvisionalCouncil 20 (May 14, 1948)
(in Hebrew).
45. Defense Emergency Regulations arts. 86-93 (Censorship), art. 111 (Administrative
Detention) (1945), reprintedin PALESTINE GAZETrE, no. 1063 (Supp. 11 1945). Criminal
Code Ordinance arts. 59-60 (Seditious Libel), arts. 79-80 (Demonstrations) (1936) reprinted
in PALESTINE GAZETTE no. 652 (Supp. I 1936).
46. At that time, there was no consistent line at the Supreme Court regarding broad
administrative powers. Some decisions contained embryonic efforts to form limiting doctrines, Alkarboutly v. Minister of Defense, 2 P.D. 5 (1948). Others had no difficulty in

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

Wol. 9.21

dependence of the Israeli legal system on British law. Israeli public law
was promulgated in English and used British legal terminology. Statutes explicitly referred to British law as a tool of interpretation, and the
Mandatory charter for Palestine stipulated that lacunae in local law
should be filled with "principles of common law and equity."'4 7 Not
only was reliance on British law legitimate, but bench and bar were
psychologically conditioned to it. The Israeli Court would look reflexively to Britain for guidance in limiting the powers of the Minister of
Interior to suspend newspapers. a8 The problem was that while the
English legal system was relatively free of the oppressive Mandatory
statutes, it was equally barren of more general doctrines about the legitimate limitation of speech in a democracy.4 9
These barriers were critical. Legitimacy was involved: By what
authority could the justices of the Israeli Supreme Court legilimately
import American law? Pride was involved: Should revived Israel imitate foreign sources, or should it develop its own independent tools,
based on Jewish/Israeli heritage? Practicality was involved: Who
knew enough American law to master the intricacies of doctrine?
C. Justice Agranat: An Anatomy of Transplantation, Grand Style
Kol-Ha'am is the story of how the Israeli Supreme Court confronted, skirted and resolved much of the complexity described above
and emerged with the doctrine of probable danger. It is also the story
of the man who wrote the opinion-Justice Shimon Agranat--the person who had the proper background, craftsmanship, courage, and creativity to write the Israeli version of a judicial opinion, Grand Style.
Karl Llewellyn defined the Grand Style as a "way of thought and
work, not. . . of writing. ' 50 In it he saw a judicial strategy of developing, sometimes changing, doctrine, while at the same time maintaining
a "touch with the past," a "craft-conscious mood," and "a clean line." 5 1
In other words, a style which allows for policy oriented, sometimes radical, results, while retaining conservative judicial tactics.5 2 Writing in
sanctioning the broad discretionary powers of the executive, Ziv v. Gubernik, 1 P.D. 85, 89
(1948).
47. See generally Friedmann, Infusion of the Common Law Into the Legal Sys em f
Israel, 10 ISR. L. REV. 324, 357-77 (1975).
48. See generally Friedmann, Independent Development ofIsraeliLaw, 10 IsR. L. REV.
515, 516-36 (1975). But see references there for deviation of the Israeli Court from British
precedents.
49. See H. STREET, FREEDOM, THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE LAW 201-37 (1972).
50. K. LLEWELLYN, supra note 7, at 36.

51. Id
52. Id
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the Grand Style, therefore, requires a judge whose jurisprudence recognizes the policymaking function in judicial decisionmaking, but who, at
the same time, masters the specific technique through which judicial
policy is legitimately constructed. To these qualities should be added
two which are unique to a study of transplantation: intimate familiarity with the donor system and the ability to assimilate organically its
spirit and its techniques into the recipient system. Justice Agranat was
the person for the task.
Born and educated in the United States, he felt at home with both
its language and culture. A 1929 graduate of the University of Chicago
Law School,53 his legal education was distinguished and distinctively
American. In law school, he was exposed to the revolutionary trend in
American legal thought away from legal formalism and toward sociological jurisprudence.5 4 His American background had also made him
sensitive to the importance of free speech for a viable democracy,
which may help explain his concern about the growing signs of governmental intolerance toward minority views55 and his resulting strategy
to anchor an elaborate conception of free expression in Israel's legal
system.
His legal training was broad and rich. In Palestine,56 he served
both as a magistrate and as district court judge. He was among the first
to be recruited to Israel's Supreme Court after independence. Justice
Agranat was therefore intimately familiar with the three relevant legal
systems: the American, the English,57 and the Israeli (the former Palestinian). His judicial experience gave him a keen eye for the intricacies
of judicial decisionmaking and an understanding of the common law
techniques of legal reasoning.
Finally, Justice Agranat possessed a sense of mission-to build a
solid body of case law suitable for making the dream of a free demo53. WHO'S WHO IN ISRAEL (Eng. ed. 1978).
54. In the early twenties, the University of Chicago Law School was known for its departure from pure law and formalism in legal education. The basic premise of the curriculum was that "[a] scientific study of law involves the related sciences of history, economics,
philosophy--the whole field of man as a social being." F. ELLSWORTH, LAW ON THE MIDWAY 93 (1977). In an August 1980 discussion with the author, Justice Agranat acknowledged being influenced by Professor Ernst Freund, a leader of the social jurisprudence
school of thought. See also note 181 infra.
55. In the early fifties, official intolerance applied both to the political left, see Shapira,
supra note 30, and to the right, eg., Sheib v. Minister of Defense, 5 P.D. 399 (1950).
56. He immigrated to Palestine in 1930.
57. Because of the open pipeline to the British legal system, a Palestinian as well as an
Israeli judge had to develop a high degree of familiarity with English law. See notes 47-48
and accompanying text supra.
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cratic Jewish homeland come true.5 8 Many of his decisions are essays,

spelling out Israeli law clearly, extensively and methodically so as to
educate the bench, the bar and the people. Kol-Ha-am is but one ex59
ample of his legacy.
The decision in Kol-Ha'am has three parts. The first presents the

philosophical justifications for freedom of expression and clearly demonstrates Justice Agranat's ability to probe beyond the formal realm of
the law and to comprehend and to state the relevant principles from

political philosophy. 60 The third part of the opinion relates doctrine to

the factual situation and revokes the suspension order. It is in the second part of the opinion-the subject of this chapter-that his judicial
talents shine. In it, the complicated task of transplantation is
performed.
The transplantation undertaken by Justice Agranat was performed
in three steps. First, he imported the approach of interest balancing

from American law. 6 1 Next, he imported a specific doctrine, probable
danger, a diluted version of the clear and present danger formula,62 as
the correct definitional principle of interest balancing. In passing, Justice Agranat also managed to incorporate two other major First
Amendment doctrines: the doctrine against prior restraint and the doc-

trine against seditious libel. Finally, in the postdoctrinal phase, he responded to the judicial and scholarly critique of the clear and present

63
danger test by providing a set of guidelines for his preferred doctrine.
A particularly interesting feature of the transplantation is the
58. The other members of the Court shared this sense of mission. See I. OLSHAN, supra
note 39, at 215.
59. See Feller, Foreword, and Cohn, On Shimon Agranat, in 7 MISHPATiM 369, 371
(1977) (in Hebrew). Upon independence there was very little genuine Israeli law. Judicial
opinions that purported to "discover" and "summarize" Israeli law amounted to judicial
lawmaking.
60. He first presented the justification from democracy: "[IThe people ... are entitled
.. . at any time to scrutinize... [the rulers'] political acts, whether with the object of
correcting those acts and making new arrangements in the state, or with the object of bringing about the immediate dismissal of the 'rulers,' or their replacement as a result of elections." 1 SELECTED JUDGMENTS at 95. Second, he presented the justification of the search
for truth and the role played by a free marketplace of ideas in this process. Id at 96. Third,
he presented the individual's interest in self-fulfillment through expression. Id at 97.
61. See G. WHITE, supra note 6; Tushnet, Truth, Justice and the American Way: An
InterpretationofPublic Law Scholarshp in the Seventies, 57 Tax. L. Rav. 1307, 1321 (1979).
62. As announced by Chief Justice Vinson's plurality opinion in Dennis v. United
States, 341 U.S. 494, 510 (1951). Apparently, Justice Agranat felt a need to compensate for
the absence of a developed constitutional history and tradition by assimilating the entire
American jurisprudence of the First Amendment.
63. Interestingly, First Amendment jurisprudence was imported under the umbrella of
statutory and administrative law, and thereby the principle of parliamentary supremacy was
preserved. See note Ill and accompanying text infra.
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sources used to locate the substantive material. United States Supreme
Court decisions were generously cited, but the dominant influence was

scholarly. The jurisprudential and doctrinal sections bear the mark of
Zechariah Chafee, Jr.'s book, Free Speech in the UnitedStates.'r The

postdoctrinal section was clearly influenced by Elliot Richardson's critique of Dennis v. UnitedStates. 5
The method employed is fascinating. First, the scholarly influence
is hidden behind a barrage of case law. Second, mindful of Israeli legal

culture's suspicion of foreign sources other than English law, Agranat
was careful to interweave American and English precedents. English

case law was displayed in strategic comers, in order to convey an appearance of reliance upon it. In crucial links of his legal reasoning,
where the ratio decidendi was presented, English law gave way to Israeli precedents and statutes, thus implying the local authenticity of the
holding. All in all, Kol-Ha'am is a fine example of creative transplan-

tation, Grand Style.
The complexity of transplantation in its three substantive phases is
traced below. Also discussed within each phase are the sources relied

upon and the technique of transplantation.
D. Jurisprudence: Interest Balancing as the Correct Method to Define
the Limitations on Speech
1. The Substantive Material Transplanted
The foundations for the American jurisprudence of free speech
were being laid 66 when Justice Agranat was a student in law school. At
Harvard, Professor Chafee utilized both Roscoe Pound's sociological
jurisprudence and his more specific efforts in the area of free speech to
construct a theory for the First Amendment.67 The theory was
64. Z. CHAFEE, JR., FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES (2d ed. 1969). The book was
first published in 1920 under the title FREEDOM OF SPEECH. At that time, Chafee did not
adopt the clear and present danger test, but did use the jurisprudential approach of interest
balancing. Justice Agranat relied on the second edition.
65. 341 U.S. 494 (1951); see Richardson, Freedom of Expression and the Function of
Courts, 65 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1951).
66. The efforts took place at both the judicial and academic levels. See Auerbach, The
Patricianas Libertarian: Zechariah Chafee, Jr., and Freedom of Speech, 42 NEW ENG. Q.
511 (1969); Ragan, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Zechariah Chafee, Jr., and the Clear
andPresent Danger Yestfor Free Speech: The First Year, 1919, 58 J. AM. HIST. 24 (1971).
But see Anderson, he FormativePeriodof FirstAmendment Theory, 1870-1915, 24 AM. J.
LEGAL HIsT. 56 (1980). Indeed, American positive law at that time was by and large unsympathetic to dissenting expression, yet there began a growing awareness that the bad tendency
test was incompatible with the justifications for free speech, and a search was under way to
give broader meaning to the First Amendment.
67. See Auerbach, supra note 66, for a discussion of Pound's influence on Chafee. In
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presented in the first chapter of Chafee's seminal book, Free Speech in
the United States.6" Thirty-three years later, Justice Agranat used the

theory of this chapter to adopt interest balancing in Israel.
Chafee began his theory with two basic premises: that freedom of
expression played a significant role in the American polity and that, as
a legal principle, it was not absolute.6 9 He then proceeded with an his-

torical inquiry. He examined two doctrines that were historically employed to distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate speech: the
Blackstonian doctrine against prior restraint and the "licentiousness
doctrine," which distinguished between liberty and license.7 0 Although
both were utilized by American courts well into the twentieth century,7 '
Chafee rejected them as inconsistent with the central message of the
First Amendment. The limitations on speech, he asserted, can be correctly discerned only by carefully balancing the societal interests involved, a process which would yield a "rational principle."7 2 Because
Chafee's immediate task was to assess the constitutionality of the Espionage Act, he posited the societal interests involved in the defense of

free expression against the interest in national security. The process of
balancing these interests yielded the "rational principle," clear and
present danger.7 3
the first chapter of Z. CHAFEE, JR., FREEDOM OF SPEECH (1920), Pound is mentioned twice.
Id at 8 n.9, 35 n.73. The latter reference is of particular interest because there Chafee
invokes both John Chipman Gray and Roscoe Pound in his attack on legal formalism and
his adoption of sociological jurisprudence: "It must never be forgotten that the balancing
cannot be properly done unless all the [individual social] interests involved are adequately
ascertained, and the great evil of all this talk about rights is that each side is so busy denying
the other's claim to rights that it entirely overlooks the human desires and needs behind that
claim." Id at 35. See also text accompanying notes 314, 335-37 iqfra.
68. This was the book's title in the revised edition. See note 64 supra. The following
analysis refers to the 1941 edition, which was used by Justice Agranat.
69. Z. CHAFEE, supra note 64, at 3.
70. Id at 8-14.
71. Id at9.
72. "The true boundary line of the First Amendment can be fixed only when Congress
and the courts realize that the principle on which speech is classified as lawful or unlawful
involves the balancing against each other of two very important social interests, in public
safety and in the search for truth." Id at 35. See also id at 8, 32-34. Because the term
"rational principle" was used by Chafee himself and was later adopted by Justice Agranat, it
will also be used in this essay. The contemporary equivalent would probably be an "accommodating principle" under the "principled balancing" or the "definitional balancing"
approaches.
73. Id at 35: "[T]he great interest in free speech should be sacrificed only when the
interest in public safety is really imperiled, and not, as most men believe, when it is barely
conceivable that it may be slightly affected. In war time, therefore, speech should be unrestricted by the censorship or by punishment, unless it is clearly liable to cause direct and
dangerous interference with the conduct of the war."
In his first edition, Chafee did not recommend the clear and present danger test, yet he
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Justice Agranat followed the same route, but he zigzagged along
the way. He opened by transplanting Chafee's two basic premises into

Israeli soil-freedom of speech is a living part of a free, democratic

Israel, but that freedom is not absolute. 74 He then came to the heart of
Chafee's analysis. Here, some interesting departures from Chafee's ap-

proach provide an insight into the intricate dynamics of transplantation. The licentiousness doctrine and the doctrine against prior
restraint,7" both rejected by Chafee as inadequate, were absorbed as
organic parts of Israeli law. As if logic required, and as if no chimera 76

was thereby created, the balancing approach was joined, Chafee's societal interests were weighed, and the "rational principle" was found:
probable danger to national security.
Justice Agranat began by incorporating the licentiousness doctrine
into Israeli law and then proceeded to analyze "licentiousness" in terms
of societal interests: "There is a difference between freedom and license. . . . IT]hat is to say, that certain interests also require protec-

tion and for the sake of these it is essential to place clear limits on the
right to freedom of expression."7 7 What are the interests to be protected? Justice Agranat distilled a list from the Israeli Criminal Code
Ordinance of 193678 and concluded: "We do not intend to exhaust the

list of those interests, and we shall mention only the most important of
them, namely, the interest . . .[of] 'state security.'-"9 Thus, having
placed the Court one hundred-eighty degrees from Chafee, Justice

Agranat carefully navigated back again, using as his compass the interdid utilize the balancing approach and the quest for a rational principle. See Gunther,
Learned Hand and the Origins of Modern FirstAmendment Doctrine: Some Fragments of
History, 27 STAN. L. REv. 719 (1975).
74. 1 SELECTED JUDGMENTS at 98. "Nevertheless, the right to freedom of expression
does not mean that a person is entitled to proclaim, by word of mouth or in writing, in the
ears or eyes of others, whatever he feels like saying." Id Cf.Z. CHAFEE, supra note 64, at 3
("This book is an inquiry into the proper limitations upon freedom of speech, and is in no
way an argument that any one should be allowed to say whatever he wants anywhere and at
any time").
75. The incorporation of the doctrine against prior restraint appears later in the decision. I SELECTED JUDGMENTS at 106. It is mentioned here to provide a complete comparison with Chafee's analysis.
76. For a discussion of the relationship between licentiousness and balancing, see text
accompanying notes 189-200 infra.
77. 1 SELECTED JUDGMENTS at 98.
78. One interest of this kind was previously hinted at: the need for protecting the good
name of the citizen, Criminal Code Ordinance §§ 201 & 202 (1936). Other kinds of interests
requiring the raising of a barrier against the effect of statements are: the securing of a fair
trial and the doing of justice to parties before the courts, id at §§ 126 & 127; the prevention
of outrage to religious feelings id at § 149; and the prohibition of obscene publications
which offend against moral values, id at § 179. See 1 SELECTED JUDGMENTs at 98.
79. Id
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est in national (state) security. This interest begot a lengthy analysis.
Despite its extreme importance for society, excessive patriotic zeal
could result in an unjustified suppression of ideas. Against national
security Justice Agranat juxtaposed freedom of expression, emphasizing that beyond its individual value in permitting self-fulfillment, this
freedom is of "great social value .. .add[ing] to the efficacy of the
democratic process. ' '8° In conclusion, he quoted from Justice Frankfurter's opinion in Dennis: "[I]t would be a major defeat if the enemies
of democracy forced us to abandon our faith in the power of informed
discussion and so brought us down to their own level."'"
The ground prepared, Justice Agranat performed a powerful tour
deforce. One page earlier, the licentiousness doctrine was incorporated into Israeli law, and national security was a valid interest under
this very doctrine. Now, the analysis of national security completed
and its relationship to freedom of expression explicated, a doctrinal
shift occurred. Under the guise of an innocent and descriptive summary of the previous discussion, the balancing approach was introduced: "So far, we have dealt with the problem in a general way, and
have establishedthat the solution must come by weighing the interests of
state securit ...againstfreedom of expression .. 82
Justice Agranat was mindful of the tension created by his shift to
interest balancing. The licentiousness doctrine concerns the legitimacy
of legislative discretion to limit liberty of expression. In spirit, at least,
it implies legislative discretion to delegate broad discretionary powers
to the executive, particularly in the area of national security where executive claims of special expertise are frequent. Interest balancing, by
contrast, necessarily implies a more active judicial role in safeguarding
the principle of free expression. 83 If licentiousness is the prevailing
80. Id at 101. See also Chafee's distinction between the social and individual interest
in free speech, supra note 64, at 33, and his conclusion: "The great trouble with most judicial construction of the Espionage Act is that this social interest has been ignored and free
speech has been regarded as merely an individual interest, which must readily give way like
other personal desires the moment it interferes with the social interest in national safety," id
at 34.
81. 1 SELECTED JUDGMENTS at 101. In fact, Agranat quotes Sir William Haley, Director of the British Broadcasting Corporation, quotedin Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494,
concurring).
553-54 (1951) (Frankfurter, J.,

82. 1 SELECTED

JUDGMENTS

at 101 (emphasis added).

83. In a system that has a written constitution and recognizes the powers of judicial
review, the tension between interest balancing and licentiousness is accentuated, since the
legislature does not have discretion to limit free expression for whatever reason it wants.
But the tension is still forceful where legislative supremacy obtains, because interest balancing lifts the veil of limitations on expression and requires a probing inquiry into the weight
of the principles and considerations involved.
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doctrine, why not allow the Minister of the Interior to combat "license"

wherever he sees it?
Justice Agranat had already begun to resolve this tension by excising national security from the other interests.84 Other interests, regulated by the Criminal Code Ordinance, did not invite judicial
balancing, since the Code contained a "clear and defined" balancing
formula for their protection." National security, when it conflicted
with free speech, produced a particularly "complicated" situation, and
thus warranted more judicial attention. 6 He then adjusted Chafee's
First Amendment analysis to the Israeli system, where parliamentary
supremacy prevailed:
[S]ometimes the legislator leaves the discretion. . . [to the] Executive . . . . [Then] the question must inevitably arise (particu-

larly because that approach does embody a concise, narrow
formula), as to what is the rationalprinciplethat ought to guide
the Executive when engaged in the aforementioned process, in
order to settle the question in favour of one or other of the two
interests.87
Finally, Justice Agranat connected his theory of judicial control to
the text of section 19, which allowed the Minister of the Interior to
suspend a newspaper if in his opinion it was "likely to endanger the
public peace." 8 Agranat omitted any reference to "in his opinion" and
posed the following question: "[WIhat is the test which the Minister
. . . should apply when he comes to decide whether the material that

has been published is 'likely to endanger the public peace'. . .?"9 The
decisive legal issue was then further reduced to the interpretation of
"likely," an interpretation which miraculously coincided with the
"probable danger" formula of Dennis v. United States.90
84. See text accompanying note 79 supra.
85. 1 SELECTED JUDGMENTS at 99.
86. "mT1he tests. . . [for other interests] . . . are. . . clear and defined. . . . But in
speaking of the 'balancing' of the interests involved in maintaining. . . security on the one
hand, and preserving.. . freedom of expression... the process of weighing up competing
interests becomes more complicated." Id at 99 (emphasis added). See Z. CHAFEE, supra
note 64. "[E]ven in war time freedom of speech exists subject to aproblematicallimit." Id
at 8 (emphasis added).
The word "complicated" in Agranat's text is the choice of the translator from Hebrew,
it could also be translated to "problematic." A counterargument could be as persuasive:
The "problematic" nature of the balancing makes it more suitable for legislative, rather than
judicial, discretion.

87. 1 SELECTED

JUDGMENTS

at 101 (emphasis added).

88. Id at 102.
89. Id
90. 341 U.S. 494, 509-10 (1951). Compare the formula in Dennis with the test articulated in Kol-Ha'am, 1 SELECTED JUDrMENTs at 102-03.
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The Process of Transplantation

Both the process and the substance of the transplantation in KolHa'am pose problems. First, there is the issue of the sources. Sociological jurisprudence and interest balancing were major intellectual
trends, widely discussed in the legal literature. Was the importation of
interest balancing merely a general flow of ideas from one culture to
another, or was there a particular American source which actually influenced the Israeli analysis? If the latter, what American source most
influenced this section--Chafee's work or United States Supreme
Court decisions? Second, what methodology applied in using the foreign sources and why was it so employed? 9 1
That ideas flow from one culture to another is a truism. Justice
Agranat must have been familiar with the general tenets of sociological
jurisprudence and did not need an actual source to lead him in this
direction. 92 Indeed, in the section just reviewed, Chafee was cited only
once, in the context of analyzing the interest in national security and in
connection with a marginal point.9 3 Yet beyond the general influence,
beyond the structural similarity between Chafee's and Agranat's analyses, Chafee's words ring throughout the Israeli decision. For example,
compare Chafee's description of the licentiousness doctrine94 with that
by Agranat. Chafee said, "A statement of the same view . . . was
made by Judge Hamersley of Connecticut: 'Freedom of speech and
press does not include the abuse of power of tongue andpen, any more
than freedom of other action includes an injurious use of one's occupation, business, orproperty. . . .,
Agranat changed the order of the
sentences: "[J]ust as the right to freedom of action in other fields does
not extend to the use of a man's freedom of profession, business orproperty in a manner injurious to others, so also the right to freedom of
speech and the press does not entail the abuse of the power of the
tongue or thepen."96 Also, compare each author's analysis of the socie91. The latter part of this question is generally related to the choice between the two
broad models-the organic and the mechanical models of transplantation. See text accompanying note 104 infra.
92. See note 54 supra.
93. "In his important book, Freedom of Speech in the U.S.A. [sic] Professor Chafee
severely criticizes the Federal Courts in the United States for being led away into such error
when interpreting the Espionage Act during the First World War." 1 SELECTED JUD,MENTS at 101.
94. An interesting question, central to our study of doctrinal transplantation, is whether
or not Agranat understood that Chafee was rejecting the licentiousness doctrine. For a discussion of this issue, see note 189 infra.
95. Z. CHAFEE, supra note 64, at 12 (emphasis added).
96. 1 SELECTED JUDGMENTS at 98 (emphasis added).
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tal interest in national security and its relationship to freedom of expression. Chafee said, "[L]et us recognize the issue as a conflict
between two vital principles, and endeavor to find the basis of reconciliation between order and freedom . . even in war time freedom of
speech exists subject to aproblematicallimit . . . ,"' and "[Tlhe great

interest in free speech should be sacrificed only when the interest in
public safety is really imperiled.""8 Justice Agranat said, "But in speaking of the 'balancing' of the interests involved in maintaining state security on the one hand, and preserving the principle of freedom of
expression on the other, this process of weighing up competing interests
becomes more complicated,"99 and "that the great social value of the
principle which protects the latter interests is worthy of particular attention; and that preferring that former interest is justifiable only when
the situation definitely calls for it."" Finally, compare their attitudes
concerning the quest for a rational principle. Chafee wrote, "The question whether such perplexing cases are within the First Amendment
...[can be solved] only by the development of a rationalprincopleto
mark the limits of constitutional protection." 10 1 Justice Agranat wrote,
"But sometimes the legislator leaves the discretion in this field in the
hands of others . . .the question must inevitably arise (particularly

because that approach does embody a concise, narrow formula),
as to what is the rationalprinc#ile that ought to guide the Executive
",102

It seems clear that the source which influenced Justice Agranat
most in incorporating the interest balancing approach was not specific
American case law, but Chafee's scholarly work. Transplantation,
therefore, did not amount to incorporation of positive law from one
system to another but to legal thought. Perhaps Justice Agranat was
uncomfortable with this consequence, since while Chafee was hardly
acknowledged, this part of the decision was peppered with a variety of
97. Z. CHAFEE, supra note 64, at 8 (emphasis added).
98. Id at 35 (emphasis added).
99. 1 SELECTED JUDGMENTs at 99 (emphasis added).
100. Id at 101 (emphasis added).
101. Z. CHAFEE, supra note 64, at 15 (emphasis added).
102. 1 SELECTED JUDGMENTS at 101 (emphasis added). Compare Z. CHAFEE, supra note
64, asserting the importance of breaking away from legal formalism in a quotation of
Holmes: "The provisions of the Constitution are not mathematicalformulashaving their
essence in their form; they are organic living institutions transplanted from English soil," id
at 30, with Agranat, adjusting it to the doctrine of parliamentary supremacy: "It is clear that
this approach by itself does not amount to a mathematical formula which can be accurately
adapted to every single occasion. The legislator does, in point of fact, sometimes do the
work of weighing and balancing by himself, that is, he himself determines in advance the
kind of material that is not to be published," 1 SELECTED JUDGMENTs at 101.
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sources, many of which appeared in Chafee's first chapter.0 3
There may be, however, a deeper explanation for the internal
structure and methodology of citation. Justice Agranat's probable discomfort with acknowledging the influence of foreign scholarship
reveals both his conception of how Israeli constitutional law should be
formed and his ability to manipulate the techniques of common law
judicial decisionmaking. The "clean" appearance of the licentiousness
and balancing doctrines, stripped of almost all foreign reference, reflect
his view of Israeli law as a national creation which should be independent of, not parasitic on, foreign sources. It reflects an effort to make
transplantation organic, not mechanical. Justice Agranat apparently
wished to educate bench and bar in the methods of receiving foreign
law. Israeli law could learn from foreign sources, but it would form its
doctrines independently.' ° 4
There may also have been a tactical dimension to this structure.
Since the analysis led to a novel doctrine-the limitation of executive
discretion by judicially imposed standards in the sensitive area of national security-it needed to be cemented to conventional Israeli law in
a way which would preempt criticism. Reliance on foreign sources,
particularly American, would have invited the charge that the Court
was making, not applying, law. In a judicial system heavily influenced
by legal formalism, this would have been a charge of some significance.
Hence the licentiousness doctrine was "discovered" in Israeli law, and
Israeli precedents and statutes were invoked. This respectable, seemingly conservative attire was needed in order to perform the task which
lay ahead.
In announcing his doctrine of limited executive discretion, Justice
Agranat was confronting not only the most dangerous branch-the executive-in an area where it universally claims expertise, but he was
also facing problems from within the legal system. His argument certainly was not watertight. First, it was not clear why the interest in
national security deserved a different treatment from that accorded
other interests such as the right to reputation or the right to a fair
103. E.g Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951); Schenk v. U.S., 249 U.S. 47
(1918); Ronnfeldt v. Phillips, 35 T.L.R. 46 (C.A. 1918).
Furthermore, in presenting the licentiousness doctrine, Justice Agranat used Israeli
sources, with the single exception of his reference to Lord Kenyon. I SELECTED JUDGMENTS
at 98. His analysis of national security and its relationship to free expression was a collection of early twentieth century English and United States Supreme Court decisions. Id at
100-01. The balancing approach and the search for a rational accommodating principle
appeared incognito-as if logically derived from the previous discussion. See id at 101.
104. But see Lupu, Untangling the Strands of the Fourteenth 4mendment, 77 MICH. L.
Rv. 981, 1045 (1979).
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trial.10 5 The fact that balancing was "complicated" did not explain
why it should be self-delegated to the judiciary, nor why the legislative
judgment1 6 that the executive would best be able to do the balancing
should not be honored."0 7 Further, in emphasizing that the Criminal
Code Ordinance of 1936 provided for a "clear and defined" test to balance free expression with other societal interests, Justice Agranat ignored its provisions about national security, which also contained
"clear and defined" tests.
Justice Agranat's seeming loyalty to statutes and precedents
helped befog the gaps in his argument and thereby deter criticism.
Moreover, his historical survey of the dangers that an overzealous care
for security had posed to two of the most revered democracies-England and the United States-served as a tactful warning to the Israeli
government and was geared to disarm any contention that the issue of
national security should be excluded from judicial intervention.108 In
addition, his scientific, 0 9 logical and legally grounded analysis was
designed to force the executive to swallow the change in the status quo
ante.1 °0 Finally, Justice Agranat cleverly neutralized one front: the
legislature. He stopped short of positivizing the principle of free ex105. See note 78 supra.
106. There is a complicating factor here, since the relevant law (Press Ordinance) was
passed by the High Commissioner in Palestine, who possessed both executive and legislative
powers. See Palestine Order in Council art. 17 (1922), as amended by Palestine [Amend.]
Order in Council § 3 (1923), reprintedin 3 R. DRAYTON, supra note 21, at 2590, 2591.
107. A persuasive justification exists. A politically independent judiciary is the best
guarantor of the democratic process and the political rights that will keep it viable, but the
theory has to be developed and cannot be taken for granted. See generally J. ELY, DEMOCRAcY AND DImTRUST, A THEORY OF JUDICIAL Rnvinw (1980). In fact, that is precisely what
Justice Agranat tried to do, to assert as much judicial power to review abuse of political
rights as can be consistent with the doctrine of parliamentary supremacy.
108. The warning is also issued to the Knesset. For while his doctrine is limited to executive action and thus formally leaves intact the Knesset's power to tamper with free expression, his analysis clearly implied that any such action will poison the heart of Israel's
commitment to democracy.
109. That is, by being the product of "scientific" legal analysis, it was apolitical and
therefore should not be subjected to political criticism.
110. The novelty and potential radicalizing effect of this new doctrine cannot be overemphasized. As a consequence of incorporating the entire body of Mandatory law, which reflected the stormy political conditions in Palestine prior to independence, the Israeli legal
system was saturated by provisions vesting the executive with unlimited discretion in matters
of national security. See, e.g., Defense Emergency Regulation, reprintedin PALESTINE GAzETE no. 1442 (Supp. 111945); Press Ordinance §§ 34-35, reprintedin 2 R. DRAYTON, supra
note 21, at 1231-34. Imposition of standards by the Court, rational as they might be, meant
a significant contraction of executive power. From the executive's point of view, that the
criminal law remained intact was of no great moment, since it is always easier to handle
matters administratively, free from the slow judicial process which necessarily takes place in
the public eye.
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pression. He distinguished executive from legislative discretion. And

where are there legislators who would deny that they'alone are the legitimate creators of standards?"'
E. Doctrine: Transplantation of Probable Danger and the Doctrines
Against Prior Restraint and Seditious Libel
The search for a concrete formula in Kol-Ha'am was couched in

terms of statutory interpretation: What is the meaning of "likely" as
used in section 19 of the Press Ordinance?" 2 Justice Agranat predetermined the outcome by forcing the Court to choose between either the
"bad tendency" test or the "probable danger" test.' '3 As a justification

for the choice of probable danger, he marshalled two other basic First
Amendment doctrines, the doctrine against prior restraint and the doctrine against seditious libel. Thus, in one stroke he incorporated into
Israeli law'11 three basic layers of First Amendment jurisprudence: the

eighteenth century Blackstonian doctrine against prior restraint, the
early nineteenth century aversion to seditious libel attributed to the
Framers I" and the "modem" probable (clear and present) danger test.

Again, Chafee's influence is unmistakable. Having rejected both
the licentiousness doctrine and the doctrine against prior restraint and
111. Indeed, in so doing he formally reaffirmed the power of the Knesset to suppress
political liberties, but the doctrine of legislative supremacy had already filled the vacuum of
Israeli constitutional law, and at least the Agranat doctrine made detailed rational standards
of statutory suppression a necessary condition for legitimacy. Besides, he could reasonably
expect that his analysis of the relationship between free expression and democracy would
deter legislative action in this area.
112. See text accompanying notes 88-90 supra.
113. "But section [19(2)] says, 'likely to endanger.' What is the purport of the term
'likely'? The answer to that question depends on the choice of one of two possible approaches. According to one approach it is sufficient, in order to satisfy the condition stated
in the section in question that the publication reveals only a tendency--even a slight or
remote tendency-in the direction of one of the consequences that we included in the notion, 'endangers the public peace'; while according to the other approach, the Minister of
Interior must be convinced beforehand that there has been created, having regard to the
circumstances inwhich it takes place, a link between the publication and the possibility of
one of the said consequences occurring, which must lead to the inference that the occurrence
of that consequence is probable. We think that the second approach represents the intention
of the legislator in section [19(2)]." 1 SELECTED JUDGMENTS at 102-03.
Other tests were available, e.g., the incitement test and the adhoc balancing test, and
Justice Agranat must have been familiar with them. The conscious limitation to only two
possibilities reflects Chafee's influence.
114. At least as obiter dicta.
115. That was before L. Levy came out with his seminal book, Legacy of Suppressiom
Freedom ofSpeech and Press in Early American History, in 1960. Both of the sources consulted by Justice Agranat on this issue, Z. CHAFEE, supra note 64, and Dennis v. United
States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951), espoused the version that the historical raisond'etre of the First
Amendment was to drop seditious libel from American law.
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having opted for a balancing approach, Chafee looked into the history
of the First Amendment in order to ascertain the weight of the interest
in free expression. He saw the First Amendment as one manifestation
of the effort to turn the American polity from an oligarchy into a republic.I6 In his view, an oligarchy rejected prior restraint but allowed
suppression of dissent by applying the laws against seditious libel. The
American republic, on the other hand, has allowed neither," 7 because
open and uninhibited political expression was vital for representative
democracy. On the basis of this analysis, Chafee rejected the "bad tendency" test"' and arrived at a balancing formula-"rational
principle."
Justice Agranat used the same ingredients but mixed them differently. He echoed Chafee in stating that a republican polity was allergic
to both prior restraint and seditious libel and therefore could not tolerate the bad tendency test. But he replaced Chafee's concluding
formula with the Vinson-Hand version, announced in Dennis v. United
States."19

The transplantation of the three doctrines and the reasons why the
Israeli Supreme Court preferred the probable danger to the clear and

present danger test are analyzed below.
L

Transplantingthe Doctrine 4gainst PriorRestraint
As for the second sign' 2' ...

it has long been recognized that

116. "Two different views of the relation of rulers and people were in conffict. According
to one view, the rulers were the superiors of the people, and therefore must not be subjected
to any censure that would tend to diminish their authority. The people could not make
adverse criticism in newspapers or pamphlets, but only through their lawful representatives
in the legislature, who might be petitioned in an orderly manner. According to the other
view, the rulers were agents and servants of the people, who might therefore find fault with
their servants and discuss questions of their punishment or dismissal, and of governmental
policy." Z. CHAFEE, supra note 64, at 18-19.
117. "In short, the framers of the First Amendment sought to preserve the fruits of the
old victory abolishing the censorship, and to achieve a new victory abolishing sedition prosecutions." Id at 22.
118. The bad tendency test clearly emanated from the law of seditious libel. Id at 24-26.
119. 341 U.S. at 510 (Chief Justice Vinson's plurality opinion adopted Circuit Judge
Learned Hand's articulation of the rule. Id at 510 (quoting 183 F.2d 201, 212 (1950)).
120. Justice Agranat referred to the doctrine against prior restraint and seditious libel as
"signs" which proved the superiority of probable danger over bad tendency. He also advanced a third "sign": the Oxford Dictionary. 1 SELECTED JUDGMENTS at 108. The dictionary definition of "likely," Agranat observed, was "seeming as if it would happen...
probable,. . . that may reasonably be expected to happen." Thus, a neutral, respectable,
scientific (compared with his quest for a rational principle in the 'irst section of Kol-Ha'am,
1 SELECTED JUDGMENTS at 106) and last, but not least, perfectly English source, pointed at
the very same direction of interpretation. Mindful of the value of such "evidence," Justice

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

[VoL 9:21

1'-which

that . . . "preventive measure"
is . . .nothing more
than censorship . . . is . . .most powerful. "The censor," says
Chafee, "is the most dangerous of all the enemies of the liberty of
the press. . . ." [H]aving regard to the drastic character of that
power, one should not attribute to the Israeli legislator an intention to authorize. . . suspension. . . only because the matters
published seem. . .to disclose a mere tendency to endanger the
public peace. .
2

Once again, Chafee's scholarly analysis was the main vehicle for
transplanting a doctrine into Israeli law. 23 Again, Justice Agranat varies Chafee's analysis. Chafee considered the distinction between prior
restraint and subsequent punishment as antiquated and dangerous to a
meaningful protection of free speech.

4

Had Justice Agranat followed

Chafee mechanically, he would not have given this doctrine a central
place in Israeli free speech law. By resting his case on the doctrine
against prior restraint, Justice Agranat proved his ability to transcend
temporal criticism and to grasp the functional importance of the doctrine against prior restraint to the dynamics of free expression.
The doctrine against prior restraint was not transplanted in its
Agranat presented it as the last of his arguments-a triumphant finale to his scientific expedition.
Still, this was no more than cosmetics. Justice Agranat was fortunate to find the very
term "probable" under the definition of likely, but surely the dictionary definition could
persuasively support a bad tendency test. Further, the decision to opt for "probable" had
already been made; it was inherent in the opening question: should "likely" be interpreted
as bad tendency or as probable danger? Scientific make-up was needed in order to disguise
the appearance of radical English and American notions on the Israeli scene and to deflect
criticism. But it should not be given more weight than it deserves. The original order of the
signs is: (1)seditious libel, (2) prior restraint, and (3) the dictionary definition of "likely."
The sequence is changed here to emphasize the historical layers incorporated.
121. Here he tied the power of suspension to censorship. "In. . .the present case, we
are concerned with a preventive measure, which bears no criminal character in the regularly
understood sense, seeing that its primary and immediate purpose is to secure the non-publication of the newspaper, because it is likely to contain similar improper material in the
future." 1 SELECTED JUDGMENTS at 105.
122. Id at 105-07.
123. Chafee is cited twice in the section discussing the perils of censorial devices. Id at
105-06. In addition, he is cited as a reference to the assertion that censorship was rarely
invoked in modern British history. Id at 106. A quotation of Jefferson's warning against
allowing "the civil magistrate to intrude his powers into the field of opinion" also refers to
Chafee as a source. Id at 107. The two other sources relied on by Justice Agranat are 4 W.
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *151-52, and Chief Justice Hughes' opinion in Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931). Both sources appear in, but are not quoted from, Z. CHAFEE,
supra note 64, at 9, 375. Again, the balance between English and American law is manifest.
124. Chafee, while reviewing the Blackstonian theory, spoke against understanding freedom of expression in terms of the prohibition of prior restraint and permission of subsequent punishment. "The Blackstonian theory dies hard, but it ought to be knocked on the
head once and for all." Z. CHAFEE, supra note 64, at 9.
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crude form. The scholarly influence of Chafee gave way to the influ-

ence of the donor system's case law; the formula for prior restraint
stated by Justice Agranat was the sophisticated dictum announced by
Chief Justice Hughes in Near v. Minnesota.125 It took enormous courage to present the doctrine as Israeli, for if ever there was a system
honeycombed with prior restraints, it was Israel's. The press was
doubly licensed, both by the Press Ordinance and by the Defense
(Emergency) Regulations.126 Military censorship conferred broad discretion to the censor, and its use was rampant. 27 A statute authorized
censorship of movies and theater; 128 radio operated under the exclusive
monopoly of the government. 129 Furthermore, section 19 was couched
in broad discretionary terms.' 30
One could claim that in fact there was no justification for the aversion to prior restraint in Israel. Where was the hook to hang either
Blackstone, the First Amendment or Near v. Minnesota on Israel's legal
system? Justice Agranat transcended these apparent difficulties by tying the legal system to certain aspects of the political order. 131 He inyoked the negative role of censorship in Jewish history132 and
125. 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931). Justice Agranat says: "Finally, the American judge, too,
recognized the nonapplication of that limitation in extraordinary instances, such as in time
of war, when there exists a need for preventing the obstruction of recruiting for military
service, the publication of the sailing dates of transports or the disclosure of the number and
location of troops; and also, at all times, when we must defend ourselves against the publication of matters inciting to acts of violence or the overthrow by force of the lawful regime." 1
SELECTED JUDGMENTS

at 107 (citation omitted).

126. For a discussion, see Lahav, supra note 2, at 491-501.
127. Id at 505-06.
128. Cinematographic Films Ordinance, reprintedin 1 R. DRAYTON, supra note 21, at
135.
129. Broadcasting Authority Law 5725-1965, 19 L.S.I. 103-12 (1964-1965). At that time
there was no television broadcasting in Israel.
130. There is no doubt that the drafters of § 19 chose words that they thought would
preclude judicial review of administrative action. Since broad administrative discretion was
a trend in Mandatory public law, it seems very likely that Justice Agranat, a former district
court judge in Palestine, would be well aware of this trend. See Lahav, supra note 2, at 51113.

131. 1 SELECTED

JUDGMENTS

at 105-06.

132. "The history of many peoples, and of the people of Israel first and foremost, is full
of examples without number, of men who have dared and ventured, without being deterred
by the fear of punishment, to publish what their conscience dictated, notwithstanding its
prohibition on the part of the ruling authorities. However, it is clear that such display of
courage has never been, nor is it today, any sufficient guarantee against the effective stay, by
preventive measures, of disseminating views or thoughts that are entirely novel." Id This,
in fact, is not an argument from democracy but an argument from the search for truth. For
the role of censorship in Jewish history, see M. CARMILLY-WEINBERGER, CENSORSHIP AND
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN JEWISH HISTORY (1977).
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separated the Mandatory regime from the Israeli legislature. 133 The

latter was committed to democracy. Thus, aversion to prior restraint
was part of Israel's legal order because democracy needed a fair measure of free press and a climate hostile to censorship. Justice Agranat
took the shift in the political order, from authoritarianism to democracy, to be of crucial importance for the legal system. He tried to give
the legal system a new identity, both independent and reflective of its

ties to western political tradition and culture. This was constitutional
law in the making.
2

Transplantingthe DoctrineAgainst Seditious Libel
The approach of a "a bad tendency" is perhaps suitable to a
political system employed in a state based on an autocratic or
totalitarian regime, but it obstructs, or at least renders inefficient,
the use of that process which constitutes the very essence of any
democratic
regime, namely, the process of investigating the
34
truth. 1

As in the transplantation of the doctrine against prior restraint,
Chafee's influence was again both apparent and acknowledged.135 In

his presentation of this "sign," Justice Agranat converted Chafee's rhetoric and observations from American history into Israeli terms. Chafee
discussed the process by which Americans came to dread seditious libel

and concluded that "[t]he First Amendment was written by men...
who intended to wipe out the common law of sedition.

.

.[and make

it] forever impossible in the United States of America."' 136 Justice
Agranat borrowed Chafee's framework and into it injected Israeli con-

tent. Freedom loving America was replaced by freedom loving Israel,
133. "[O]ne should not attribute to the Israel legislator an intention to authorise...
suspension [on grounds of bad tendency].. . .To attribute such intention is quite out of the
question since. . .Israel is a State. . .based on the fundamentals of democracy and freedoms." 1 SELECTED JUDGMENTS at 107.

134. Id at 104.
135. Justice Agranat's presentation of this "sign" opens with a review of old English
seditious libel cases, John Drakard's Trial, 31 How. St. Tr. 495 (Ex. 1811), Leigh Hunt's
Trial, 31 How. St. Tr. 367 (K.B. 1811). Both opinions are quoted at length and Z. CHAFEE,
supra note 64, is acknowledged as the source. I SELECTED JUDGMENTS at 103-04. A third
opinion, Trial of Thomas Muir, 23 How. St. Tr. 117 (High Ct. Justice 1793), is quoted from
Sutherland, British TrialsforDisloyalAssociationDuringthe FrenchRevolution, 34 CORNELL
L. Q. 303, 314 (1949). 1 SELECTED JUDGMENTS at 104. Agranat also relied on Chafee's
condemnation of the doctrine of indirect causation. "And the most powerful weapon in
their hands (Le., of those who oppose freedom of the press), Professor Chafee once stressed,
'is this doctrine of indirect causation, under which words can be punished for a supposed
bad tendency long before there is any probability that they will break out into unlawful
acts."' 1 SELECTED JUDGMENTS at 104.
136. Z. CHAFEE, supra note 64, at 21.
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and Israel's Declaration of Independence was substituted for the First
Amendment:
The system of laws under which the political institutions in Israel
have been established and function are witness to the fact that
this is indeed a state founded on democracy. Moreover, the matters set forth in the Declaration of Independence, especially as
regards the basing of the State "on the foundations of freedom"
and the securing of freedom of conscience, mean that Israelis a
freedom loving State. It is true that the Declaration "does not
consist of any constitutional law laying down in fact any rule regarding the maintaining or repeal of any ordinances or laws"
• . ., but insofar as it "expresses the vision of the people and its
faith". . . , we are bound to pay attention to the matters set forth
in it when we come to interpret and give meaning to the laws of
the State, including the provisions of a law made in the time of
the Mandate and adopted by the State after its establishment,
• . .forit is a well-known axiom that the law ofa people must be
studiedin the light of its nationalway of life. Thus, here we have a
first sign indicating that we must interpret the term "likely,"...
in the sense of "probability" rather than in the spirit of the view
which favours the doctrine of the "bad tendency" and "indirect
causation." 137
This was a major moment for Israeli constitutional law. Hitherto
it was a shapeless body of norms wandering aimlessly in space. Here
begins the process of transforming Israeli law, through judicial decisions, into a system with a fixed, coherent underlying theme: democratic constitutionalism. 13 It was a powerful break from legal
formalism. Formalism had raised a wall between law and the political
system and had led the court to deny the Declaration any role in the
legal system. Justice Agranat cracked the wall by holding the executive, and to a large extent the legislature as well, to the principles of
democratic constitutionalism."3 9 To give these principles concrete
meaning, he tied them to the very document which gave Israel life-the
Declaration of Independence. 140
137. 1 SELECrED JUDGMENTS at 105 (emphasis added). Cf. Z. CHAFEE, supra note 64.
"The judges [who held that sedition was a common law crime in the federal courts] forgot
the truth emphasized by Maitland: 'The Law ofa nation can only be studiedin relationto the
whole nationallife.'" Id at 20 (emphasis added & citations omitted).
138. This does not mean that the process has been or can be completed.
139. Indeed, he does not overrule the former precedents which denied the Declaration a
role, but his interpretation, in fact, disarms them. See note 42 supra. Investing constitutional power in the Declaration also ties the hand of the legislature since the latter is now
presumed to uphold the principles emanating from that Declaration. The legislature, still
supreme, may violate these principles, but the task is so much harder. It will have to concede that it clearly wishes to do so and technically spell out the details of the limitation.
140. There is a problem here, since the very principle of freedom of expression is not
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As in the case of transplanting the doctrine against prior restraint,
witness the stubborn determination to force the grim reality into conformity with the national dream. Like censorship, seditious libel was a
part of Israeli positive law.' 4 ' It would not do to provide a technical
way out by stating that the court meant to exclude seditious libel from
consideration only when construing section 19. Justice Agranat's analysis exposed a fundamental incompatibility of seditious libel and democracy, an incompatibility which would have to spread throughout
the entire legal system. While powerless to deny the validity of seditious libel in Israeli criminal law, he could and did subvert its
legitimacy.
3.

Why "ProbableDanger"?

Whereas Chafee concluded his analysis by adopting the clear and
present danger test, 142 Justice Agranat preferred another formula for
the law of Israel. Clearly, Justice Agranat's methodology does not
demonstrate why the probable danger test should be preferred to the
clear and present danger test. His very gambit-the limitation of
choice to either bad tendency or probable danger-reveals his bias and
forecloses the issue. 143 Furthermore, on close examination, none of his
three "signs" supports his choice. The dictionary definition could be
interpreted to support even a bad tendency test.'" The doctrine
against seditious libel and the doctrine against prior restraint both justify a rejection of the bad tendency test, but they entail no preference
for any particular "danger" formula. We must therefore look elsewhere for Justice Agranat's reasons to prefer "probable" over "clear
and present" danger. Justice Agranat's own explanation somewhat illuminates his preference. He observed that the statutory term "likely"
explicitly mentioned in the Declaration. In this sense, Justice Agranat's doctrine transcends
the text of the Declaration. Whether Justice Agranat meant to incorporate "fundamental
principles" or just those principles essential to a viable democratic process, shall not be
discussed. But see J. ELY, supra note 107, at 43-104. The Israeli Supreme Court perhaps has
been unaware of this dichotomy. Yet a case could be made that Justice Agranat thought of
the democratic process rather than of "fundamental values," since his entire analysis gravitates toward the democratic theme. Such an orientation is also more in keeping with the
doctrine of parliamentary supremacy.
141. Criminal Code Ordinance § 59 (1936), reprintedin PALESTINE GAZETTE no. 652, at
285, 306 (Supp. 1 1936). Seditious libel was also part of the Press Ordinance that Agranat
was interpreting. Press Ordinance § 23, reprintedin 2 R. DRAYTON, supra note 21, at 122728.
142. Z. CHAFEE, supra note 64, at 35.
143. See note 113 supra.
144. See note 120 supra.
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better fit a probable rather than a clear and present danger formula.'4 5
Yet this is just the tip of the iceberg. Here again, one witnesses a transdonor systeip's scholarly
plantation process which juxtaposes the
46
source with the donor system's case law. 1
Probable danger was Judge Learned Hand's version of the clear
and present danger test, created during the course of upholding the
convictions of the Communist Party leadership in Dennis v. United
States.' 47 Dennis was decided ten years after Chafee had published the
second edition of his book. In 1953, Dennis was one of the freshest
authoritative versions on the limitations of free speech in the United
States. Clearly, Justice Agranat understood that he would have to
choose between Chafee and the Vinson-Hand formula. 148 Chafee's
work, although highly respected, was a scholarly reference in a legal
system which placed an overriding premium on judicial decisions.
Hence, there should be little wonder that Agranat, a judge himself,
would gravitate toward the most recent authoritative version of the
"danger" test. As a common law judge in a newly independent state he
49
may have equated the "modern" version with the "better" approach.1
He also may have been influenced by the general rules about reception
of foreign law, the requirement that foreign law upheld by a local court
be updated. 150
145. 1 SELECTED JUDGMENTS at 113.
146. The process occurred first when Justice Agranat preferred Near v. Minnesota over
Chafee's rejection of the doctrine against prior restraint. See text accompanying note 125
supra.
147. 341 U.S. 494, 510 (1951). See also M. SHAPIRO, FREEDOM OF SPEECH: THE
SUPREME COURT AND JOURNAL REVIEW 95-105 (1966); Gunther, supra note 73.
148. "[S]ee also the judgments collected on this point in the addendum to the judgment
of Justice Frankfurter, in the case of Dennis v. U.S... . (cf the new approachof the majority
opinion in the last-mentionedcase). Now, it is very evident, in view of the approach we have
indicated above, that we cannot go to the extreme of demanding that the Minister of the
Interior be satisfied, before ordering the paper to be suspended, that the danger to the public
peace created in consequence of the publication is also proximate in time." I SELECTED
JUDGMENTS at 113 (emphasis added & citations omitted).
149. The official translation from the Hebrew refers to Dennis v. United States as the
"new" approach. Id It is better translated as the "modern" approach. In the fifties, "modem" was also "better," and Justice Agranat's analysis may reflect the assumption that law
develops progressively. See also note 151 infra.
150. See Stem, ForeignLaw in the Courts: JudicialNotice andProof,45 CALIF. L. REV.
23 (1957). In a way, this transplantation technique amounts to a triumph for those who see
judicial decisionmaking as a process distinct and separate from other lawmaking processes
and, for some, to a vindication of the Grand Style. Here, law is made, but within the classical constraints, respect for stare decisis (indeed, even, of the donor system's), respect for
tradition and authority, and respect for the statutory terms. In other words, while law was
both transplanted and made, the basic rules ofjudicial decisionmaking were still controlling
and affecting the final choice made by the judge.
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His choice of "probable danger" had important political and legal
dimensions. Politically, the tighter clear and present danger formula
was likely to intensify bureaucratic antagonism. From the legal view-

point, adoption of clear and present danger could also expose him to
the criticism that he was importing a formula already discarded in its
mother country. But beyond the tactical considerations lay thoughtful
inquiry into substance. Chafee was influential, recent decisions of the
United States Supreme Court were influential, yet Justice Agranat also
looked deeper into the critique of the clear and present danger test.

The final part of his decision, the "postdoctrinal" portion, reveals an
effort to synthesize the donor system's case law and scholarly critique
in order to give Israel a more polished formulation of the legitimate
limitations on expression. 1 '
F. The Postdoctrinal Stage: A Synopsis of Components
for "Probable Danger"
In the last section of his decision, Justice Agranat breaks the
formula for properly restricting free expression into components. Together, these components amount to detailed instructions to the Minister of the Interior and to the courts as to how and when expression may
be curtailed.' 5 2 On reflection, there may be two reasons for this structure: one theoretical, the other institutional.
The theoretical reason may be an attempt to take into consideration the critique of the clear and present danger test. Justice Agranat
was concerned primarily with Justice Frankfurter's critique' 53 of Chief
Justice Vinson's plurality opinion in Dennis. Since Justice Agranat had
borrowed the probable danger formula from Chief Justice Vinson's
opinion, he was particularly sensitive to this critique. He therefore at151. In a way, the synopsis of the elements of probable danger in the postdoctrinal stage
provides for another explanation of Justice Agranat's preference of the probable danger test
over the clear and present danger test-that upon reflection there is little difference between
the two formulas. See T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF ExPRESSION 113-16,
(1970).
152. One may limit the holding in Kol-Ha'am, as applying only to open-ended statutes
and may argue that the instructions obtain only when a broad discretion is granted to limit
free expression. Although this purpose undoubtedly was both central and immediate, it
seems that the decision should be read more broadly. The attempt to anchor the principle of
free expression in Israel's legal system implies, at least, judicial advice to the Knesset not to
transcend these boundaries lest the democratic character of the state be injured.
153. 341 U.S. at 542-43. Justice Agranat referred several times to Justice Frankfurter's
concurring opinion; see, e.g., 1 SELECTED JUDGMENTS at 101, 102, 113. Some observe that
Justice Frankfurter's criticism was misdirected because Chief Justice Vinson's opinion did in
fact balance the principles of free expi -sssionand national security. E.g., J. ELY, supra note
107, at 108.
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tempted to elaborate a more comprehensive doctrinal theory to provide
Israeli law with a version more solid and less vulnerable to attack than
the American original.
The second reason for the detailed elaboration relates to the selfperceived role of Israel's Supreme Court. The Court was creating constitutional common law,"5 4 principles of democratic constitutionalism
for a system which revolved around parliamentary supremacy. This
The detailed
required that the Court assume an educative function.'

synopsis was a way of educating and of sensitizing the bureaucracy and
the courts to the workings of the constitutional principle. Two interesting aspects of this synopsis, both atypical of Israeli judicial opinions,
reveal its underlying educative mission. First, Justice Agranat separates the checklist from the discussion of its application to the instant

case. Future decisionmakers are thus spared the burden of distilling
the rules from the opinion. Second, the synopsis provides the deci-

sionmakers with factors relevant to a determination of whether or not
"probable danger" exists, identifies factors which are generally irrelevant, and provides a perspective which the decisionmaker should adopt

when reaching a decision.
From the point of view of transplantation, the most interesting aspect of this section is the foreign sources used.'5 6 Whereas in previous
sections the predominant influence had been Chafee's, now the sources

are more diverse. United States Supreme Court opinions, particularly
those of Justices Brandeis and Holmes and Chief Justice Vinson, are
quoted.'5 7 Yet scholarly work again is closely consulted. This time the

primary source is postdoctrinal-an article published in the Harvard
Law Review by Elliot Richardson that examines Dennis. 58

The springboard for the Richardson critique, Justice Frankfurter's
154. For a discussion of the concept of constitutional common law, see Monaghan, The
Supreme Court, 1974 Term, Foreword- Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1
(1975).
155. Rostow, he Democratic Character of JudicialReview, in JUDICIAL REVIEW AND
THE SUPREME COURT 74, 88 (L. Levy ed. 1967).
156. Another interesting aspect, which already appeared in the first part of Kol-Ha'am
(transplantation of interest balancing) is the technique of transplantation. Israeli doctrines
are ostensibly created as original derivations of Israeli law, not as imitations of foreign
sources. To the extent that the synopsis relies openly on foreign sources, it invokes the great
classic authorities: Justices Holmes and Brandeis. Scholarly works, however critical in actuality, are formally subdued.
157. 1 SELECTED JUDGMENTS at 113. These opinions, e.g., Dennis v. United States, 341
U.S. at 507 (Vinson, C.J.), have by now acquired considerable authoritative weight.
158. Richardson, supra note 65. The article is quoted by Justice Agranat, I SELECTED
JUDGMENTS at 97, 114, in connection with the justification of the search of truth in free
expression.
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opinion in Dennis," 9 characterized the clear and present danger
formula as an ossified "uncritical libertarian generality" which is empty
of analytical content. 6 ' Justice Frankfurter cited the celebrated passage from Professor Paul Freund's book, which became the banner for
conservative opposition to clear and present danger:
The truth is that the clear-and-present-danger test is an oversimplified judgment unless it takes account also of a number of other
factors: the relative seriousness of the danger in comparison with
the value of the occasion for speech or political activity; the availability of more moderate controls than those which the state has
imposed; and perhaps the specific intent with which the speech or
activity is launched. No matter how rapidly we utter the phrase
"clear and present danger," or how closely we hyphenate the
words, they are not a substitute for the weighing of values. They
tend to convey a delusion of certitude when what is most certain
is the complexity of the strands in the web of freedoms which the
judge must disentangle. 6 '
From this passage came the inspiration to look for structuring factors.
1. Content
Those in power, said Justice Agranat, may suppress speech "only
when the publication has left the framework of the mere explanation of
an idea and takes on the form of advocacy." This requirement is "a
sine qua non for applying the drastic power of suppressing the views of
others."' 62 The requirement that speech amounts to advocacy of unlawful action before it can be legitimately suppressed was the most central achievement of American twentieth century free speech law, since
it undermined the notion that speech which
is intuitively perceived to
163
be "bad" may be legitimately suppressed.
By 1950, the advocacy requirement had penetrated so deeply into
the legal consciousness that Chief Justice Vinson and Justice Frankfurter expressed agreement about its theoretical centrality.164 By making it the sine qua non requirement of Israeli law, Justice Agranat again
159. 341 U.S. at 517.
160. Id at 527, 543.
161. P. FREUND, ON UNDERSTANDING THE SUPREME COURT 27-28 (1949), quotedin 341
U.S. at 542-43 (Frankfurter, J. concurring).
162. 1 SELECTED JUDGMENTS at 109.

163. See Gunther, supra note 73; Gunther, In Search o/JudicialQuality on a Changing
Court The Case o/JusticePowell, 24 STAN. L. REv. 1001 (1972).
164. See 341 U.S. at 502 (Vinson, C.J., plurality opinion); 341 U.S. at 544 (Frankfurter,
J.,
concurring). Later opinions have strengthened this trend. See, e.g., Cohen v. California,
403 U.S. 15 (1971); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
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displayed both a keen understanding of the dynamics of suppression
and an ability to locate the jugular of American free speech doctrines.
2. Circumstances
One of the major debates about the limitations of free expression
focuses on the weight to be assigned to either of two variables: content
and circumstances. 61 Justice Agranat merged the two. Having incorporated "content" as the first factor in his synopsis, he proceeded to
transplant the consideration of circumstances. "[What is expected of

the Minister of the Interior is] an estimation that a proximate (and not
necessarily a certain) result will follow if he does not make prompt use
of his said powers. . . . [That means] an estimation made accordingto
the circumstancessurroundingthe act ofPublication.' ' 66
The requirement of circumstances partially resembles Chief Justice Vinson's opinion in Dennis. 7 Justice Agranat's analysis of which
circumstances count seems to rely on Richardson's article. 168 For example, Justice Agranat's emphasis on the relationship between content
and circumstances and the legitimacy of judicial consideration of either
"immediate" or "general" circumstances echoes Richardson's effort to
loosen the requirement of "direct causation" by permitting judicial
considerations of national security and foreign affairs. 169 Richardson
165. Some have argued that content should be the predominant variable while others
have focused on the circumstances. See, e.g., Gunther, supra note 73. In later years, an
attempt to recognize the importance of both variables for certain categories has developed.
See J. ELY, sufpra note 107, at 105-16; L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 576-88
(1978).
166. 1 SELECTED JUDGMENTS at 110 (emphasis in original). For a description of these
circumstances, see note 169 infra.
167. 341 U.S. at 505.
168. Richardson, supra note 65.
169. Compare Richardson's view on the interaction between content and circumstances
with that of Justice Agranat. Richardson says, "Irrespective of whether the surrounding
circumstances make the existing probability of the apprehended evil great or small, evidence that the utterance in question made some contribution toward increasing that
probability seems essential." Richardson, supra note 65, at 11. Justice Agranat says, "that
the test to be applied always consists of some preestimation. . . as to whether, as the result
of the interaction of publication and circumstances, a probability is created that the public
peace will be adversely affected." 1 SELECTED JUDGMENTS at 11 (emphasis in original).
Or compare the two on "immediate" and "general" circumstances. Richardson states,
"Among the circumstances which may affect the probability is the existing state of opinion,
local, national, and international. . . [in] 'emergency' situations ... not merely the immediate environment of the speaker but the entire state of world affairs... may be relevant."
Richardson, supra note 65, at 9-10 (emphasis added). Justice Agranat holds, "It is important
to stress that the circumstances which the Minister of Interior is entitled to take into account
are liable to be varied and of different nuances. For instance, he must consider not only the
immediate external facts. . . but also the general background, such as the state of emer-

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 9:21

identified factors which in general should not be considered by courts
as relevant, in order to forestall a growth of loose and overbroad requirements and a return to the bad tendency test and indirect causation. These factors were incorporated into Israeli law. 170
3. Proximity in Time and Gravity ofEvil
The clear and present danger test, particularly as developed by
Justice Brandeis, focused on the danger's imminence. Speech could be
suppressed only when there was no time for the marketplace of ideas
(more speech) to counteract.1 7 1 In Dennis, the effort to prosecute the
leaders of the Communist Party successfully would have collapsed in
the face of a requirement of an imminent danger. The Vinson-Hand
formula provided the grounds for a legitimate conviction by concentrating on the nature of the danger as reflected in international politics
(the "general circumstances"), while simultaneously diluting the time
component. According to the formula, one should consider "the gravity of the 'evil' discounted by its improbability." 172 Justice Agranat followed suit:
But if the Minister of Interior becomes aware, in the light of circumstances, that the publication makes it possible, amounting almost to a certainty, that serious harm will be caused to the public
peace, then there is nothing to prevent him from exercising the
that
power given him by section [19(2)] even where he estimates
1 73
it is not a case where harm will be caused forthwith.
Justice Agranat openly acknowledged his deviation from the
Holmes-Brandeis opinions. 7 4 His explanation was legalistic: the statutory language prevented him from imposing a requirement of imminence.175 Unquestionably, he was strongly influenced by the "modern"
Dennis approach. 76 Tactically, it was a clever finale to the lengthy
process of transplantation. Open rejection of the American approach,177 accompanied by an open reliance on the Israeli statute,
demonstrated the Israeli Supreme Court's loyalty to the letter of the
law. At the end of a long opinion, the Court proved that it was engency existing in the country... or the tension prevailing in international relations at that
moment." I SELECTED JUDGMENTS at Il1.
170. See text accompanying notes 180-85 infra.
171. See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
172. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. at 510.
173. 1 SELECTED JUDGMENTS at 113.
174. Id
175. Id
176. Id
177. Conformity with the "modern" American approach was underplayed. Id
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gaged in a legitimate exercise of statutory interpretation rather than in
an imitation of foreign law. Moreover, this approach sufficed for accomplishing the strategic ends sought: considerable circumscription of
the powers of the Minister of the Interior in general, and revocation of
the suspension order in particular.
In both Dennis v. United States and the Richardson analysis, the
fall of the imminence requirement was compensated by a rise in the
danger's gravity.17 Justice Agranat did likewise:
Finally, in cases in which there exists no danger of causing immediate, or evenprobable, harm to the public peace, it would be

best to weigh very carefully the gravity of the danger which the
Minister of Interior sees in the offing as a result of the publication
in question. .. [and] to consider whether the gravity of the danger that the Minister of Interior foresees as the result of the publication of the matters objected to, is indeed so great as to be
comparable to the public harm to the other public interest, that
is, the harm to the interest of freedom of expression.' 79
4. FactorsNot to be Considered- A Perspectivefor Balancing

So far the synopsis for the probable danger test had been lukewarm toward the principle of free expression. Although thoughtful
consideration of all the variables and insistence that each be assigned
substantial weight could lead to protection of expression, one cannot
overlook the fact that the period of the early fifties was a low point for
First Amendment values in general. Hence, Agranat's postdoctrinal
transplantation into Israel lacked the force that could be found in
Holmes, Brandeis, and Chafee. Justice Agranat, either because he perceived the dissonance or because he was genuinely interested in a comprehensive balancing, or both, went further. Following Richardson, he
attempted to counteract the possibility of reading "bad tendency" into
"circumstances" by listing factors, the consideration of which would be
generally illegitimate. 8 ' The "bad" intention of the speakers,"8 " the
178. See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. at 509-10 (Vinson, CJ.); Richardson, supra
note 65, at 9-12.
179. 1 SELECTED JUDGMENTS at 114 (emphasis in original). Both Chafee and Richardson are briefly mentioned in the omitted material, but the Dennis plurality opinion is not.
180. This method of framing a rule, which consists of listing the positive and negative
factors of decisionmaking in a matter-of-fact style, devoid of rhetoric and carefully attentive
to the psychological dynamics of suppression, reflects his determination to educate the bureaucracy. Further, realizing the strong tendency to justify suppression in light of precisely
these factors, he lists them as "observations, for guidance only and without setting up any
strict rules," thus neutralizing strong executive opposition to his decision. See I SELECTED
JuDaMENTS at 111.
181. The origins of the Israeli analysis of intent are interesting. The Dennis plurality
opinion, 341 U.S. at 515, which followed Justice Holmes opinion in Abrams v. United

60
60
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8 2 and,

"offensive" quality of the language or its emotional tinge
finally, the personality or character of the speaker 8 3 should, "generally
speaking," not be taken into consideration.
While Holmes' and Brandeis' imminence requirement was compromised, their careful analysis of the dynamics of free expression in
society was not. From their analysis, Justice Agranat distilled guidelines which the Minister of the Interior was "advised" to weigh. For
example, speech should be fought with more speech.
As a general rule, there is a good chance that truth, in the end,
will prevail; so that, if only there is enough time to spare, it is
better to act through discussion, education and counter-explanation, in order to cancel out the effect of the false information published in the newspaper in question or in the article for which
space was found. 4
Suppression is also instrumentally unwise. It may prove to be a twoedged sword.
It often happens that the very act of oppression--the actual suspension of the newspaper in which the matters objected to have
been published-endows them with an exagerated value in the
eyes of the public. Where "the enemies of liberty are met with a

States, 250 U.S. 616, 627-29 (1919), specifically rejected the contention that consideration of
evil intent would be unconstitutional. Professor Freund opined that "perhaps the specific
intent with which the speech... is launched" should be taken into consideration. P.
FRuEND, supra note 161. Justice Agranat heeds to the "perhaps" while adopting Richardson's analysis of the intent requirement in the Holmes' free speech opinions which concluded that "[i]ntent, or its absence, should thus be relevant only in so far as it supplies
evidence of theprobableeffect, or lack of it, of utterancesotherwise colorless or ambiguous."
See Richardson, supra note 65, at 15. See also Agranat's expression of this analysis:
"[G]enerally speaking, there will be no need to consider the bad intention... [for]...
only the possible effect of the published matters.., is of iportance ... . [Yet] in certain
conditions, the intention... may be of great assistance. ...
[For] example, where the
matters published may be understood in different ways ." 1 SELECTED JUDGMENTS at 11112 (Agranat did not cite Richardson here).
182. "Moreover, in certain circumstances and in certain conditions, it would not be out
of place to take into consideration the strong tone, the offensive language and the emotional
tinge in which the contents of the article or the piece of information published have been
clothed." I SELECTED JUDGMENTS at 112 (citing Z. CHAFEE, supra note 64, at 43).
183. "Finally, it will not, generallyspeaking, be right for the Minister of Interior to take
into account, among his considerations, the personality or character of those responsible for
the improper publications. The observations of Lord Chatham when supporting the struggle
of John Wilkes. . . , a person of the most dubious past, for the freedom of the press in
England, are most enlightening on this point: 'In his person though the worse of men, I
contend for the safety and security of the best.' (Chafee, p. 242, et seq.)" I SELECTED JuDaMENTS at 112 (emphasis in original & citation omitted).
Notice the citation to Lord Chatham, which serves to fasten the analysis to the old and
respectable English common law.
184. 1 SELECTED JUDGMENTS at 113, 114 (citing Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375
(1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring)).
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denial of liberty, many men of goodwill will come to suspect that
there is something in the proscribed doctrine after all. Erroneous
doctrines thrive on being expunged. They die if exposed."' 8 5
G. Conclusion
The decision in Kol-Ha'am is a fiue example of transplantation. 18It6
shows how foreign law, broadly conceived to include scholarship,
can be creatively utilized to build constitutional law into a system without a constitution.
Kol-Ha'am was the beginning. Judged by the results of the particular case, it was a spectacular success-never again did the government
of Israel invoke section 19 of the Press Ordinance.1 87 Yet Kol-Ha'am

was not simply a result-oriented decision, but an effort to construct Israeli constitutional law. As such, it contained reactionary and authoritarian as well as liberal and progressive elements. Twenty-five years
later, in another seminal decision, Lord Kenyon's licentiousness doctrine emerged at least partially triumphant, and the rule in New York
Times v. Sullivan"" was explicitly rejected.
Before turning to this decision, a brief discussion of the inner tension in Kol-Ha'am and a sketch of the doctrinal development in the
area of free speech during these twenty-five years are in order.
H. Between Licentiousness and Interest Balancing
A. Inner Tension Within Kol-Ha'am
Justice Agranat began his analysis of the legitimate boundaries of
free speech by adopting Lord Kenyon's licentiousness doctrine as an
adequate reflection of Israeli law. He then shifted to Pound's theory of
interest balancing.18 9 Thus, a fundamentally incompatible union be185. 1 SELECTED JUDGMENTS at 114 (Justice Agranat credits this idea to Sir William
Haley, quoted/n Dennis, 341 U.S. at 553-54 (Frankfurter, J., concurring), see note 81 supra,
and to Justice Holmes' dissent in Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 624 (1919).
186. This point raises a practical question of access. Did the Israeli Supreme Court, in
1953, have adequate access to United States Supreme Court opinions, or was the scholarly
influence simply a reflection of poverty in library materials?
187. Yet the government did use another suspension power in its arsenal. See Lahav,
supra note 2, at 519.
188. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
189. This theory of balancing is part of sociological jurisprudence and fundamentally
opposes the adhoc balancing approach advocated by Justice Frankfurter. See text accompanying notes 159-61 supra; M. SHAPiRO, supra note 147. Why Justice Agranat did adopt
the licentiousness doctrine, which Chafee rejected, is unclear. This instance is different from
the adoption of the doctrine against prior restraint, also rejected by Chafee, since prior restraint is an important step in the struggle for protection of free expression. Licentiousness is
not. Justice Agranat's background and personal gifts render the possibility that he found
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tween the Lord Kenyon doctrine 9 ' and the Pound-Chafee analysis was

created. This chimera, made up of diametrically opposed political philosophies, accompanies Israeli free speech case law to this day, and

Lord Kenyon's doctrine oftentimes militates toward rejection of American doctrines now transplanted into Israeli law.
On its face, the licentiousness doctrine seems compatible with both
the principle of free expression and interest balancing, at least where

there is parliamentary supremacy. If licentiousness is taken to mean
that some speech is illegitimate, then it lives in harmony with the principle of free expression, which all concede is not absolute.'

91

The ques-

tion becomes one of determining which branch of the government
legitimately ought to draw the line between protected and unprotected

speech. Under the doctrine of parliamentary supremacy, the legislature
retains the power to balance the various interests at stake and to decide
which speech is to be legitimately suppressed.192 From this angle, Jus-

tice Agranat's doctrine is at least formally reconcilable with licentiousness: only when the legislature delegates broad discretion to the

executive is judicial interest balancing activated. But this analysis ignores both the actual process of judicial decisionmaking and the substance of licentiousness.
It is easy to say that the doctrine of probable danger obtains only

where the legislature has failed to provide clear statutory guidelines. It
is another matter to see it working in reality. "Perfectly clear" statutes
are rare-rarer still where political rights are regulated. Interpretation
Chafee unpersuasive. There may be other reasons. Having spent his adult life as a judge in
Palestine, sensitized to authoritarian-colonial and English law, he might have harbored at
least some sympathy for this doctrine. Perhaps, here is the spirit of the first Xol-Ha'am
decision, see note 30 supra, so cleverly repressed in the second Aol--a'am opinion.
He might also have considered it a necessary lip service to those whose conception of
the separation of powers in government was rigid and dogmatic and who opposed an active
liberal court. Most importantly, it was a useful device to further institutionalize, through
administrative law, the principle of free expression in the Israeli legal system. The licentiousness doctrine, distilled from Israeli statutes and cases, implied that these sources were
the legitimate exception to protected speech; therefore, it pointed to a core of an inviolable
right to free speech. It implied that there was a core of constitutional liberty in Israeli law.
190. See note 14 supra.
191. Even proponents of the expression/action formula concede this proposition, but
they draw the line at the point where expression is classified as action within the parameters
of their theory. See generall, T. EMERSON, supra note 151.
192. Where a written constitution prescribes a principle of free expression and judicial
review obtains, the power of the legislature necessarily shrinks. Chafee rejected the licentiousness doctrine partially on these grounds. See Z. CHAFEE, supra note 64, at 14. For a
discussion of the legislature's role in suppressing expression which is viewed as endangering
national security, see Linde, "Clear and Present Danger" Re-examined. Dissonance in the
Brandenburg Concerto, 22 STAN. L. Rlv. 1163 (1970).
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is inevitable, and judicial standards creep back through interpreta-

tion.

93

Hence, either the doctrine of licentiousness is hardly relevant,

since most statutes are subject to interpretation, or it carries substantive

standards and is therefore relevant to substantive decisionmaking.
There is little doubt that the licentiousness doctrine does imply

substantive limitations on speech. First, the very polarization between
"liberty" and "license" implies authoritarianism. Professor Martin

Shapiro has put it succinctly:
[A] morass opens when we seek to distinguish liberty from license, and "true" freedom from. . . abuse of freedom. Whenever freedom pops up in the course of Western philosophy true
freedom is not far behind. And true freedom almost always ends
up meaning doing what is good for us, not doing what we want to
do. This in turn usually means not doing things that somebody
labeled God and sometimes the general will, tells
else, sometimes
194
us not to do.

Clearly, such results disagree with Justice Agranat's libertarian theories
of free speech.

Second, licentious speech is speech that is "hostile or offensive to
accepted standards."' 9 5 Therefore, commonly used, the distinction be-

tween liberty and license rests on the distinction between acceptable
and unacceptable community standards. The distinction is intuitive

and does not penetrate into the philosophical and political justifications
of free expression. In contradistinction, Chafee's interest balancing
calls for a review of the justifications advanced for each principle in
order to achieve rational accommodations between them.
Moreover, twentieth century American analysis of the justifica-

tions for free political expression rejects the notion that acceptable
community standards should provide the line between legitimate and
illegitimate speech. 196 Freedom of expression for minority views is es-

sential, even when they are anathema to accepted standards either in
193. This was also part of Chafee's critique of licentiousness. "To a judge obliged to
decide whether honest and able opposition to the continuation of a war is punishable, these
generalizations [the distinction between liberty and license] furnish as much help as a woman forced, like Isabella in MeasureforMeasure, to choose between her brother's death and
loss of honor, might obtain from the pious maxim, 'Do right.' What is abuse? What is
license? What standards does the law afford?" Z. CHAFEE, supra note 64, at 14.
194. M. SHAPIRO, supra note 147, at 92-93.
195. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEw INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1304. (Unabridged 1969).
196. See the Holmes-Brandeis opinions in Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 372
(1927) (concurring); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 672 (1925) (dissenting); Abrams v.
United States, 250 U.S. 616, 624 (1919) (dissenting); Z. CHAFEE, supra note 64, ch. 1. This
idea was particularly crystallized during the sixties, see Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15
(1971); T. EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 16-25
(1967). But see I SELECTED JUDGMENTS at 112. The justification known as the free market-
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form or in substance. Both the probable (or clear and present) danger
doctrine and the content-based doctrine, which distinguishes between
incitement and advocacy, 197 break from the notion of "acceptable
speech" and focus on concrete harms to the society.
In contradistinction, the licentiousness doctrine at its worst draws
the line- between standards acceptable to the aristocracy or another
political elite and those below it. At its best, it legitimizes popular standards as perceived by a majority of the legislature or by the court. 198
For Israel's legal system, the tension created by transplanting both
the Kenyon and Chafee approaches was operative on two levels. First,
because Parliament is supreme, it can reject the principle of minority
rights and suppress any view which the majority dislikes or fears. The
Court, on the other hand, if it internalizes the American doctrines
transplanted by Kol-Halam, would act according to a different political
philosophy, which would not accept the legitimacy of suppression because an idea or its expression is feared or disliked. Each branch
would then espouse a political theory that is incompatible with the
other.
The second locus of tension is of more immediate concern. The
intuitive method of balancing, inherent in the licentiousness doctrine,
contradicts Chafee's method of interest balancing. Its substantive component-legitimizing only views which either in form or in content
comply with acceptable community standards-is irreconcilable with
the justifications of the now transplanted American doctrines. 199 Thus,
an Israeli court, after Kol-Ha'am, may apply the licentiousness doctrine
and believe that it is following Kol-Ha'am's legacy, while in fact it
would be rejecting its rational methodology and its libertarian theory.
Indeed, the Israeli Supreme Court has done exactly that. Below is a
brief review of the Court's concept of free expression over the twentyplace of ideas is particularly relevant here. All ideas should fight in the marketplace, unacceptable ideas included.

197. Both appear in Justice Agranat's synopsis, I

SELECTED JUDGMENTS

at 108-15.

198. The historical context of Lord Kenyon's remark corroborates this view. The licentiousness doctrine was advanced to legitimate counterrevolutionary suppression in the late
eighteenth century and early nineteenth century aristocratic England. Its conversion, under
conditions of democracy would change aristocratic into popular taste-but the legitimacy of
suppressing minority views remains constant. The same period gave birth to the Alien and

Sedition Act in the United States, I Stat. 570, 596 (1798). See A.

GOODWIN, THE FRiENDS
OF LIBERTY: THE ENGLISH DEMOCRATIC MOVEMENT IN THE AGE OF THE FRENCH
REVOLUTION (1979). See also R. PALMER, THE AGE OF THE DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTION 459

(1979).
199. See M.

SHAPIRO, supra

note 147, at 89 (critique of adhoc balancing).
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five years which separated Kol-Ha'am from Ha'aretz v. Electric
Company.200
B. From 1953 to 1977: The Development of Israeli Free Speech Law
After Kol-Ha'am
20
A comprehensive analysis of Israeli Supreme Court opinions '
reveals that the transplantation of American doctrines in Kol-Ha'am
was only partially successful. Generally, the cases fall into one of two
broad categories: cases in which the Court failed to recognize that the

principle of free expression was implicated, and cases in which it did.

The first category, while not interesting from the doctrinal point of
view, is of crucial importance. The cases reflect a superficial notion of
the licentiousness doctrine: once the legislature 2 2 indicated that there
should be some limits on expression, even if it delegated broad discretion to the executive, the Court would not intervene. The Court's fail-

ure reveals that the core postulates of Kol-Ha'am have not yet been
internalized in Israels jurisprudence.20 3
The second category can be portrayed as containing two circles:
an inner circle of cases where one type of expression, political speech,
was held to be inviolable; and an outer circle, of borderline cases.
200. 31(2) P.D. 281 (1974) (Halaretz 1), rev'd on rehearing, 32(3) P.D. 337 (1977)
(Ha'aretz-I).
201. For a more extensive discussion, see Lahav, Freedom ofExpression in the Decisions
of the Supreme Court, 7 MISHPATIM 375, 403-22 (1977) (in Hebrew).
202. The Court did not usually recognize a difference between genuine Israeli statutes
(post-1948) and statutes inherited from the Mandatory regime (pre-1948). See, e.g., Forum
Films v. Cinematic and Plays Review Bd., 15 P.D. 611 (1960).
203. Lahav, supra note 201, at 403-06. In Forum Films v. Cinematic and Plays Review
Bd., 15 P.D. 611 (1960), a distributor challenged a conditional permit of the Cinematic
Board stipulating that the script of a German documentary be read in Hebrew, since "a
movie about Israel should not be presented in the German language." Id at 613. The
Court (per Justice Silberg) held that "if the Board considered the German language as unfit
for the content and purpose of that film, we are not prepared to opine that that consideration
was unreasonable." Id at 613. In Shalom Cohen v. Minister of Defense, 16 P.D. 1023
(1962), the Court sustained the repeal of a permit to a reporter to serve as military correspondent because the journal which employed petitioner "acts consistently against the educational spirit of Israel's Defense Forces.' Chief Justice Olshan, speaking for the Court,
held that petitioner had "no right recognized by statute." Id at 1033. There was no statutory basis for the established practice of the Defense Ministry to grant permits to reporters.
In Itzhaki v. Minister of Justice, 28(2) P.D. 692 (1973), a retired pfiblic employee wrote a
book on the 1948 Battles of Latroun. The book was cleared by the military censorship, but
the Minister of Justice withheld permit for publication. The decision was sustained by the
Court, again without consideration of the right to free expression herein implicated. None
of these decisions attempted to explore the due process requirements of free speech claims.
See Monaghan, FirstAmendment Due Process, 83 HARV. L. Rnv. 518 (1970). These decisions also reflect the Formal Style in Israeli decisions, which goes together with the licentiousness doctrine.
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The Inner Circle

In a handful of decisions, the Court recognized a core of expression which it considered inviolable under Israeli law. This line of decisions clearly reflects the legacy of Kol-Ha'am, in terms of both the

content of expression and the justification for its protection.2°4 Political
expression, open, robust and often offensive, should be protected. The
justification for this unequivocal protection was derived from the democratic character of the state. Adequate processes of democracy cannot
function without the guarantee of free speech.
2. The Outer Circle
The common denominator of those cases falling into the outer cir-

cle is a conscious effort by the Court to outline the boundaries of free
speech in situations where it perceived the expression as falling outside
the inner circle. While none of these cases attempted to follow the

route carved by Kol-Ha'am, its elements are present in all of them.20 5

In these cases, the Court shifts among three doctrines-bad tendency,

variations of adhoc balancing, and probable danger-without explaining why one test is preferred to another.
a. The Bad Tendency Test
Despite the fact that the bad tendency test was unequivocally rejected by Kol-Ha'am and several other cases,20 6 it was utilized by the

Court in two significant cases, both of which sprang from a general
campaign by the government to outlaw a nationalist organization of

Israeli Arabs. °7 In Jiryis v. Haffa District Commissioner,"8 the Court
204. Lahav, supra note 201, at 407-11. See, e.g., Israeli Communist Party v. Mayor of
Jerusalem, 16 P.D. 723 (1961). The Mayor of Jerusalem refused to grant the Communist
Party a permit to display an advertisement which criticized detente between Israel and West
Germany, saying, inter alia, "[W]ill Hitler's successors educate the teachers of Israel?" The
Court, vacating the denial of permit, said, "No municipal authority in Israel will find it hard
to allow amiable messages of its own Party or Parties which support it, but a true democracy
is measured by the voicing and publication of criticism, without which the democratic parliamentary regime will be destroyed." Id at 728 (Sussman, J.). In Livneh v. Prisons' Authority, 28(2) P.D. 686 (1974), a prisoner challenged denial of permit to purchase and read
Marxist literature. The permit was denied on the grounds that "reading these books will
cause debates on public matters which are directly or indirectly related to national security,
in the broad sense of the term." Id at 689. The Court, vacating the denial of permit, found:
"These are books which are studied-and which ought to be studied .
" Id
205. Lahav, supra note 201, at 413-21.
206. Dissenchik v. Attorney General, 17 P.D. 169, 180 (1962); Ulpaney Hasrata v. Garry,
16 P.D. 2407, 2418 (1962); Companies Registrar v. Kardosh, 16 P.D. 1209 (1961); KolHa'am, 1 SELECTED JUDGMENTS at 104.
207. The movement, called "El-Ard" ("The Land" in Arabic), listed among its goals the
finding of "a just solution to the Palestinian problem-through its consideration as an indi-
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employed the two elements of the bad tendency test-constructive in-

tent and indirect causation-to sustain denial of a permit to form an
association. 0 9 In Yardor v. CentralElections Commission to the Sixth
Knesset, 1 ° members of the same group, joined by Israeli Jews, submitted a list of candidates to run in the 1965 elections to the Knesset. Despite the conceded fact that no statute authorized such denial, the Court

sustained the permit denial on the grounds that the list's initiators
"deny the integrity of the State of Israel and its very existence."22 ' Un-

questionably, Israel's vulnerability in terms of national security triggered the Court's aversion to this type of speech.
b. The Balancing Test

All cases that discussed balancing, with one exception,212 employed a simple ad hoc balancing test. The Court juxtaposed the interest in free expression against another social interest and intuitively
decided which was weightier. One such example, from the pen of Jus-

tice Landau, suffices.2z 3 Petitioner challenged denial of a permit to
show his play. Sustaining the denial, the Court said:
Indeed, there is a consensus that one purpose of the theatre is to
criticize negative social phenomena, and satire is a known means
to do so. But under Israeli law even a playwright is not absolved
of the duty not to hurt the feelings of others. This duty stems
visible unit-according to the will of the Palestinian Arab people." There was no evidence
of an attempt to engage in illegal or terrorist activities, and such intent was denied by the
organizers.
208. 18(4) P.D. 673 (1964).
209. The Court said: "This goal [of EI-Ard] denies resolutely and absolutely the existence of the State of Israel in general and the existence of the State in its present borders in
particular.. . and it is natural that those who support the association's goal disregard the
who will be fooled to
existence of the State and the rights of the Jewish People in it...
believe that this plan may be augmented through peaceful means and persuasion and that it
will not eventually lead to subversive activities and hostility." Md (per Witkon, J.; Landau
& Berinson, JJ., concurring). In responding to the petition, the State relied on foreign Arab
broadcasts and classified material not presented to the Court. For elements of the bad tendency test, see Z. CHAFEF, supra note 64, at 23-24.
210. 19(3) P.D. 365 (1965).
211. Id at 369. The Court did not analyze the slate's platform and relied on the "fact"
established in Jiryis that El-Ard's goals were illegal. Justices Agranat and Sussman wrote
opinions for the majority. Justice Cohen dissented. The fact that Justice Agranat was in the
majority proves that he himself did not completely internalize his own theories presented in
the Kol-Ha'am case. One explanation for his opinion may be the pervasive Israeli fear of
Palestinian nationalism.
212. Omer v. State of Israel, 24(1) P.D. 408 (1969), held that pornographic material is
that which (1) is likely to influence the reasonable man, not those particularly vulnerable,
and (2) has no redeeming social value. This type of balancing resembles the approach
known as definitional balancing.
213. Keynan v. Cinematic Review Bd., 26(2) P.D. 811, 814 (1972).
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directly from the reciprocal obligation of tolerance among free
citizens of different creeds, without which a pluralist democratic
society like ours cannot survive. So important is this obligation,
that even 2 the
basic principle of free expression must be
14
withdrawn.
c. The Probable Danger Test
Despite the fact that probable danger was adopted as the proper
test in Kol-Halam, it was subsequently utilized only twice by the Israeli
Supreme Court. Both cases sprang from the denial of a permit to show
a film or a play. In one case, involving a newsreel about police brutality in a Tel-Aviv slum, the Court overruled the Board's decision. 1 5 In
the other, involving a play the plot of which resembled a bribery trial
against a judge while the trial was still pending, the Court decided that
a permit should be denied. 1 6
These opinions point out several important facets of Israeli free
speech jurisprudence just prior to Halaretz in 1977. z
The core
message of Kol-Halam, that political speech is crucial for the survival
of democracy, had been partially internalized. This does not mean that
the Court had made a conscious effort to protect political expression
whenever such expression came before it. Indeed, the contours of protected political expression are rather narrow. 1 8 But the recognition
that there is such a core, whatever its boundaries, along with the justification from democracy, have become a part of Israeli constitutional
law.
Intellectually, however, Israeli free speech jurisprudence can be
characterized as rather unsatisfactory. None of the opinions reviewed
matches the formidable task accomplished by Justice Agranat in KolHa'am. On the theoretical level, no effort was made to pursue in any
depth the variety of justifications for free speech offered by KolHa'am,2 1 9 or to analyze their implications for establishing doctrine.
On the doctrinal level, fragmented thinking characterized the opinions.
It is not clear why a particular doctrine was applied in a particular case
or if the Court perceived any difference between the doctrines. Rather,
it seems that the opinions were written on an ad hoe basis, without a
214. Id at 814. See also Wagner v. Attorney General, 18 P.D. 29 (1964); Dissenchik v.
Attorney General, 17 P.D. 169 (1962).
215. Ulpaney Hasrata v. Garry, 16 P.D. 2407 (1962).
216. Attorney General v. Cinematic Review Bd., 20(4) P.D. 75 (1966).
217. 32(3) P.D. 337 (1977).
218. See, e.g., Keynan v. Cinematic Review Bd., 26(2) P.D. 811 (1972); Yardor v. Central
Elections Comm., 19(3) P.D. 365 (1965).
219. See note 60 supra.
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sense of intellectual continuity. Justice Agranat clearly foresaw the
possibility of such a development and therefore outlined detailed instructions for decisionmaking in this area,220 but the post-Kol-Ha'am
opinions made little use of his effort.
If there is a guiding theory in the Israeli opinions, particularly in
those contained in the outer circle, it is the licentiousness doctrine. The
process component of this doctrine-abstention from principled interest balancing-is clearly there. Deference to executive, as well as to
parliamentary judgment, in the realm of both national security and
morality, is evident.22 ' Where the Court undertakes a substantive review of the speech involved, legitimate speech oftentimes coincides
with acceptable community standards, as intuitively perceived by the
2 22

Court.

Thus, the tension created in Kol-Ha'am between interest balancing
and the licentiousness doctrine has accompanied Israeli free speech
opinions since 1953. The next intellectual effort to confront this subject
occurred in 1977, in Halaretz v. Electric Company.2 2

I.

1977-Exit: New York Times v. Sullivan Rejected

A. Ha'aretz v. Electric Company: A Brief Summation

Between 1965 and 1967, Israel underwent a sharp and distressing
recession. During that time, the Electric Company, one of Israel's largest governmental enterprises, purchased a luxury car for its director
general. The press was alerted, the purchase was criticized, and the
director soon announced that he would sell the car. Months passed, the
car was not sold, and the press resumed the attack. Ha'aretz, one of
Israel's most respected dailies, published an article asserting that "in
fact the . . . Company has no interest in selling the car."224 At that
220. For a discussion of the doctrinal and postdoctrinal stages, see text accompanying
notes 162-85 supra. In the Yardor opinion, 19(3) P.D. 365, Justice Agranat himself failed to
follow these guidelines.
221. Eg., Avidan v. Cinematic and Theatrical Review Bd., 28(2) P.D. 766 (1973);
Yardor v. Central Elections Comm., 19(3) P.D. 365 (1965); Jiryis v. Haifa Dist. Comm.,
18(4) P.D. 673 (1964).
222. E.g., Ulpaney Hasrata v. Garry, 16 P.D. 2407 (1962).
223. 32(3) P.D. 337 (1977). A similar tension exists within American free speech jurisprudence between the methodology of interest balancing advocated by Chafee and adhoc
balancing advocated by Justice Frankfurter (the latter echoing the licentiousness doctrine).
See M. SHAPIRO, supra note 147, at 76-104.
224. The article is cited by Justice Shamgar: "On 10.26.1966 Ha'aretz published that the
Electric Co. had purchased a Chevrolet Impala model 1966 for its director general Mr. J.
Pelled. The car cost 33,500 IL.
"Following letters from readers and articles in the press, which protested this 'spending
habit' of a public company which suffers deficits, raises prices and is unable to distribute
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time, some tension must have existed between the director general and
Ha'aretz. Before publication, the reporter who investigated the case

sought the company's reaction, but its spokesman "refused to answer,
apparently following a general order from the [director]. . . not to give
2 2 5 The Electric Company and its direcany information to Ha'aretz."
2
26
tor brought a libel suit.
Years passed. In 1974, the newspaper appealed the final judgment against it to the Supreme Court in a'aretz v.
Electric Company.2 2 7 First, an ordinary panel of three Supreme Court

justices overruled the district court decision against Ha'aretz by a twoto-one vote (Ha'aretzI). Justice Shamgar, one of the majority, rested
his analysis on a 1964 decision by the United States Supreme Court,
New York Times v. Sullivan.228 The Electric Company, encouraged by
dividends, Mr. Pelled's press release was published on 11.8.66. It said: '[A]lithough I disagree with those who see a connection between replacing the car and the recession policy, I
decided to sell the new car and keep the old car-only in order to remove any ground for
dissatisfaction, even though unjustified.'
"Mr. Pelled (70), who is expected to retire in October, returned to his old car. Chevrolet
Impala 1963.
"The new car, in which Mr. Pelled drove some 6,000 km., was returned to the Tel-Aviv
agent, Mr. Leo Goldberg, to be sold and its value returned to the company.
"It is already more than 4 months that the car is supposedly on sale, at the Goldberg
Agency in Tel-Aviv, but in fact the Electric Co. has no interest in selling the car. It hopes
that after a while, when the public forgets about this story, the car -ill be returned to serve
the retiring director, because by then it will be a used car, model 1966, whereas the model
year 1967 nears its end.
"The Goldberg Agency was instructed to sell the car, but on the condition that the
Company first approves the deal. After much efforts the Agency managed to find a buyer
who offered 24-25 thousand IL. The official in the transportation department of the Electric
Co. refused to approve. He said that even if they get an offer of 28,000 IL. (which they will
never get) they will still have to receive his approval before closing the deal.
"And thus, the people at the Goldberg Agency conclude that the Electric Co. is not
interested in selling the car, that all it wants is to gain time, until public indignation withers.
Because if they decided, for reasons of public hygiene, to sell the car, what difference does
the price make? All one has to ascertain is that the car gets the right price in the used cars
market.
"It is not so easy to sell a luxurious Impala, such as was ordered by the Electric Co. for
its Director, Mr. Pelled; with an automatic shift, a foreign-made radio, electric antenna and
other luxurious devices which raise its price some thousands ILs. above the standard.
"The Ministry of Development should instruct the Electric Co. to sell the car without
duplicity." Ha'aretz v. Electric Co., 31(2) P.D. 281, 286-87 (1974).
225. Id at 289.
226. Shortly thereafter the car was sold. Id at 289.
227. 31(2) P.D. 281 (1974). [Editor's note: There is no official translation of Ha'aretz v.
Electric Company, 31(2) P.D. 281 (1974) (Ha'aretz1). The author has prepared her own
translation of Ha'aretz I and all quotations from that case are taken from her unofficial
translation. All citations, however, to Ha'aretz I are made to the official report in 31(2)
P.D.].
228. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). Sullivan, an Alabama police commissioner, brought a libel
suit against the New York Times for having published an allegedly defamatory advertise-
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the strong dissent, petitioned for a further hearing. In 1978, by a fourto-one vote, Israel's Supreme Court reversed itself and reinstated the
libel verdict (Ha'aretz 1). 229 As it did before the previous panel,

Halaretz argued that two defenses absolved the publication from
charges of defamation: truth and fair comment. There was a consen-

sus among the justices that the defense of truth did not apply.230 The
various opinions accordingly focused on the defense of fair comment.

The relevant portion of the Defamation Law was section 15(4):
In a criminal or civil action for defamation, it shall be a good
defense if the accused or defendant made the publication in good
faith under any of the following circumstances:
(4) the publication was an expression of opinion on the
conduct of the injured party in a judicial, official or public capacity, in a public service or in connection with a public matter, or
past actions or opinions as revealed by such
on his character,
23 1
conduct

ment. The United States Supreme Court reversed the Alabama Supreme Court decision.
Justice Brennan, writing for six members of the Court, held that state libel laws which protect public officials must conform to the principles embedded in the First and Fourteenth
Amendments. Hence, "constitutional guarantees require. . . a federal rule that prohibits a
public official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official
conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with 'actual malice'--that is, with
knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not." Id at
279-80.
229. Electric Co. v. Ha'aretz, 32(3) P.D. 337 (1977). [Editor's note: There is no official
translation of Electric Company v. H'aretz, 32(3) P.D. 337 (1977) (HalaretzI1). The author
has prepared her own translation of Ha'aretz11 and all quotations from that case are taken
from her unofficial translation. All citations, however, to Halaretz1I are made to the official
report in 32(3) P.D.]. Court Law 5717-1957, at § 8, 11 L.S.I. 157 (1956-1957), provides for a
further hearing by a bench of five or more justices to reconsider a case already decided by a
panel of three justices, "if in view of the importance, difficulty or novelty of the rule...
there is. . . room for a further hearing."
230. Defamation Law 5725-1965, at § 14, reads: "In a criminal or civil action for defamation, it shall be a good defense that the matter published was true and the publication was
in the public interest, provided that the publication did not exceed what was necessary from
the point of view of that interest. This defense shall not be denied by reason only that the
truth of an incidental detail which is not actually injurious has not been proven."
The factual errors in the Ha'aretz article, on which the district court relied in denying
the defense of truth were: a) three-and-one-half (rather than four) months had passed since
the car was returned; b) the model year of American cars is calculated according to the
Gregorian calendar (unlike European cars)-hence it was not true that the model year was
about to expire; c) it was not true that the Goldberg Agency did not make efforts to sell the
car, d) the Goldberg Agency made the decision to store the car in the warehouse-hence.it
was erroneous to attribute to respondents an intent to hide the car. Ha'aretzl,31(2) P.D. at
291-92. For two opposing interpretations of the entire factual situation, compare the Shamgar opinion, see notes 251-92 and accompanying text supra, with the Ben-Porath dissent, see
notes 293-316 and accompanying text supra.
231. Defamation Law 5725-1965, at § 15.
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Section 15(4) deals directly with public officials and therefore
could be interpreted as recognizing the role of free expression in democracy. The meaning of "opinion" in section 15(4), however, is not
clear. It could be distinguished from "fact," or it could be interpreted
more loosely as applying to all expression the predominant nature of
which is "commentary." Section 16 of the Defamation Law, constructing a presumption of "good faith," could be utilized to support either
interpretation:
(a) If the accused or defendant proves that he made the publication under any of the circumstances referred to in section 15
and that it did not exceed what was reasonable under such circumstances, he shall be presumed to have made it in good faith.
(b) The accused or defendant shall be presumed to have made
the publication otherwise than in good faith if(1) the matter published is not true and he did not believe
it to be true; or
(2) the matter is not true and he had not, prior to publishing it, taken reasonable steps to ascertain whether it was true
or not;
(3) he intended to inflict greater injury by the publication
than was reasonable in defending the values protected by
section 15.232

One could read the New York Times v. Sullivan standard of faultknowledge of falsehood or reckless disregard of the truth-into sections
16(b)(1) and (2). Section 16(a)'s requirement that the expression "did
not exceed what was reasonable under such circumstances" supports
this interpretation by referring to standards generally employed by
journalists in researching and publishing. In contradistinction, a court
wishing to define opinion narrowly could interpret the phrase "the matter published is not true" in sections 16(b)(1) and (2) as a condition that
all facts upon which the publisher relies be true before good faith is
recognized.233
Justice Shamgar's interpretation in Ha'aretzI was inspired by the
justification for free speech in democracy, particularly in the context of
criticism of public officials. This led him to conclude that where a publication involves both facts and opinion, whether or not it falls under
section 15(4) should be determined in light of the predominant nature
232. Id at § 16.
233. As a matter of statutory construction, this interpretation is unsatisfactory. First, it
implies that the defense of fair comment applies only when the defense of truth also applies,
which may nullify the fair comment defense. Moreover, such an interpretation forces the
court into an artificial definition of "good faith," since the "good faith" of the journalist and
the fact that reasonable standards of research are employed are not sufficient, and the
"facts" must still be true. See note 312 infra.
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of the publication. Once the publication is classified as "opinion," the
defense of good faith obtains unless the elements mentioned by section
16(b) are proven. That is, the defense of fair comment is operative

even though some erroneous facts were interlaced in the text. Applying
this formula to the instant case, Justice Shamgar held that the predomi-

nant nature of the publication amounted to opinion, and because none
of the conditions of section 16(b) were proved, Ha'aretzwas protected
under the defense of good faith.2 34

Justice Landau's majority opinion in Ha'aretzI, following Justice
Ben-Porath's dissent in Ha'aretzI, preferred the interest of protecting
the reputation of the public official over the interest in free expression
and rested on a firm distinction between facts and opinion. A court
must classify the content of publications into either facts or opinion.
Facts can enjoy only the defense of truth. Opinion can enjoy the defense of good faith, provided that the facts upon which it was based
were clearly presented and true. Justice Landau then classified crucial

parts of the Halaretzarticle as facts. Since untrue, they could not enjoy
the defense of section 15(4). Halaretz thus was held liable for having
published a defamatory article. 35
B. The Recipient System on the Eve of Rejection
Before analyzing the opinion further, it is helpful to contrast the
Israel of 1953 with that of 1977-1978. When the probable danger test

appeared in 1953, Israel was a nascent state with fledgling institutions.
By the time that Halaretz was decided, a quarter of a century had
passed. Israel had evolved into a more mature entity, and the history

of its growth included the intoxicating feeling of omnipotence following the 1967 Six Day War and the sad, sober disillusionment following

the War of 1973. Its political processes were already structured. The
234. Ha'aretz 1, 31(2) P.D. at 305-06. In other words, the presumption of good faith
created by § 16 is not rebutted only because some facts are untrue, since proof of the other
elements mentioned in § 16 is still required. Justice Berinson, concurring in the result,
opined that the facts presented in the article were only marginally incorrect and that since
the good faith of the reporter was evident, the defenses of § 15(4) and § 16 should obtain.
31(2) P.D. at 314-15.
235. Three justices concurred in the Landau opinion, Justices Kahan, Etzioni, and BenPorath. Justice Shamgar dissented. It should be emphasized that in terms of the result, the
decision could not be read as having a chilling effect on the press. The Electric Company
was awarded the symbolic sum of 1 IL., worth 7 cents in 1977 (because of its spokesman's
refusal to communicate with Ha'aretz).
See text accompanying note 225 supra. The Director General was awarded 10,000 IL.
But see New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), where the damages awarded at
the state level amounted to $500,000. See also Kalven, The New York Times Case: A Note
on The CentralMeaning ofthe First 4mendment, 1964 Sup. CT. RFv. 191, 196.
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constant anxiety over national security did not erode the basic commitment to democracy. Moreover, the establishment press 236 developed a

sense of self-identity. Differentiated from the government, the press
became a watchdog of the power holders.23 7

The legal culture was transformed. There was a constitution of
sorts and a draft of a bill of rights was pending in the Knesset.238 The
issue of Israel's dependence on British law was debated at length, and a
consensus had emerged about the necessity of developing independent
modes of legal thinking. New statutes replaced old Ottoman and Eng-

lish law.2 39 In 1965, after ten years of turbulent debate in which public
opinion, the press and the bar were heavily involved, the Knesset had
passed a new Defamation Law.2 4 Thus, the statute to be interpreted

by the Israeli Supreme Court in 1977 was not the archaic product of a
colonial government but the creation of the sovereign Israeli legislature, one considered suitable to mode= Israel.

Last, but not least, the Supreme Court largely had accomplished
the task it was laboring to achieve in 1953. It had developed into a
symbol of justice and the rule of law. The Court had delivered coura236. Halaretzwas an independent daily, catering to the middle class and the intelligentsia. Kol-Ha'am was the voice of the Communist Party and was therefore at the fringe of
Israeli politics.
237. Until independence, the establishment Hebrew press generally viewed itself as a
partner, often as the voice, of the Jewish leadership in Palestine. The sociopolitical upheaval
surrounding the passage to sovereignty slowed somewhat the differentiation process. Notice
the difference between the article in Kol-Ha'am (hyperbolic editorial attacking the legitimacy of the government) and the article in Halaretz (investigative reporting exposing alleged corruption in an otherwise legitimate government).
238. Because of the inability of the Knesset to reach a consensus concerning the content
of a constitution, it was decided to enact a series of basic laws which together would eventually form a constitution. So far, seven basic laws have been passed. See Lahav, Israel's
Constitution, in CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD (Blaustein & Flanz,
eds.) (Supp. 1979). In July 1980, "Basic Law: Jerusalem" was added as seventh to the list.
In coining the term "basic law," the drafters were probably influenced by the fact that in the
German Federal Republic the constitution was termed "basic law" (Grundgesetz, rather
than Perfassung). The Grundgesetz, however, is a comprehensive constitution. The Bill of
Rights, pending in the Knesset since 1973 (whether or not it will ever be enacted is unclear),
recognizes the principle of free expression and provides for judicial review only for statutes
passed subsequent to the passage of the Bill. For the text of the Bill of Rights and commentary, see Ratner, Constitutions,Majoritaranism,and JudicialRevieK: The Function of a Bill
ofRights in Israeland the United States, 26 AM. J. COMP. L. 373 (1978). See also note 284
infra.239. The "Fundamentals of Law" statute, 1980 SEPHER HA-HOUKIN 163 (in Hebrew),
cuts the formal Israeli ties to England, substituting therefor "the principles of liberty, justice,
fairness and peace of the heritage of Israel." For a discussion of the process of creating an
independent Israeli positive law, see Friedman, Independent Development ofIsraeliLaw, 10
ISR. L. Rv. 515 (1975).
240. See note 230 supra.
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geous decisions which directly affected Israeli political culture, had attempted to exercise the powers of judicial review, and had developed
administrative law to curb caprice and bias in the bureaucracy. 24 1
All the above does not necessarily suggest that transplantation,
particularly of American law, became easier. To be sure, a strong, confident Supreme Court, presiding over a more developed legal system
with an increased level of societal tolerance and broader recognition of
the principle of free expression, could readily lead to a rather sympathetic attitude toward the New York Times v. Sullivan formula. The
actual exposure of corruption among high government officials could
be expected
to strengthen faith in the "checking value of a free
' 242
press.
Yet the legal milieu within which the Ha'aretz case had to be decided presented formidable obstacles to transplantation. Legal formalism, the rival of sociological jurisprudence, was still strong in Israel. In
Halaretz, legal formalism created two major obstacles to transplantation of American case law: the distinction between private and public
law, and the rigid separation of fact from opinion, epitomized in the
nineteenth century British conception of fair comment. The distinction between private and public law is an aspect of legal formalism 2 4 3 that has been strong in Israel. Ha'aretz was a tort
case, of private law, even though criticism of official conduct was involved. 244 When the United States Supreme Court applied the First
Amendment to the law of defamation, it turned the defamation of public officials into a matter of constitutional law, thereby relaxing the orthodox, common law division between public and private law.24 5 It
could do so not only because it had a Constitution to expound, but also
because it was part of a pragmatic, intellectually curious legal culture,
which did not fear the exploration of law's interrelationship with politics and society. Israel's Supreme Court operated in a milieu spellbound by analytical positivism. The Court generally, although not
exclusively, took "legal formalism" as the legitimate standard for ap241. See generally A. RUBINSTEIN, supra note 1; Shetreet, Refections on the Protection of
the Rights ofthe Individual- Form and Substance, 12 IsR. L. REv. 32 (1977).
242. E.g., Yadlin v. State of Israel, 32(1) P.D. 31 (1977). For the checking value of the
press, see Blasi, The Checking Value in FirstAmendment Theory, 1977 AM. B. FOUND. RESEARCH J. 521, 529-44.
243. W. FRIEDMAN, LEGAL THEORY 285 (5th ed. 1967). See also Kennedy, Form and
Substance in PrivateLaw Adjudication, 89 HARv. L. REv. 1685 (1976); note 294 infra.
244. In contradistinction, Kol-Ha'am was a case of administrative (public) law and focused on the power of the government to interfere directly with press activity.
245. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE
LAW OF TORTS 819 (1971); L. TRIBE, supra note 165, at 634-46.
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propriate judicial decisionmaking. For this Court, it was much more
difficult to make a connection between the doctrine of seditious libel
and a private tort action.
The second barrier to transplantation is the doctrine of fair comment. The nineteenth century distinction between fact and opinion has
strong appeal for formalists, not only because of its ostensibly scientific
aura, but also because the Israeli statute itself speaks of "opinion" and
'
"fact."246
Transplantation of New York Times v. Sullivan would require relaxation of this distinction-at least with respect to criticism of
public officials. This barrier contained a variable which is also part of
the private-public law dichotomy, but which is more pronounced here;
that is, the attachment of Israeli legal thought to the common law
world, particularly to England. New York Times v. Sullivan was a radical departure from the traditional fair comment doctrine. Outside the
United States, the fact-opinion dichotomy in the defense of fair comment was still strong.247 Transplantation of the American doctrine,
therefore, meant a painful separation from the rest of the common law
world. Justice Agranat, in Kol-Halam, did not have to confront such a
major rupture. 24 8

Added to these major barriers is the basic attitude toward free expression. In Ha'aretz, the distinction between the doctrine of licentiousness and interest balancing creeps back into the picture. In KolHa'am, Justice Agranat preferred the balancing approach. He left licentiousness dormant, yet breathing. In Ha'aretz I, Justice Shamgar
adopted the Agranat position. Justice Ben-Porath, in her dissent, revived the spirit of licentiousness, and Justice Landau's majority opinion in Ha'aretzII restored it to a predominant position.24 9
None of the justices involved in Ha'aretz had the asset which
made transplantation of American law so smooth for Justice Agranat
in Kol-Ha'am: a solid American legal training. Yet, even in the absence of an American trained judge as an active participant in this controversy, it is apparent that American law played a substantial part in
246. See text accompanying note 231 su.pra.
247. This, at least, was the perception of the Israeli Supreme Court. Ha'aretzII, 32 (3)
P.D. at 355 (Landau, J.).
248. In Kol-Ha'am no sophisticated common law doctrine competed with the American
approach.
249. It may be argued that the Landau/Ben-Porath approach is further consistent with
Kol-Ha'am because Justice Agranat explicitly left the regulation of speech about reputation
to the legislature, see notes 78-79 and accompanying text supra. Yet, the Defamation Law
needed interpretation which necessarily depended upon the Court's conception of free
expression.
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the Court's disposition of the case. 50
C. The Shamgar Version of Grand Style
1. Jurisprudenceand Doctrinein Justice Shamgar's Opinion
Policymaking, through the method of interest balancing, dominates Justice Shamgar's opinion. The "problematic" nature of the

question before the Court, he says, springs from the conflict between
the interest in privacy on the one hand and the interest in free expres-

sion on the other.2 51 He solves this conffict by juxtaposing three possible approaches: a "horizontal" balancing approach that considers all
interests as equal in worth and weight; a "vertical" balancing approach,
that assigns a preferred status to certain interests; and a two-tiered ap-

proach that "consider[s] the law of defamation as an exception to the
right of free expression." 2
Justice Shamgar selected the "vertical" approach as the most appropriate. First, the vertical approach was presented as the one which
is generally preferred over the other two:
[W]ith regard to defamation addressed toward those holding an
250. Chief Justice Agranat had retired in 1976, one year before Ha'aretz was decided.
By then, the Court had some new members, including Justice Shamgar, appointed in 1975,
and Justice Ben-Porath, appointed in 1976. These two justices represent the cleavage in the
new Court. Justice Ben-Porath, formerly President of the District Court, represents the formal style in judicial opinions and a dogged loyalty to English law. Justice Shamgar, formerly Attorney General, displays Grand Style policy-oriented activism as well as sympathy
for American doctrines. The confrontation between the two was temporarily solved by a
veteran member of the Court, Justice Landau (now Chief Justice). His opinion is a mixture
of styles: Formal Style, to plant firmly the fair comment doctrine into Israeli law, and
Grand Style, to buttress his conservative bias and to oust "radical" American free speech
doctrines from the shores of Israel.
251. Ha'aretz I, 31(2) P.D. at 293. "The problematic nature of this area of law...
[stems from the fact]. . that with regard to both the prohibitions on defamation and the
protection of privacy, the question arises concerning the proper boundaries between the protection of these rights and the protection of free expression." Id (emphasis added). But see
Justice Agranat's gambit in Kol-Ha'am, supra notes 91-102. Why Justice Shamgar linked
the right of privacy to the right of reputation becomes apparent when his source is consulted.
He refers to T. EMERSON, supra note 151, at 517 (libel and privacy). Justice Shamgar, like
Justice Agranat before him, borrows the analysis of an American scholar in order to develop
Israeli law.
252. Ha'aretzl,31(2) P.D. at 293-94. "The relationship between the prohibition of defamation and freedom of expression was defined in a variety of ways and approaches. The
difference between the approaches lies principally in the assertion of the statuses of the two
areas, one against the other, Ze.,. . . separate and equal areas or values one of which deserves preference and therefore outweighs the other, either generally or depending on particular circumstances. Some considered the law of defamation as an exception to the right to
free expression, and defined it as a prohibition which circumscribes this right and narrows
its decisiveness." Id (citations omitted). The terms "horizontal" and "vertical" are taken
from Justice Landau's opinion in Ha'aretzII, 32(3) P.D. at 343.
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official or public position, the approach which considers defamation as an exception to free expression was long abandoned in the
United States, for example, and there the principle was established, which assigns a preferred position to the right of free expression [opinion] in matters of public 2interest
which involve
53
those holding official or public positions.

Justice Shamgar then buttressed the applicability of the vertical approach in Israeli law. He interpreted Israel's commitment to a demo-

cratic form of government as endowing the principle of free expression
with special status in its constitutional law. 4 Criticism of public officials was seen as the essence of a thriving democracy.25 5 The impor-

tance of public criticism cannot be overlooked merely because a case
involves defamation and thus nonpublic law.
[T]he right to free expression may easily deteriorate, if. . the
road to direct governmental intervention be barred, but at the
same time the individual be exposed to defamation suits as a result of negative criticism of a public official concerning his official
conduct, which blemishes [the official] in the eye of public

opinion.256
Here Justice Shamgar encountered an obstacle. In the United
States, a preferred position for the First Amendment could arguably
lead to a nullification of a statute if that statute assigned another con-

flicting interest, such as the interest in reputation, a heavier weight. In
Israel, the principle of parliamentary supremacy obtained: the Knesset

could prefer any interest over free expression. Justice Shamgar circumvents this obstacle by invoking the technique used by Justice Agranat
253. HalaretzI,31(2) P.D. at 294. Notice that the United States is presented as an example, thus implying that the preferred position is also accepted elsewhere.
254. The crucial role of free speech in safeguarding other fundamental rights further
enhances this special status. "[Tihe basic liberties, and first and foremost among them the
principle of free expression, are anchored in our basic legal approach, and they are an integral part of Israeli Law. It is well known that these rights have been woven into our legal
system as a result of the political system which we chose for ourselves. However, the obligation to maintain them in practice is not only political, or socio-moral, but also legal.
"The basic right of free expression is of decisive importance to ascertainment of the
nature of the regime, which obtains in a given political or social framework. Furthermore, it
is the very foundation and precondition for loyal safeguarding of most other basic rights;
Ze., other basic rights such as the right of free exercise of religion lose their stability and
their materialization in actuality is threatened. Furthermore, the described character of free
expression as a right among constitutional basic rights gives it a superior legal status." Id at
295 (citation omitted).
255. "The possibility and opportunity to air political, social and other criticism of the
conduct of the regime, its institutions, companies, their agents and employees, is a sine qua
non for the maintenance of a working democracy." 1d at 296.
256. Id at 296 (emphasis in original & citations omitted).
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in Kol-Halam, by holding that a statute cannot impede free expression
unless it is couched in clear, explicit terms:
Every limitation of this right and its scope, which stems from a
statute, should be narrowly interpreted, with the purpose of giving this right maximum living space, and not limiting it one bit
beyond what is clearly and explicitly required by the statutory
language. . . . Freedom of expression and a statutory provision
which2 5comes
to limit it do not have an equal and identical
7
status.
Having thus established his premises, Justice Shamgar turned to
Israel's defamation statute. The components of the defense of fair
comment, he asserted, should be the following: a) the defamatory text
should be read as a whole; b) the opinion expressed therein can be
harsh and robust (the opinion need not be "objective" and need not
satisfy the taste of a moderate and balanced reader); and c) the classification of the content of the publication as either "fact" or "comment"
depends on its predominant nature. A defamatory text can still be classified as comment even if some inaccurate facts are interpolated.2 5 8
Justice Shamgar summarizes the defense of fair comment in Israeli law
in these terms:
[T]he purpose is to open the door before criticism, and protect it
against defamation suits, even if it is found that the comment is
not based upon truth and even if the mode of thinking which was
expressed in that comment does not fit with the logic acceptable
to the court. Sections 15 and 16 do not create a judicial censorship over the truth in writing, and the logic of drawing conclusions; rather, they are a system of cumulative conditions the
purpose of which is to deny the defense of goodfaith to malicious
expression only, Le., false expression which is airedeither knowingl or recklessly, as delineatedin section 16(b).25 9
Justice Shamgar then applied his doctrine to the case before him, and
held that the defense of fair comment absolved the newspaper of tort

liability.

260

257. Id at 295. Both Justices Agranat and Shamgar use Dicey's formula of clear statutory statements in order to protect an unwritten constitutional principle against legislative
encroachment. Justice Shamgar, it should be noted, goes one step further than Justice
Agranat, since he is limiting not the power of the executive branch (as was done in KolHa'am), but the power of the courts to protect private individuals who are also public officials. See A. DicEy, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 6263 (1885).
258. Halaretz1, 31 (2) P.D. at 300-10.
259. Id at 310 (emphasis added).
260. Id at 310-14.
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Transplantation American Influence on Justice Shamgar's Opinion

Like Justice Agranat's opinion in Kol-Ha'am, the Shamgar opinion reflects both a general influence of American jurisprudence and a
particular imprint of American doctrines.
a. Jurisprudence
American jurisprudential influence on Justice Shamgar is manifest
on three levels: the general characterization of the problem as calling
for interest balancing, the three approaches toward balancing the interest in free expression against other interests, and the justifications for
protecting free expression in a liberal democracy.
The dominance of interest balancing in American constitutional
law and its influence in Israel has been discussed above.2 6 1 As for the
method of balancing, two of the three approaches mentioned by Justice
Shamgar also appear in Justice Brennan's opinion in New York Times
v. Sullivan-the two-tiered approach and the preferred freedom approach.26 2 What is particularly interesting here is the intellectual development of the balancing approaches in American First Amendment
jurisprudence and their connection to the development of free speech
law in Israel.
It was Chafee who first articulated First Amendment doctrines in
terms of interest balancing. Balancing by the United States Supreme
Court was not merely result oriented. Rather, the Court had to enunciate a "rational principle" which mediated the conflicting interests.26 3
Chafee applied his theory to the conflict between free expression and
national security by concluding that clear and present danger was the
proper "rational principle" for the particular situation, but his theory
could apply to any conflict of interests. However, courts generally did
not see the connection between principled balancing and clear and
present danger. When Justice Frankfurter offered his adhoc balancing
test as an alternative to the prevailing doctrine, 26" it became accepted
dogma that "balancing" was something different from clear and present danger. Balancing Ala Frankfurter also had an instrumental tinge;
it sought to give additional weight to the interest in national security.
261. See text accompanying notes 67-111 supra.
262. Ha'aretzI, 31(2) P.D. at 293-94. The two cases cited by Justice Shamgar to illustrate the two-tiered theory, Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942), and
Beauhamais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 266 (1952), also appear in Justice Brennan's opinion,
New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 268.
263. Z. CHAFEE, supra note 64.
264. See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 546-52 (1951) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
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In this respect, it differed from Chafee as well as from the Holmes-

which assigned a preferred status to the principle of
Brandeis opinions,
2 65
free expression.
In New York Times v. Sullivan, Justice Brennan restored Chafee's

theory of interest balancing. The particular emphasis on the pivotal
role of the principle of free expression reflected both a thoughtful bal-

ancing process (the kind advocated by Chafee and Pound) and a reaction against Justice Frankfurter's ad hoc balancing. The "actual
malice" formula was none other than the "rational principle" advocated by Chafee.

66

In New York Times v. Sullivan, Justice Brennan

rejected both the ad hoc balancing test and the two-tier 'formula, at
least insofar as it applied to the defamation of public officials, and instead instituted Chafee's theory of balancing, or the "preferred position" method of balancing.
The connection between this development and Israeli case law is
clear. Justice Shamgar did not have to travel to America to discover
preferred balancing.2 67 The Chafee-Brennan approach was trans-

planted into Israel in 1953, in Kol-Ha'am. This direct borrowing from
New York Times v. Sullivan reflects either a failure to see that the local

law provided an identical approach or an attraction to the foreign. In
either case, the 1977 transplantation does indicate that while the transplantation of 1953 did not fail, it was not fully integrated into Israeli
law.
The influence of Justice Brennan's opinion is also manifest in the

content of the justifications for free expression advanced by Justice
Shamgar-the relationship between free expression and the nature of

the polity, and the function of free speech as guardian of other rightsboth of which appeared in New York Times v. Sullivan .268 But what is
265. Id at 517. See also note 196 supra. Under Justice Frankfurter's analysis, the careful explication of the interests at stake gave way to a casual assessment and the quest for a
"rational principle" gave way to an ad hoc approach. See J. ELY, supra note 107, at 108.
For a similar historical analysis of the respective roles of interest balancing, the clear and
present danger test, the preferred position, and ad hoc balancing, see M. SHAPIRO, supra
note 147, at 76-104.
266. See Z. CHAFEE, supra note 64, at 279-80.
267. Indeed, Justice Brennan did not use the term "preferred position," but in the literature following New York Ymes v. Sullivan his approach was labeled the "preferred position" approach as well as definitional balancing or categorization. -See, e.g., M. SHAPIRO,
supra note 147, at 76-104; Nimmer, The Right to Speak From Times to Time. FirstAmendment Theory Applied to Libel and Misappliedto Privacy, 56 CALIF. L. REv. 935 (1968).
268. "The basic right of free expression is of decisive importance to ascertainment of the
nature of the regime." Ha'aretzl, 31(2) P.D. at 295. See Justice Brennan's statement, "[The
American] form of government was 'altogether different' from the British form, under which
the Crown was sovereign and the people were subjects. is it not natural. . . under such
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most striking is the omission of Justice Brennan's seditious libel argument. It was not presented, despite the fact that Kol-Ha'am did absorb
the rejection of seditious libel,26 9 despite the centrality of this argument

in Justice Brennan's opinion, and despite the persuasiveness that this
argument could lend to the Shamgar approach.27
b. Doctrine
In order to transplant the New York Times v. Sullivan formula,

Justice Shamgar first had to overcome the formal separation between
private and public law. Again, Justice Shamgar relied on the redefinition of the boundary line between tort action and constitutional law in
New York Times v. Sullivan.27 Then, relying extensively and openly
on the Brennan analysis of the inadequacy of the defense of fair com-

ment to protect criticism of public officials,272 he transplanted Justice
Brennan's formula verbatim as the correct interpretation of section 16

of Israel's Defamation Law:
Sections 15 and 16 do not create a judicial censorship over the
truth in writing and the logic of drawing conclusions; rather, they
are a system of cumulative conditions, the purpose of which is to
deny the defense of goodfaith to malicious expression only, 1 e.,
different circumstances... that a different degree of [press] freedom ... should be contemplated?" 376 U.S. at 274-75 (quoting Madison).
Justice Shamgar's opinion continues, "flt is the very foundation and precondition of
loyal safeguarding of most other basic rights, ie., other basic rights such as the free exercise
of religion." Ha'aretzl,31(2) P.D. at 295. See Justice Brennan's statement, "[The right] of
free communication ... has ever been justly deemed the only effectual guardian of every
other right." 376 U.S. at 275 (quoting the Virginia Resolution of 1798). The connection to
the First Amendment is clear.

269. 1 SELECTED JUDGMENTS at 94-95.
270. See text accompanying note 287 infra.
271. Ha'aretzI, 31(2) P.D. at 295-96. "The described approach is indeed generally accepted by all, during assessment of the interrelationship between freedom of expression and
governmental powers in their entirety, but the maximal restraint upon governmental powers
in the areas of criminal law and administrative law is only part of the means designed to
protect . . .democracy .... It is needless to emphasize the importance of the correct
application of the yardstick referred to above, even in circumstances of the second type [tort
law], because the right to free expression may easily deteriorate, if indeed the road for dfrect
governmental intervention be blocked but at the same time the individual is exposed to
litigation within the defamation law as a result of negative and critical expression against a
public official, concerning his official conduct, which blemishes his status before public opinion (§ 1(3) Defamation Law)." Id (emphasis in original). See New York Times v. Sullivan,
376 U.S. at 254, 297 (Brennan & Goldberg, J.J.; joined by Douglas, J.).
272. Ha'aretzI, 31(2) P.D. at 296-97, 305. Justice Brennan also discussed the need to
modify the common law defense of fair comment in order to protect public debate. New
York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 271-72 (Brennan, J., plurality).
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either knowingl or recklessly, as
false expression which is aimed
273
delineated in Section 16(b).
3. Grand Style. Strategy and Tactics ofMaking Law in Generaland
Making Law Through Transplantationin Particular
The message in New York Times v. Sullivan was radical;2 74 the
message in Kol-Ha'am was radical;1 75 yet both were widely acclaimed
as important achievements of the particular legal system within which
they were conceived. Not so the message of Justice Shamgar; his
message was radical, and it was radically rejected. Upon rehearing, the
Israeli Supreme Court dropped his interpretation of the defense of fair
comment, the basic doctrinal approach of preferred freedoms, and the
theoretical justifications for the defense of free expression in
democracy.
The explanation for rejection cannot rest on a mere defense of the
positive law. Surely the language of the Israeli statute was subject to
interpretation. Technically, both the American approach and the common law approach could serve as the "correct" interpretation of the
law.27 6 Furthermore, had the rejection rested primarily on the "correct" interpretation of the law, it would not have ignited the wrath unleashed by Justice Landau in Ha'aretz II. More must have been at
stake.
The rejection emanated from both the strategy and the tactics of
the Shamgar opinion. In the Ha'aretz litigation, the struggle between
the liberal (American) conception of free expression and the doctrine
against licentiousness finally came to the surface. As is discussed below, both the Ben-Porath dissent and the Landau majority opinion embrace the licentiousness doctrine as the proper conception of free
expression. On this level, the rejection of Justice Shamgar's opinion
simply reflects refusal to stomach the proposition that the press should
be "uninhibited, robust, and wide open," and that expression "may
well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials. 27 7
The other explanation for the massive rejection of Justice Shamgar's analysis involves a concept of judicial decisionmaking. Through
273. Ha'aretz 1,31(2) P.D. at 310 (emphasis added). See Justice Brennan's statement,
note 228 supra.
274. The word "radical" is used here in the sense that the common law doctrine of fair
comment was replaced by a doctrine applying the First Amendment and the rule against
seditious libel to tort law. Kalven, The New York Times Case: A Note on "The Central
Meaning of the FirstAmendment," 1964 Sup. CT. REV. 191, 194.
275. See generally text accompanying notes 90-151 supra.
276. See text accompanying notes 246-48 supra.
277. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 270.
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the method of interest balancing, Justice Shamgar was making policy.
Clearly, the Court in Ha'aretz II rejected the substance of that policy;2 78 but the uprising against Justice Shamgar's opinion reveals more.
Here legal formalism clashed with sociological jurisprudence, which
considers factors external to formal rules in the process of delineating
doctrine. The Court, as the opinions of Justices Ben-Porath and Landau illustrate, did not look kindly at the "Grand Style" of judicial
decisionmaking.
Justice Shamgar made his opinion an easy target for the legal formalists. His opinion failed to demonstrate the judicial craftsmanship
which legitimizes the policymaking function of judicial opinions. It is
impossible to speculate whether in different form the Shamgar opinion
could have prevented the final outcome of the Ha'aretz case, but it
seems plausible that a different and more sophisticated craftsmanship
could have softened the Court's reaction.
Opinions which conscientiously engage in lawmaking generally
harness all the great work horses to the carriage-history, tradition,
precedents, and the statutory language. Effort is made to present novel
doctrine as evolving from the great body of autonomous law. Policy
considerations are tied to the mainstream of the "law." Consider Justice Brennan's opinion in New York Times v. Sullivan. The decision is
replete with references to the Founding Fathers, First Amendment history and doctrine, and state law.279 Transplantation presents an additional problem: To present obviously foreign doctrine as part of
autonomous local law. Justice Agranat did this well in Kol-Ha'am. He
carefully aligned the history of Israel with the general history of the
freedom loving West. He carefully balanced American and English
precedents and demonstrated that his particular brand of the clear and
present danger test was homemade.
Justice Shamgar, on the other hand, stripped the Grand Style of
these attributes. His opinion was predominantly policy oriented. His
preference for American law went unconcealed. He transplanted New
York Times v. Sullivan but failed to perceive and transplant its style.
278. It thus rejected the substantive aspect of interest balancing as advocated by Chafee,
see note 64 supra; Justices Holmes and Brandeis in their opinions in Whitney v. California,
274 U.S. 357, 372 (1927) (concurring), Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 672 (1925) (dissenting) and Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 664 (1919) (dissenting); Justice Brennan
in New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254; and Justice Agranat in Kol-Ha'am. See text
accompanying notes 189-223 supra.
279. 376 U.S. at 268-80. See also id at 280 & n.20 (listing ten state cases as having
adopted a rule similar to the actual malice formula. Immediately following the footnote the
text reads, "The consensus of scholarly opinion apparently forms the rule that is here
adopted").
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His opening premise set the tone for the entire opinion. He began by
discarding the two-tiered approach: "However, in matters concerning
defamation of persons holding an official or public office the approach
expression was long
which considers defamation as an exception to free
280
abandoned in the United States, for example."
Justice Brennan also distinguished the two-tiered approach as inapplicable.281 So did Justice Agranat in Kol-Ha'am. 28 2 Indeed, this
approach, when closely examined, is nothing but a remnant of the licentiousness approach. 8 3 Yet Justices Agranat and Brennan skillfully
avoided confrontation with this doctrine. Justice Shamgar demonstrated accurate understanding of the foreign material but not enough
sensitivity to the method by which new doctrine must be carved.
Justice Agranat in Kol-Halam, aware that not much "freedom loving tradition" was available in Israel proper, was careful not to rely too
heavily on the American experience. He diversified his sources and
thus achieved both independence and alignment with a heroic past.
Not so did Justice Shamgar. Except for alluding to the draft of Basic
Law-the Right of the Person-he referred only to the "political system of government which we chose for ourselves. ' 28 4 Kol-Ha'am was
280. Ha'aretzl,31(2) P.D. at 294. His imprudence was revealed in an earlier paragraph
where he presented three approaches as possible alternatives. Then, having discarded the
two-tiered approach, he asserted that only the preferred freedom (vertical balancing) approach was left. He did not explain why he left out of the analysis the horizontal balancing
approach, which assigned equal weight to all principles.
281. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 268. "Respondent relies ... on statements. . . to the effect that the Constitution does not protect libelous publications. Those
statements do notforeclose our inquiry here." Id (emphasis added).
282. 1 SELECTED JUDGMENTS at 98.
283. The two-tiered approach set forth categories of speech that are outside the protection of the First Amendment. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942). All are
"hostile or offensive to accepted standards" and thus fall under the definition of licentiousness. See text accompanying note 195 supra.
284. Ha'aretz1, 31(2) P.D. at 295. "The new draft Basic Law comes to mold principles
and delineate their contours. . . . But even now the basic liberties, and first and foremost
among them the principle of free expression. .. are an integral part of Israeli law. It is well
known that these rights have been woven into our legal system as a result of the political
system which we chose for ourselves." Id
The reliance on the draft Basic Law, Rights of the Person, was a tactical error. Formally, it was a political document, irrelevant in adjudication. Also, the protection which the
Law grants to free expression is dubious. Section 11 reads, "(a) Every person has the right
to express his opinions, to publish them, to disseminate and impart them to others ....
(b) None of these rights may be limited except by a law whose purpose is to insure the
existence of a democratic rule, to safeguard the defense of the State and the public peace, to
safeguard moral values or to prevent desecration of religion, to safeguard the rights of
others, or to guarantee proper legal proceedings." 1973 HATZAOT HOK [Bills before the
Knesset] at 448 (in Hebrew). See also note 332 i.fra (Justice Landau's interpretation of the
Law's guarantees).
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cited as reference for this democratic commitment, but the wealth of
other sources used there, including Israel's Declaration of Independence, went unnoticed. Also unnoticed were the substantial number of
Israeli cases that asserted the right to free expression as basic and vital.285 Furthermore, only one case was cited for the doctrine that every
statute should be narrowly construed so as to allow maximum breathing space to the unwritten constitutional principle. 2s 6
Most curiously, the doctrine of seditious libel was not invoked.
New York Times v. Sullivan traced the origin of its own formula directly to the antipathy toward seditious libel in American constitutional
thought. Justice Agranat incorporated the same antipathy into Israeli
law. The prestige of Justice Agranat, together with the age of the KolHa'am decision and the wealth of its contents, could have helped. Yet
Justice Shamgar preferred to go his own way.
These were not the only bold steps taken by the newly appointed
judge. In his solitary journey to adopt a better policy for Israeli law,
Justice Shamgar was not hesitant to awaken some foes. Israeli precedents and English law served as primary targets. Not only did he fail
to align his case with previous precedents, he also attacked one of them.
In a previous eight-year-old decision emanating from the same
Ha'aretz case, Justice Witkon, an eminent veteran of the Court, ruled
that the press did not enjoy a privileged status under Israeli law.2" 7
Justice Shamgar clearly, and in all probability knowingly, diverted
from his subject matter to comment:
I shall not deal here with the specific question, whether the press
has a special. . . status vis-A-vis the Defamation Law, since in
our case the question was already decided. . . . Undoubtedly,
this is an important question every examination of which can
only contribute to its further clarification. . . . I would only like
to reflect that maybe there is room to regret . . . that . . . there
was no opportunity to examine all the defenses together . ... 288
Justice Shamgar's treatment of English law was equally belligerent. English law was still revered in Israel.2 8 9 Justice Shamgar did not
have to confront it any more than he had to confront Justice Witkon.
He could have averted the confrontation by concentrating exclusively
285. See notes 204 & 215 supra.
286. "Hilron" v. Council for Growing and Marketing of Fruit, 30(3) P.D. 645, 653 (1976)
(Shamgar, J., dissenting).
287. Ha'aretz v. Electric Co., 23(2) P.D. 87 (1969).
288. HalaretzI, 31(2) P.D. at 298.
289. Recall the kid glove treatment it received from Justice Agranat in Kol-Ha'am. See
generally text accompanying notes 20-189 supra. Israel's formal ties to English law were
severed in 1980. See note 239 supra.
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on the language of the Israeli statute, but he chose to kick the English
precedents off Israel's shores once and for all: "[I]t is necessary to classify and examine very carefully, before applying English precedents or
treatises, part of which are outdated even in Britain."2 9 He continues:
It is not surprising that in view of the inconsistency in the case
law, the British jurists are dissatisfied with the degree of clarity of
their defamation law. Lord Diplock says in the Slim case:
"[T]he law of defamation. . . has passed beyond redemption by
the courts." These words, constituting testimony of the baker
about his goods, should advise us to use extra caution when we
come to interpret our statutory law, with its clear principles in
light of British case law.29 1
By thus barring the flow of influence from Britain, Justice Shamgar,
intentionally or not, emphasized the American influence over his opinion and thus made it even more vulnerable.2 9 2 Judge made law in
America was exposed as a nontraditional policymaking method which
foregoes the familiar approval of the ancient English common law.
One should not criticize Justice Shamgar too harshly, however,
there are strong elements in his opinion. He perceived clearly and correctly that law was part of the social fabric. He understood the central
importance of public criticism, especially criticism of public officials.
He analyzed perceptively the dynamics of a free press. His basic policy
line-broadening the contours of free expression in Israel-and his
concern for the impact of an adverse decision on the press should be
commended. From this point of view, his straightforward style was an
important addition to the general structure of Israeli Supreme Court
decisions. Yet, either because he was inexperienced or because he underestimated the power of "craftsmanship," Justice Shamgar failed to
take from American law its depth, did not make use of landmark Israeli decisions and did not root properly the transplanted formula into
the local soil. He appeared instead to be utilizing a radical method to
transplant a radical formula. It is therefore unclear whether it was the
substance or the method which was more responsible for the failure of
his analysis.
290. Halaretz I, 31 (2) P.D. at 299.
291. Id at 309.
292. Ironically, even he could not get away from the English influence. In discussing the
particular details of the fair comment doctrine, he referred to English precedents, sometimes
using them in response to the Ben-Porath dissent. Id at 308-09. Since the Israeli Bar is still
influenced by England, the briefs in this case are likely to have relied mostly on English case
law.
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D. Formal Style: Justice Ben-Porath's Dissent
In the Ben-Porath dissent, 293 we finally confront a classic example
of the other pole of the typology of judicial opinions in Israel: the For-

mal Style.294
Justice Ben-Porath's opinion was essentially a treatise on the English defense of fair comment, interlaced with an extensive analysis of
the evidence which demonstrated that the article's factual structure was
false, and therefore the defense could not stand. It shunned policy
analysis and interest balancing and "discovered" the law in the nineteenth and twentieth century English precedents. Thus, the Ben-Porath
dissent reflected not only an opposing jurisprudential and doctrinal
trend but was also a work of transplantation. This time, however, the
donor system was not the United States but the United Kingdom.
.

The FairComment Doctrine: Legal Formalismand the BiasAgainst
Free Speech
Analytically, the defense of fair comment rests on the premise that

any reasonable person can separate fact from opinion. Judges are
thought particularly adept at making the distinction. Since facts are
not value judgments, the principle of free expression is of limited relevance. Facts should be true if they are to receive the protection of the

law. By contrast, opinions, once separated from the facts, receive substantial legal protection. If uttered in good faith, they may be "exaggerated, stubborn and prejudiced. 2 95
The problem with this analysis is its formalist epistemology. Language is subjective and imprecise; "fact" and "opinion" are at best two

poles between which lies a continuum of many shades.296 By ostensibly
293. Ha'aretzI, 31 (2) P.D. at 315. In part, Justice Ben-Porath made me what I am
today. While this article is a critique of her work, it also recognizes and respects her substantial contribution to the development of Israeli law.
294. Contrasting the Grand Style with the Formal Style, Llewellyn said: "[The Grand
Style's] very existence has been obscured and buried by the incursion later of a way of work
in which the appellate judges sought to do their deciding without reference to much except
rules, sought to eliminate the impact of sense, as an intrusion, and sought to write their
opinions as if wisdom (in contrast to logic) were hardly a decent attribute of a responsible
appellate court. I call that way of work the Formal Style." K. LLEWELLYN, supra note 7, at
5-6 (emphasis in original). See also H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 120 (1961); M.
HoRowrrz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 253-66 (1977).
295. Ha'aretz1, 31(2) P.D. at 315. About the fair comment doctrine generally, see W.
ODGERS, A DIGEST OF THE LAW OF LIBEL AND SLANDER 193-215, 634-36 (1911), citedin
Ha'aretzI, 31(2) P.D. at 320 (Ben-Porath, J., dissenting).
296. Schauer, Language, Truth and the FirstAmendment: An Essay in Memory of Harry
Canter, 64 VA. L. REv. 263, 276-81 (1978). See also Titus, Statement ofFact versus Statement of Opinion-A Spurious Dispute in Fair Comment, 15 VAND. L. REv. 1203 (1962).
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deciding what is "fact" and what is "opinion," judges exercise immense

control over the content of freedom of the press. If they tend to consider the specific publication as worthy of protection, they may be
prone to see the disputed statement as involving opinion. If of a contrary tendency, they may classify the statement as "fact" and will de-

mand full proof of its truth before granting protection.
A particular aspect of the common law defense is that the speaker
is expected to separate fact from opinion. Said Justice Ben-Porath,
"Another logical requirement is that the publication should clarify sufficiently what is asserted as fact and what is a comment. ' 2 97 Yet if

people ordinarily do not think and speak in such logical sequence, the
question is whether or not they should be expected to do so, particularly in political debate. Legal formalism, striving toward the neat
elaboration of rules, ignores the reality, which is that fact and opinion
are frequently mixed, especially when the speakers feel very strongly
about something or wish to make their message powerful and moving
rather than dry, technical, and logical.2 98

The defense of fair comment, both in its distinction between fact
and opinion and its insistence on the separation of fact from opinion,

conceals a potent weapon against free expression. Justice Ben-Porath's
application of the "fair comment" defense to the Ha'aretz case exemplifies the danger:
The article presented. . . [the Company and its Director's] intention to deceive the public as a given fact, not as a writer's
opinion based on the facts which he disclosed. The words "supposedly" and "in fact," which are not qualified in any way, appear in the first paragraph of the article. . . and were tied and
inter-related with the facts which were brought before and after
them.
I have no ground to assume, as a realistic possibility, that the
297. Ha'aretz1, 31(2) P.D. at 320. Then she elaborates: "In this case I do not find it
necessary to decide whether there is an obligation to detail all the facts which support the
critic's opinion. At least from Lord Oaksey's opinion in the Kemsley case [Kemsley v. Foot
& Others, [1952] 1 All. E.R. 501] it follows that such an obligation does not exist ....
Absent an explicit provision. . . I am prepared to assume (without deciding in this matter)
that also here there is no obligation. . . . Yet, at the same time the great difference between
the defense of truth and the defense of fair comment should be remembered. . . . The
justification for the broad protection of the latter defense stems from the proper opportunity
which is given the readers. . . to judge for themselves if the publication's description of the
facts indeed leads to the opinion expressed on the basis of these facts. Hence, [the defendant
should]. . . first describe at least the primary facts.., and secondly clarify sufficiently to
the ordinary readers that the part which damages the person's reputation is merely an opinion. Therefore, if the general impression. . . is that the damaging part states a fact. . . the
defense of fair comment will not obtain. .... Id at 321 (emphasis in original).
298. Schauer, su.pra note 296, at 276-81.
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newspaper's readers to whom the article was presented, understood or could have understood, through reading the piece as a
whole, that there is room for doubt concerning the bad intention
of the respondents.2 99
A shrewd and experienced judge, she did not rest her case merely
on this ground. She fortified her opinion with two more layers; in each,
she assumed arguendo that she was wrong on the former conclusion,
yet proceeded to show that nevertheless the law mandated that the defense should fail. First, she assumed arguendo that the imputation of a
bad motive indeed amounted to opinion. English precedents, however,
teach that another component of the doctrine should be met: "There
must always be some reciprocal relationship between the facts and the
opinions . . .
Absent such minimal relationship, the text which
posed as an opinion turns into a fact; the truth of which should be
proven."'3 "° Her analysis of the record showed that, in this case, no
such "minimal relationship" existed. 31 Next she assumed arguendo
that the article's attribution of deception was indeed an opinion and
further that it was not necessary to provide "even a minimal factual
infrastructure which [would] enable the reader to judge for himself if
the opinion rested on reliable facts." 30 2 Still, one more condition had
to be met: "provided that during the trial the defendant proved...
supplementary facts which together form an adequate factual basis. 30 3
Then, demonstrating an admirable mastery and manipulation of fact
and doctrine, she utilized the trial record to prove that the "supplemen3 °4
tary facts" did not amount to "an adequate factual basis."
2 Political Vision in Justice Ben-Porath'sOpinion
Justice Ben-Porath's opinion presents a seemingly watertight case
against the newspaper, exclusively based on logic and legal analysis.
Yet the fair comment doctrine reflects the licentiousness doctrine, this
time directed at the form rather than the substance of speech. The licentiousness doctrine proscribes speech that fails to conform to accept299. Halaretz I, 31(2) P.D. at 322-23.
300. Id at 324-25. She relied on Veeder, Freedom of Public Discussion, 23 HARV. L.
REv. 413, 424 (1910), and on Lord Denning's opinion in London Artists, Ltd. v. Littler,
[1969] 2 All E.R. 193 (C.A.). For a comment on her usage of the American source, see note
313 infra.
301. Ha'aretz1,31(2) P.D. at 325.
302. Id at 326.
303. Id at 329. These "supplementary facts," she claimed, are facts that were known to
the reporter before he wrote the article because facts unknown to him could not play a role
in forming his opinion.
304. Id at 329-31. The extensive utilization of the trial record reveals Justice Ben-Porath's own background. See note 250 supra.
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able societal standards (as articulated by the courts). Justice BenPorath prescribes standards for editors and reporters: separate facts
from opinion, make sure to present an "adequate minimal factual
structure," take care to keep in the record "supplementary facts," and
choose words very carefully.30 5 A judge may see a fact where the
speaker means opinion. Clearly this is policy - to make the press conform to certain structured, rather rigid standards of reporting.
The value choice of the Ben-Porath opinion lies not only in her
adoption of the English doctrine but also in the disclosure of a political
vision antithetical to that advanced in Kol-Ha'am. This is apparent in
her rejection of Justice Shamgar's interest balancing. She opened her
opinion by positing the "fair comment" defense as "much more liberal" than the defense of truth:
[Tihe legislature's approach toward a comment made in good
faith in a matter of public interest is very liberal, since freedom of
expression and debate in public matters are among the fundamental principles of a progressive society. Any unjustified limitation of free expression necessarily violates this 3sacred principle
which should be protected with the utmost care. 06
Why is "fair comment" a more permissive defense? "An explanation
we find in the ancient case law in England, that a person who claims
'fair comment' must bring to the reader's attention the30factual
basis on
7
which he relies-and that those facts should be true."
The upshot is that Justice Ben-Porath refused to see the defamation of public officials as a matter influenced by considerations drawn
from public law. Courts do not make policy. Courts balance neither
interests nor values. All the necessary balancing had already been
done in the ancient case law of Britain, from which, presumably,
Israel's Knesset had taken its cue. This approach explains why her entire opinion mentioned the principle of free expression only once, 08
and why Justice Shamgar's opinion was treated in only two paragraphs,
both highly technical. Implicitly, the bulk of his policy oriented analysis was dismissed as irrelevant. s 9
Still, Justice Ben-Porath had a political vision. At the very end of
305. Ha'aretz I, 31(2) P.D. at 326-27.
306. Id at 318.
307. Id at 319 (emphasis added).
308. Id at 318.
309. Id at 332. "By now I had the opportunity to read Justice Shamgar's opinion and I
wish to comment that the Campbell case... is still considered to the best of my knowledge
as a valid authority in England and it is cited, without reservation, in the Kemsley case
decided by the House of Lords. As to the Walker case, I do not think, with all due respect,
that it changes anything but it only adds a dimension. It is cited, inter alia, in the London
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her opinion, referring to the Director's announcement, made shortly
after the press began to criticize the purchase, that he would sell the
car,31 ° she said:
I have already clarified above that a solemn pledge in public constitutes strongpresumpiveevidence about its sincerity and it is not
refuted-by past sins of the company which employed him [the
Director] if there were such. It is also hard to believe that they
would dare resume usage of the car, when the press was monitoring their steps.3 '

So, government is trustworthy.3 12 There is a direct correlation between what government officials pledge to do and what, in fact, they
will do. The "strongpresumption" in favor of the trustworthiness of
official pledges implies a less significant role for the press, for if public
officials are trustworthy, there is no need specially to protect the freedom of the press in order to monitor their conduct.
This political vision is related to legal formalism. The government
is a government of laws, not of men. Men (sometimes also women) are
needed to breathe life into the business of government, but they are
presumed to be law abiding. The mere statement of the law guides the

conduct of public officials.
Clearly, this vision flies in the face of Justice Shamgar's philosophy. Thus, the conflict in Ha'aretz was not only between Grand and
Artists case on which, in any event, I did rely, and the conditions specified therein were not
met in our case, in my opinion.
"Also, I regret that I have to express reservations concerning the description of facts in
...[Justice Shamgar's opinion], a description which is based on an evaluation of the evidence which totally differs from the evaluation of the District Court." Id
The opening sentence implies that she did not see Justice Shamgar's opinion when she
wrote her dissent. Even so, it cannot explain her declining to respond to the policy analysis.
She must have known of the general trend (interest balancing) of his opinion. The technical
tone of her comments also supports the view that her judicial philosophy shuns policy
considerations.
310. About which Justice Ben-Porath earlier wrote: "Also in my mind there is no doubt,
that a public announcement by a Director of a public institution, that he decided to sell the
car... while only pretending to place it for sale, and planning to resume driving it when
the episode is forgotten, amounts to an inadequate, irresponsible behavior ... " Id at
318.
311. Id at 333 (emphasis added).
312. Her inclination, to "trust" the good will of public officials, was apparent in her evaluation of the trial record. See, e.g., id at 331 ("The fact that an almost new car was not
tendered, could.., perhaps become a target for public debate and criticism, although it can
be seen as an exceptional case which also needs exceptionaltreatment" (emphasis added)).
Also, note her reaction to the fact that the Company's spokesman was instructed not to
speak with Halaretz: "Despite some doubts which spring from the factual inaccuracies of
the text, Iam prepared to conclude that Mr. Kotler published the article in good faith on the
basis of the fact that he sought the company's response prior to publication. . . but good
faith is not enough." Id at 331-32.
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Formal Styles, but also American and English law. At a deeper level, it
was a conflict between two distinctive political visions of democracy.
Yet, while the Grand Style openly bespeaks its political vision, the Formal Style is silent about it. This silence creates the perils of transplantation, Formal Style.
3. The Perils of Transplantation,Formal Style

While Justices Agranat and Shamgar transplanted American doctrines as the proper interpretation of Israeli statutes, Justice Ben-Porath
3 13
relied almost exclusively on English treatises and English case law.
Her technique in transplanting English law to the Israeli statute took
the following form:
The defense known in England as "fair comment" is similar to
ours, although when we refer [to English law] we should remember that we have before us an original Israeli statute which
should be interpreted in light of its text. Therefore, we may use
[English] decisions only insofar as their holdings fit our statutory
guidelines and are acceptable to us as interpretations of its
instructions.3 14

Notice that there was no exploration of whether English cases indeed
fit "our statutory guidelines." Her mechanical transplantation not only
reflects the decisive influence of the English common law on
Mandatory and Israeli law, but also reflects the training of Israeli lawyers who, long before the defamation statute was enacted, were taught
to look at the English common law for guidance. 15 The habit of
mechanical reliance on England is hard to shake off, particularly in
view of the wealth of doctrinal material in English law and the similarity in legal thought. For a judge who has neither Justice Agranat's
American background nor Justice Shamgar's penchant for policymaking, Britain seems the natural place from which to draw inspiration.
Moreover, the connection between the Israeli statute and English com313. Her opinion makes no reference to American law except for a citation to Veeder,
supra note 300. The Veeder article is characterized by Justice Brennan, in New York Times
v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 280 n.20, as a "scholarly opinion which ... favors the rule that is
here adopted." The other scholarly sources used by Justice Ben-Porath are Odgers, see note
295 supra, and G. GATELY, ON LIBEL AND SLANDER 223 (7th ed 1974). Not surprisingly,
these are orthodox works geared to synthesize black letter law. Compare these sources with
the different style and orientation of Chafee, see note 64 supra, and Emerson, see note 151
supra, that influenced the Agranat and Shamgar opinions.
314. Ha'aretz1, 31(2) P.D. 318.
315. Justice Ben-Porath received her legal education in the Palestine Law Classes. She
was one of the best trial lawyers at the Ministry of Justice and was President of Jerusalem's
District Court (original and appellate jurisdiction) prior to her appointment to the Supreme
Court.
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mon law proves the neutrality of law-the great pillar of legal formalism. If law is neutral, there should be little difference between the law
of defamation of England and that of Israel, and we can use "their"
decisions to guide "our" law. If law is neutral, it is also ahistorical. An
"ancient" explanation deriving from nineteenth century aristocratic
England is good enough for modem law, modem society and
democracy.
The deficiency of this mode of transplantation is readily apparent
when we compare it with the Grand Style. That constitutional lawmaking, or at least constitutional-common-lawmaking,

16

is involved

here is clear, for the interpretation of the defenses of defamation depends upon judicially held postulates about the relative freedom of the
press to criticize the government. Because both Justices Agranat and
Shamgar considered interest balancing and policy analysis as legitimate functions of judicial decisionmaking, they were able to recognize
the impact of their doctrines and the particular result of the case on the
Israeli polity. On the other hand, transplantation, which is combined
with legal formalism and delegitimizes policy considerations, runs the
risk of shaping political life without clearly recognizing its action for
what it is. Transplantation of this type does make policy, but it reduces
its visibility so that open debate of the court's action becomes more
difficult.
Yet the Ben-Porath dissent was a powerful one--especially so in
the Israeli milieu where legal science is still identified with formal logic.
The authoritativeness of her opinion undoubtedly influenced the
Supreme Court's decision to reconsider the case in a further hearing.
E. Ha'aretz 11" Justice Landau and the Formal Style
If you bring an electric appliance from the United States into
Israel and force its plug into an outlet, odd shrieks will emanate, sparks
of fire will fly, and with the scorched plug in your hand you will realize
that this electric system is hostile to your appliance. Think of the Landau opinion as representing Israeli electrical current, and you will understand how it treated American law.
Justice Landau (then Deputy Chief Justice and presently Chief
Justice of Israel's Supreme Court) wrote the majority opinion in
Ha'aretzII, with short concurrences by three other justices.3"7 Unlike
Justices Ben-Porath and Shamgar, Chief Justice Landau has been on
the Supreme Court since the early fifties. Interestingly, he was one of
316. For a development of this concept, see Monaghan, supra note 154.
317. Ha'aretzII, 32(3) P.D. at 337 (1977).
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the two remaining justices who joined Justice Agranat's unanimous
opinion in Kol-Ha'am. He also authored at least one landmark free
speech decision in Israel as well as the first decision in Israeli history
which declared a statute invalid.318 His opinion, therefore, represents
ripened judicial philosophy based on years of thoughtful experience on
the Supreme Court. To what extent his education in Gdansk and
London has shaped his judicial philosophy we cannot tell, but he
clearly represents judicial self-restraint combined with the Formal
Style. 319 His opinion, however, is not merely a variation of the BenPorath dissent, for Justice Landau did not utilize transplantation to formulate either the Israeli conception of free speech or the doctrine of
fair comment. The absence of a conscious reliance on another legal
system, in turn, is helpful in exploring a further question: To what
extent can the Formal Style develop indigenous constitutional concepts
in a country that has no written constitution?
Justice Landau's articulation of the Israeli doctrine of fair comment and his concept of free speech are reviewed below.
1.

The Doctrine of Fair Comment, IsraeliStyle

In essence, Justice Landau agreed with the Ben-Porath epistemology. Fact should be separated from opinion and a judge will decide
which is which. Journalists should present the facts first, then their
opinion, because ordinary readers cannot easily separate the two and
are susceptible to what they read first. It is irrelevant that the "dominant nature" of the publication is opinion or that, on the balance, the
correct facts weigh more than the incorrect assertions. All material
facts should be true. Justice Brennan's celebrated observation that
speech about public matters should be "uninhibited, robust and wideopen 320 is good for opinion but not for facts.32 '
318. Ulpaney Hasrata v. Garry, 16 P.D. 2407 (1962) (free speech) and Bergman v. Minister of Finance, 23(1) P.D. 693 (1969) (invalidating a statute). For an English translation and
commentary of Bergman, see Elman, Klien & Akzin, JudicialReview ofStatute.- Bergman v.
Minister ofFinance, 4 IsR. L. Rnv. 559 (1969).
319. A study of the judicial philosophy of Chief Justice Landau (or any other Israeli
judge) has not yet been undertaken. Therefore, this article does not attempt to reconcile
Ha'aretz II with other decisions authored by Chief Justice Landau. Occasionally, he did
deliver policy oriented decisions, e.g., Bergman v. Minister of Treasury, 23(1) P.D. 693
(1969).
320. Ha'aretz II, 32(3) P.D. at 349-5 1.
321. E.g., "[i]n my opinion every publication which seeks the defense of § 15(4) should
clearly separate between the facts and the comment on these facts. Mixing the two may blur
the publication and allow defamatory false facts to 'stealthily' infiltrate into the comment.
The writer must point to the facts on which he relies-and these must be true (except marginal details which constitute no actual injury). Once the facts were described he is permitted
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As emphasized above, the Israeli statute in question was open to
interpretation. 22 The doctrine adopted by Justice Landau clearly reflected the common law doctrine of fair comment. What is interesting,
then, is the technique employed by Justice Landau to derive the doctrine from the statutory text. Justice Landau began his analysis by observing that Israeli law provides a "full answer" and "a fair solution" to
"the problems of balancing the competing values of free speech and the

protection of one's honor and reputation. ' 323 Furthermore, he believed
the "statutory provision should be interpreted in accordance with its
language and its spirit, and foreign authorities may enlighten us, but
we should not assign to them more than their due weight. 3 24

The clue to the "language and spirit" of the statute was found in
technical rules of interpretation and "legal" logic. He disagreed with

Justice Shamgar's position that statutes limiting speech should be narrowly interpreted: "/7hisprovision, as any other statutoryprovision,
should be interpreted first and foremost in ligfht of the ordinarymeaning

of the words. 325 Specifically, he found that section 15(4) was applicable when the publication consisted of (a) reference to the conduct of the
public official and (b) a comment by the defendant about such conduct.

"There is a fundamental difference between these two components.
Component (a) must refer to correct facts, whereas under (b) the pub326
lisher has a. . .defense, even if there was no truth in the comment."
Justice Landau did not explain why the "ordinary meaning" of the
term "comment" was "opinion," rigidly divorced from "fact,"
rather
3 27
than the looser meaning assigned to it by Justice Shamgar.
There are two important aspects to Justice Landau's opinion, as
to draw his conclusions by way of a comment, but provided that he classifies and separates
fact and conclusion. In this matter, Ijoin Ben-Porath, J., in adopting Odger's [position]. On
the other hand, there is a distinction between a presentation of the facts and a commentary
by way of drawing conclusions from these facts." Id at 350 (citation omitted).
322. See text accompanying notes 230-33 supra.
323. Ha'aretz1, 32(3) P.D. at 347, 348.
324. Id at 347.
325. Id (emphasis added).
326. Id at 348-49.
327. See text accompanying notes 258-59 supra. This question could be answered only
were Justice Landau prepared to go beyond legal formalism. To evaluate the role of "fact"
and "opinion" in expression, one needs to explore their meaning in philosophy and sociology. Dicey's rule of clear statement (a statement restricting a constitutional principle such as
free expression will be interpreted narrowly unless the legislature makes its intention clear
and explicit), see note 257 supra, which was followed by Justices Agranat and Shamgar,
enables the Court to do just that: explore the meaning of free expression and its justifications, and then interpret the statutory language. Justice Landau did make a policy choice to
restrict free expression and was not unaware of it, Ha'aretz11, 32(3) P.D. at 347, but he did
not open his inner deliberations to critical scrutiny.
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reviewed thus far. First, Justice Landau did not use transplantation in
formulating his doctrine. Although he consulted and cited foreign

sources and his bias toward the British way is obvious, he rejected explicit transplantation.3 28 His approach represents an important step toward autonomy and self-determination in Israeli law. Second, unlike

Justice Agranat, Justice Landau was not prepared to make an open
policy choice. What then becomes of constitutional or administrative
law constructed in the Formal Style?
2. The "Purofcation"of IsraeliFree Speech Doctrines
a. The Tension Between Interest Balancing and Licentiousness
Temporarily Resolved

The second part of Justice Landau's opinion, discussed above, was
formalistic and rule oriented. Its end result was to marry the common
law doctrine of fair comment to the modem Israeli defamation statute.
But while this may be the ratio decidendi and technically the more important segment of his opinion, it seems that the Israeli Supreme Court
did not convene in further hearing for this purpose alone. 329 The unusual decision to rehear the case was clearly aimed at providing an au-

thoritative overruling of Justice Shamgar's intellectual framework.
While doing so, the Court proceeded to resolve the tension between

interest balancing and licentiousness, created twenty-six years earlier
by Kol-Ha'am.

Justice Landau's main concern was to reject Justice Shamgar's
holding that free expression enjoyed a preferred position in Israeli con328. Ironically, even Justice Landau's opinion bears the marks of American influence.
His opinion seems to have been influenced by Justice White's dissent in Gertz v. Welch, 418
U.S. 323, 369 (1974). Compare Justice White's assertion that the Court in Gertz is not writing on tabula rasa, id at 389, with Justice Landau's identical assertion, Ha'aretz11, 32(3)
P.D. at 347; and their reliance on Professor Barron's critique, see 418 U.S. at 400 (White, J.);
text accompanying note 346 infra (Landau, J.); and on Riesman's article, 418 U.S. at 400
(White, J.); note 359 infra (Landau, J.). In contradistinction to Justice Landau, however,
Justice White endorsed the New York Times v. Sullivan rationale, 418 U.S. at 387. The
perils of transplantation are again evident in this context, since Justice White's dissent relied
heavily on the division of powers between the federal and state governments, an issue of no
relevance in the present Israeli context.
329. "Justice Shamgar introduced important innovations to the libel law, whereas Justice
Berinson limited his opinion to narrowly considering the application of the Defamation
Law of 1965, to the facts of this case, without commenting upon the broad questions of
principle which appeared in Justice Shamgar's opinion. As far as these questions were concerned, therefore, Justice Shamgar's opinion was not binding on the court; yet it might,
because of its scope, become a leading decision which will guide the public in their behavior
and litigation, unless we reach here different conclusions." Ha'aretzII, 32(3) P.D. at 339-40.
See also note 229 supra.
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stitutional law. 330 For this purpose, he invoked Kol-Ha'am as an authoritative precedent:
Indeed. . .[Justice Agranat] later refers to the right of free expression as a "superior right. . . constituting the precondition to
the materialization of almost all other rights" but immediately he
adds "one should distinguishbetween freedom and licentiousness"
and he refers to. . .Lord Kenyon: "Freedomof thepress is dear
to England,but licentiousnessof thepress is odious to England.' 33 1

Justice Landau then put forward his own view of balancing:
Therefore: not a superior status to free expression over other
fundamental rights, but as Justice Agranat said: "a process of
balancing competing interests; and weighing their relative value."
Not a vertical grading of a superior right against an ordinary
right, but a horizontalapproachto equall important rights, without
pre/erence of one right, as defined in a statute, over anotherright.
Hence, the statutory right should be interpreted in accordance
with the letter ofthe law and the legislative intent without imposing upon it a right which does not appear in the law books. 3 32

As discussed above, the "definitional balancing" approach 333 was
already transplanted and explicated in Kol-Ha'am. Justice Landau,
therefore, not only misrepresented the central message of Kol-Ha'am
by arbitrarily focusing on Lord Kenyon's observation there,3 34 but also,
by linking Lord Kenyon's licentiousness doctrine to horizontal balancing and by further reducing this type of balancing to mere deference to
the statutory text, Justice Landau, in fact, rejected the substantive com-

ponent to interest balancing and picked the process component of the
licentiousness test, or ad hoc balancing, in its stead. In essence, this
approach holds that since the Knesset already did all the balancing, the

Court need not invoke the principle of free expression when it interprets the word "comment." The Court may thus prefer the interest of
public officials in their reputation over the interest of the press in ex330. See note 329 supra.
331. Ha'aretzII, 32(3) P.D. at 343 (emphasis added).
332. Id (emphasis added). "To be precise, we have here the liberty of the citizen against
the right of the citizen, Ze., his liberqy to express his heart and listen to what others have to
say, against his right not to have his honor and reputation violated. And if there is room, at
all, to grade the two, I would put the right above the liberty. It seems that this is the approach of the draft Basic Law. Id (footnotes omitted).
333. See text accompanying notes 74-90 supra. Had Justice Shamgar emphasized the
connection between the Ha'aretz and Kol-Ha'am, he could have made it tactically more
difficult for Justice Landau to drop interest balancing or perhaps have forced Justice Landau
to explicate his own balancing process.
334. Indeed, Justice Agranat did quote Lord Kenyon approvingly, but the structure of
his entire opinion, as well as the contents of his discussion of free speech, clearly show a
deep commitment to both interest balancing and the "special value" of free speech. See
generally text accompanying notes 20-188 supra.
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posing governmental corruption, without pondering any of the justifications which sustain either principle in a liberal democracy.
The connection between the rejection of interest balancing and legal formalism becomes obvious as we review the authority chosen by
Justice Landau to buttress his position-none other than Chafee
himself:
I am satisfied to conclude by citing a lovely fable which I found
in Chafee, Free Speech in the United States, page 31, about a
person who was brought before the judge for having raised his
arm and hit his neighbor's nose. He asked if he had no right to
raise his arm as he wished in a free country and the judge answered: "Your right to raise your arm ends precisely where your
neighbor's nose begins. 335
Chafee's first chapter, from which the quotation is taken, was largely
incorporated into Kol-Halam by Justice Agranat. Chafee used this
"lovely fable" as an illustration to an approach which is diametrically
opposed to his own-an approach he considered inadequate:
[It is useless to define free speech by talk about rights ....
[Here the "fable" is quoted]. To find the boundary line of any
right, we must get behindrules of law to humanfacts. . . . That
is, in technical language, there are. . . interests. . . which must
be balanced against each other. . . in order to determine which
interest shall be sacrificed. . . and which shall be protected and

become the foundation of a legal right.336
Whether aware of it or not in 1978, Justice Landau was confronted
with two major trends in early twentieth century American jurisprudence: interest balancing and mechanical jurisprudence. He chose the
latter.337
b. The Landau Offensive on American Law
I suggest that we not be lured by the American decision in New
York Times, which inspired my honorable colleague.338
335. Ha'aretzII, 32(3) P.D. at 344.
336. Z. CHAFEE, supra note 64, at 31-32 (emphasis added). In a footnote, Chafee acknowledged the source of his analysis, John Chipman Gray, one of the first critics of American legal journalism. Id at 32 n.6 8.
337. In Kol-Ha'am, Justice Agranat had also adopted doctrines that Chafee rejected.
Yet there is both a technical and substantive difference between Justice Agranat's and Justice Landau's treatment of Chafee's analysis. Justice Agranat did not mention Chafee as a
source when adopting a doctrine that Chafee considered and rejected. Justice Landau at
least implied that Chafee used the "lovely fable" approvingly. Substantively, Justice
Agranat manipulated Chafee's material in order to transplant Chafee's major contribution,
principled interest balancing in free speech interpretation, whereas Justice Landau adopted
a doctrine opposed to Chafee's core approach.
338. Ha'aretzII, 32(3) P.D. at 344, (Landau, L). Perhaps some psychological insight can
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The lure of American law for Israelis like Justice Shamgar and

Justice Agranat lay not only in its break with legal formalism, but also
in the intense development of justifications for free expression. New
York Times v. Sullivan epitomized American emphasis on the political
justifications for free speech. By rejecting New York Times v. Sullivan,

Justice Landau was making policy: entrenching the licentiousness doctrine in Israeli law. But his policymaking had an interesting twist; he
did not make a positive effort to develop a theory of free speech. 33 9 He
3 40
made policy indirectly, by negating the value of American law.
Justice Landau's critique of American law is fascinating both be-

cause it exposes his image of the donor system and more particularly
because of the intensity of his feelings against American law. The offensive against American law proceeded along several fronts: the in-

consistency in American defamation law, the theory of the free
marketplace of ideas, Justice Black's absolutism, the normative content
of the Bill of Rights, and last, but crucial for Justice Landau, the Amer-

3 41
ican treatment of the episode in Skokie v. NationalSocialist Party.

In condemning the inconsistency in American defamation decisions, Justice Landau stated, "The truth is that the American decisions
are so diverse and lack a clear unifying line. In Gertz v. Welch.

.

.the

majority started to withdraw from the extreme position-but the inconsistency and confusion of the decisions is still considerable."342 In a
way, this was primarily a tactical reply to Justice Shamgar's analysis,
which mentioned the inconsistency in English defamation law as one
reason for its weakness as a reliable model.343 Perhaps it also reflected

a conservative prudence-an adherence to the old "fair comment"
be gained by comparing the ways in which Justices Landau and Shamgar consistently referred to New York Times v. Sullivan. Justice Landau calls it the New York Times decision
(focusing negatively on the newspapers?), whereas Justice Shamgar calls it the Sullivan case
(focusing negatively on public officials?).
339. Thus, he did not explicitly reject the justifications of free speech embedded in Justice Agranats opinion in Kol-Ha'am. He rejected them only indirectly, by rejecting American law.
340. The licentiousness doctrine conflicts with the twentieth century American approach
to free expression on both the level of substance and that of process. The common law
doctrine of fair comment, at least where the defamation is directed at public officials, is a
derivative of the licentiousness doctrine. See text accompanying note 305 supra. Justice
Landau's adoption of the common law doctrine amounted to a rejection of the substantive
American doctrines and justifications of free speech and thus a rejection of the material
transplanted by Justice Agranat in Kol-Ha'am.
341. 69 M11.
2d 605, 373 N.E.2d 21 (1978).
342. Ha'aretzIf, 32(3) P.D. at 344-45 (emphasis added & citation omitted). He observed
that "none [of the other common law systems] has adopted the American holding." Id at
345.
343. See text accompanying note 291 supra.
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privilege as long as the more innovative solutions were not yet integrated and solidified in the donor system. Yet there is more in this
criticism, for it seeks to negate the justification for political speech. If
there is a unifying theme in the American decisions, it is to allow uninhibited criticism of official conduct. 3 " This theme was directly relevant
to the Israeli case which dealt with a public official; and it was precisely
this theme which Justice Landau wished to avoid.345
Justice Landau then invoked American scholarship to support his
distrust of American law:
In the American legal literature one finds reflections and reservations concerning the New York Times ruling. J.A. Barron, in his
Alccess to the Press-A New First Amendment Right . . . questions the main principles and considers as "romantic" and unrealistic the [United States] Supreme Court's belief that the First
Amendment is the guarantee of a free market of ideas. He points
out that the. . . communications media. . . do not constitute a
free market but a monopoly of the few.3"6
Here, then, is an outright disparagement of the central justification of
free speech theory-the free marketplace of ideas-as romantic and
utopian. Indeed, this critique substantially supports the assertion that
Justice Landau sought to reject not only American law but also the
theoretical justifications underlying it.347 To do so, however, he had to
stand Professor Barron on his head. While Professor Barron did advocate a "new First Amendment right," he did not discard the "old right"
to criticize the government. The "new right to access" was designed to
help the marketplace function better by counteracting press power accumulated in private hands. It is crucial to emphasize that Professor
Barron does not relax the basic suspicion of governmental power except in the sense that he trusts the government to open up the marketplace without introducing its own bias. His critique calls for a
modification of the theory, so as to prevent both public and private
powers from interfering with the marketplace of ideas. 348 Plainly, the
Barron critique is not relevant.3 49
W. PROSSER, supra note 245; L. TRrsE, supra note 165, at 632.
The theme, it should be recalled, was adopted by Justice Agranat in Kol-Ha'am.
Ha'aretzII, 32(3) P.D. at 345.
The justification based on the marketplace of ideas theory was explicitly adopted by
Justice Agranat in Xol-Ha'am, I SELECTED JTuDGMENTS at 96.
348. Barron,Access to the Press-A New FirstAmendmentRight, 80 HARv. L. REv. 1641,
1656-60 (1967).
349. Here is an instance of the perils of relying on segments of foreign scholarship. Criticism of the symptoms may be taken erroneously to apply to the core element, if one is not
familiar with its context. Also, there is an interesting contradiction between the message
behind the "fable" quoted above. See text accompanying notes 335-36 supra; and the Bar344.
345.
346.
347.
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Next Justice Landau critiqued Justice Black's interpretation of the
First Amendment and the Bill of Rights. The critique begins with an
attack on the legalistic interpretation of the First Amendment, then
shifts to a positivist attack on the normative content of the Bill of
Rights. It revolves around the concurring opinions in New York Times
v. Sullivan: "Justices Black, Douglas and Goldberg even went as far as
saying that.

.

. [the result].

. .

should obtain even if the publication

were done maliciously-all for the purpose of safeguarding the First
Amendment which became an unlimitable iron rule for the fundamentalist jurists of Justice Black's school."3 '
Beyond the sneer at the "fundamentalist jurists" and their "unlimitable iron rule" and beyond the caricature of the Black approach 351 is
an effort to show that New York Times v. Sullivan is the result of an
orthodox legalistic interpretation particular to the American legal system. To buttress this view, Justice Landau comments on the Bill of
Rights: "I am certain that had the American Bill of Rights contained a
clause

. .

. [about the right to reputation]

. .

. -and

I do not know

why they omitted the person's right to reputation from their Bill of
Supreme Court would not have reached such an
Rights-the American
352
extreme position.
Again, one can detect a trace of sneering. Again, a mechanical
conception of balancing emerges and this legalistic approach is projected to the American scene in an effort to separate the two legal systems as incompatible. This remark, combined with his other
observations, reveals a deep misunderstanding of the jurisprudence underlying free speech doctrines in the United States. His observation
about the Bill of Rights, if not interpreted as the unfortunate side effect
of temporary verbal puissance, is disturbing. The American Bill of
Rights was not conceived as a comprehensive charter of individual or
human rights. 3 53 Rather, it sought to constitutionalize certain rights
against the government. 54 Therefore, it did not include the right to
ron message as interpreted by Justice Landau, text accompanying notes 346-49 supra. The
"fable" assumes a sphere of individual freedom upon which neither the government nor
one's neighbor may encroach. Thus, it reflects an aversion to government intervention akin
to the aversion underlying the free marketplace of ideas theory. See Kennedy, supra note
243.
350. Ha'aretzII, 32(3) P.D. at 344.
351. See, e.g., Freund, Mr. Justice Black andthe JudicialFunction, 14 U.C.L.A. L. Rnv.
467 (1967); Kalven, Upon RereadingMr. Justice Black on the FirstAmendment, 14 U.C.L.A.
L. REv. 428 (1967).
352. Ha'aretzI1, 32(3) P.D. at 344.
353. In contradistinction to the contemporary bills of rights, such as the Basic Law of the
Federal Republic of Germany, GRuNDGESETZ arts. 1-19.
354. See L. TaimE, supra note 165, at 2-4, and references therein.
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reputation, conceived as a right of one individual against another. The
point is particularly poignant in the context of consulting a foreign system for purposes of either transplantation or rejection, but it is also
central to the understanding of the development of political rights in
the western constitutional liberalism with which Israel seeks to identify.
Thus far, Justice Landau had advanced the wisdom of the common law (do not adopt a yet "unformed" rule), the utopian nature of
the justification of the free marketplace of ideas and the distinctively
positivist content of the Constitution in order to reject American law.
He concluded his offensive with an historical argument, which at once
illustrates the contradiction between the undercurrents of policy making beneath his Formal Style, crystallizes the gap between American
and Israeli law, and unveils the Nazi trauma, a crucial factor in the
shaping of the Israeli legal concept of political rights.
A central theme in American free speech jurisprudence, starting as
early as Chafee and the first Holmes-Brandeis dissents and continuing
in full force in New York Times v. Sullivan, is the aversion to seditious
libel.3 5 This aversion was framed both analytically, as seen in the incompatibility between seditious libel and republicanism, and historically, as seen in the utilization of seditious libel as a means of political
oppression in eighteenth century England and America.
Justice Agranat adopted both the analytical and historical components of seditious libel in Kol-Ha'am. 56 Israeli legal culture, however,
was dominated by a far different historical experience: the fall of the
Weimar Republic, the rise of Naziism, and the ensuing Holocaust.
This experience nurtured a deep-seated fear-not of abuse of power by
government, but of weakness in government: a fear not of majority
oppression of helpless minorities, but of vile minorities who may destroy democracy and install the reign of terror. Justice Landau observed, "It is not superfluous to mention that one of the most efficient
instruments used by Hitler. . . to destroy the Weimar regime was unrestrained defamation of the elite. . . the circulation of lies about their

behavior. The courts did not react properly during the defamation trials ... .,,357 And now comes the writing on the wall, compelling re355. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 277; Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S.
616, 630-31 (1919); Z. CHAPEE, supra note 64, at 28.
356. See text accompanying notes 134-41 supra. Justice Shamgar, on the other hand,
adopted only the analytical component and did not utilize the concept of seditious libel.
357. Ha'aretz11, 32(3) P.D. at 346. Indeed, Justice Landau's fears were shared by other
justices on the Court, including Justice Agranat, as Justice Landau pointed out: "In
[Yardor, see text accompanying notes 210-11 supral Justice Agranat cited approvingly from
Justice Witkon's opinion in [Jiryis, see text accompanying notes 208-09 supra] that '[i]n the
history of countries with adequate democratic regimes it oftentimes happened that Fascist
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jection of American law:
These words constitute a warning to all those who are prepared
to be too permissive and disregard defamation of public officials
for fear of violating the absolute principle of free expression. We
have to fear that history will repeat itself. I have before me the
Illinois Supreme Court decision [in Skokie v. NationalSocialist
Party] where the court allowed a Nazi parade, including the
wearing of swastikas in the midst of a Chicago suburb, populated

by Jews. It was so decided because the Justices saw themselves
bound by the First Amendment. We should better reflect on that

phenomenon.

58

Would the result in Ha'aretz have been the same had Skokie never

happened? Probably yes, but maybe this ferventj'accuse would have
been less emotional.
Methodologically, Justice Landau's analysis is questionable. The

claim that free expression brought about Naziism is both oversimplified
and reductionist. Did free expression play a leading role in bringing
about the fall of the Weimar Republic? Without carefully ascertaining

its relative role, and without analyzing the content and context of the
anti-Weimar expression, can the conclusion soundly follow that free
expression should be curbed, lest it bring about totalitarianism?3 59

But there is more here. Admittedly, there is a common denominator between Skokie and Germany-Nazi ideology. Yet the analogy to
the United States and American law is revealing on several levels: Justice Landau's perception of American political reality, his ambivalence
about legal formalism and finally, his emerging political vision.
First, is the reality of American politics in the context of the Skokie episode. "There is reason to fear that history will repeat itself,"
and totalitarian movements rose against them, and used all those rights of free expression,
press and association, that the state gives them, in order to conduct their subversive activity
under their banner. Whoever saw it during the days of the Weimar Republic will not forget
the lesson.'" Id
358. Ha'aretz11, 32(3) P.D. at 347.
359. In his analysis, Justice Landau relied on the observations of his brethren, see note
357 supra, and on an article by David Riesman, Democracy andDefamation: FairGame and
Fair Comment I, 42 COLUM. L. Rnv. 1085 (1942). Riesman discussed criminal group libel
laws and opined that "in Germany libel law was one of the cumulativefactors in the Nazi
triumph." Id at 1090 (emphasis added). Riesman's explanation focuses on the application
of the German libel laws rather than on their substantive content, Ze., it was the identification of the political elite (Ministry of Justice, courts) with fascist culture, rather than the
legal norms, which contributed to the destruction of the Weimar Republic. See also 0.
HALE, THE CA.PrvE PRESS IN THE THIRD REICH 39-67 (1964), in which the author observes
that the Nazi press, the primary tool for spreading Nazi propaganda, was negligible and
insignificant prior to Hitler's rise to power. It was Hitler, as Fithrer, who made it into
a
powerful tooL
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said Justice Landau. 360 But Naziism was not in the ascent in the
United States of 1977. What in the context of Skokie so disturbed Justice Landau? To permit Nazis to roam free in American streets? The
brutal violation of Jewish sensitivities? The pervasive anxiety over
anti-Semitism and its potential translation into final solutions? As significant as these undoubtedly are, how do they justify the protection of
officialdom from criticism? Even the ban on Nazi ideology could not
prevent an anti-Semitic regime. And once the regime is remotely antiSemitic, the Jewish minority will clearly need free expression-necessarily unlimited by official criteria of what is "constructive" speech-in
order to expose the evil.36 '
These difficulties, although obvious, were not worked out by Justice Landau. It seems quite clear that the confusion in his opinion
arises from the tremendous aversion to Naziism, an aversion so powerful in Jewish existence as to generate an impulsive repulsion of anything tolerant of it.
The most astounding feature of this analysis is Justice Landau's
emphasis on orthodox formalism to explain the result in the Skokie
case. According to Justice Landau, American courts were compelled to
reach that result because it was mandated by the First Amendment.
The purpose of this assertion, presumably, is to reemphasize the normative gap between Israeli and American law. Justice Landau's view
of Skokie reflects both the same staunch refusal to concede that First
Amendment law is about substantive interest balancing and an indirect
attack on the American political justifications for free speech. The result in Skokie was reached not because the courts concluded that the
language of the First Amendment was compelling, but because they
concluded, correctly or not, that the underlyingpoliticaljustjfcationwas
compelling.362 By thus twisting the constitutional meaning of Skokie,
Justice Landau was able, one more time, to evade the theory behind the
principle of free expression in democratic society.
And yet, ironically, his analysis contains the seeds of destruction of
the Formal Style. When Justice Landau projected legal formalism into
American law, he did not like what he saw. Between the lines of the
Skokie analysis, one reads a complaint about the failure of American
courts to transcend legal language and to inject into the letter of the law
historical experience, values, and a responsible policy to guide the fu360. Ha'aretzII, 32(3) P.D. at 347.
361. But see J. ELY, supra note 107, at 181-82.
362. See Collin v. Smith, 447 F. Supp. 676, 686-88 (N.D. II1.), aft'd, 578 F.2d 1197, 1203
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 953 (1978). See also A. NEIER, DEFENDING My ENEMY:
AMERICAN.NAZIS, THE SKOKIE CASE, AND THE RisKs OF FREEDOM (1979).
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ture. In other words, courts should consider policy when they interpret
the law. Grand, not Formal, Style is needed to outline the limits on
free speech. The next two paragraphs in Justice Landau's opinion illustrate a measure of awareness of this inner conflict. First, in the only
paragraph in his opinion which acknowledged the importance of free
speech he conceded the role of policy:
Indeed, we should find the right balancing point between this
principle and the protection of the honor of a public official. I do
not want, God forbid, to underestimate the importance of a free
press and its role in criticizing governmental activity. . . . But I
reject the premise that a responsible press cannot perform this
role unless granted the liberty to defame under the guise of "fair
criticism.""
And then the resumption of legal formalism: "We have section 15(4)
. . .which includes a full solution to the issue of the defense of fair
comment. . . this provision. . . should be interpreted first and fore'364
most in light of the regular meaning of the words.
Finally, Justice Landau's analysis, despite its formalistic tenor,
also disclosed a vision of the Israeli polity. Roughly speaking, political
theory posits two models of representative democracy: classical and
elitist. The classical model of democracy places high normative value
on individual participation. The elitist model delegates a minimal role
to the concept of participation; the people should elect their government and elections ought to be periodic, but substantive policymaking
is the business of the political elite. 36 5 Historically, the elitist model
was greatly influenced by "[t]he collapse of the Weimar Republic, with
its high rates of mass participation, into fascism, and the postwar estab3 6 6 Conlishment of totalitarian regimes based on mass participation.
sequently, the elitist model places a high value on governmental
ordistability and authority and admits little faith in the ability of the
367
nary citizen to contribute actively to political decisionmaking.
363. Ha'aretz II, 32(3) P.D. at 347.
364. Id.
365. See generally J. LIVELY, DEMOCRACY 53-87 (1975); C. PATEMAN, PARTICIPATON
AND DEMOCRATIC THEORY 1-44 (1970).
366. C. PATEMAN, supra note 365, at 2.

367. "The basic assumption is that most men are incapable of understanding the complexity of governmental decisions, of adhering with any steadiness to liberal humane values,
or even of sustaining with any enthusiasm democratic procedures. Fear of the people and in
consequence a desire to restrict their entry into the political process has replaced the old
liberal faith in the innate virtue of the common man." J. LIVELY, supra note 365, at 78.
Whether or not Israeli political culture generally, and its legal system particularly, corresponds to the elitist model merits another paper. At least one Israeli scholar has argued that
it does. J. SHAPIRA, supra note 1,at 34-46.
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Justice Landau's analysis reflects this elitist model. It stems from

the same historical experience, the fall of the Weimar Republic. 368 It
emphasizes the value of authority by asserting the importance of safeguarding the "honor of the attacked official." 369 Implicitly, Landau's
analysis emphasizes stability by expressing the fear that "unchecked"
criticism will bring about the collapse of "good" government. 370 It is
elitist when it argues that broadening the common law defense of fair

comment will "tend to deter sensitive andhonorable men from seeking
public positions of trust and responsibility and leave them open to
'
Finally, it slights the
others who have no respectfortheir reputation. 371

ordinary reader:
[T]he ordinary newspaper reader does not carefully analyze what
is presented to him, but the eneral impression is decisive, and
this impression is very much influenced by the textual structure:
if a certain impression is formed in the beginning of the text, it
will not be easily erased by other things which appear later. At
that in this article fact and opinion were
least
observe
mixedwein may
a way
that the reader cannot separate them ...
.372

Along the continuum of participatory/elitist democracy, it seems
that American free speech law, at least as it emerges from the rhetoric

of the United States Supreme Court and from legal scholarship, gravitates toward the classical model.3 73 The rejection of American law, by

Justice Landau and the three concurring justices, reflects not only legal
formalism, a different positivist normative structure and a measure of
unfamiliarity on the technical level, but it goes deeper, into a different

conception of democracy. While the principle of free expression is
clearly recognized in both systems, in post-Ha aretz Israel its breathing
368. For Justice Landau, the experience is also inextricably tied to the terrifying trauma
of the Holocaust.
369. Ha'aretzII, 32(3) P.D. at 347.
370. Id at 346. Ironically, a law which criminalized "unconstructive" criticism of public
officials was passed by the Nazis as soon as they usurped political power. Kommers, The
Spiegel Affair, in POLITICAL TRIALS 15 (1971).
371. Halaretz II, 32(3) P.D. at 345-46 (emphasis added) (citing with approval G.
GATELY, ON LIBEL AND SLANDER 223 (7th ed. 1974)).
372. Ha'aretz I, 32(3) P.D. at 354. The elitist model of democracy also explains a seeming inconsistency between Justice Landau's opinion in Halaretz and his authorship of the
first decision in Israeli history which declared a statute void. In Bergman v. Minister of
Finance, 23(1) P.D. 693 (1969), the Court invalidated a statute which would allow campaign
financing only to incumbent parties. The Court reasoned, inter alia, that the statute would
impair the right of voters to elect new parties. Participation during elections was significant
enough to merit the unprecedented step of nullifying a statute.
373. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357
(1927); J. ELY, supra note 107, at 105-66; T. EMERSON, supra note 196; A. MEIKLEJOHN,
POLITICAL FREEDOM (1965); L. TRIBE, supra note 165, at 578-79. But see Blasi, supra note
242, at 561-64.
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space is considerably narrower than it is in the United States, at least
partially due to a different understanding of the meaning of democracy.
Conclusion
American free speech jurisprudence has been a powerful catalyst
in forming Israeli free speech law. Whether embraced or rejected,
American law provides an irresistible challenge to Israel's Supreme
Court. The Court's decisions
after the Ha'aretz case prove that Ameri374
can legal influence persists.

Transplantation of American law, however, has been less than successful. The transplantor's solid knowledge of the donor system, sensitivity to the need of organic integration of foreign law into the recipient
system and mastery of judicial decisionmaking techniques, may help in
building resistance to rejection, but they are not enough. It is one thing
to compress the jurisprudence of the First Amendment into one Israeli
decision and weave it into the local system so that it gains a potential to
become an organic part of it. It is another thing to persuade other
judges to follow the same route. Judicial philosophies-legal formalism or sociological jurisprudence-are decisive determinants. Political
visions, as molded by the particular history of the recipient, inevitably
affect the choice of the transplantor.
In the thirty-third year of its life, Israeli free speech law is still
struggling for self-identity. This article is not intended to advocate any
particular solution to the problem faced by the Israeli court. Rather, it
is an attempt to identify and to clarify the nature of the forces at work
in building constitutional law for a new democracy.

374. E.g., Katalan v. Prison Authority, 34(3) P.D. 294 (1980) (Barak, J.); Bourkan v.
Minister of Finance, 32(2) P.D. 800, 803 (1978).

